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History
(307 pp.)

/i

Following the American Revolution, thousands of pioneers crossed
the Appalachian mountains and settled in the trans-montane West.
Because of the problems and needs created by this great migration,
the American Confederation Congress from 1783 through 1787 had to
compose a policy for the trans-Appalachian West. The purpose of
this thesis is to survey and discuss the formulation of the land
and Indian policies, diplomacy and territorial government ordinances
that resulted in the first American western policy. The information
contained in the following essays has been drawn from numerous
secondary works on the subject, the personal correspondence of
individuals who created western policy, the Letters of the Members
of the Continental Congress, and the Journals of the Continental Congress.
The debate over western policy fit into the sectional division of
Confederation political factions. Eastern Nationalists (Northeasterners who favored strengthening the federal government) were wary
of westward expansion, and feared that new western states would
lessen their political and economic supremacy. They favored limited
migration, a humanitarian Indian policy, revenue-oriented land policy,
temporary surrender of American navigation of the Mississippi River,
and a colonial form of territorial government. The Southerners were
more optimistic about westward expansion, and opposed this Eastern
Nationalist view. The South expected political and economic benefits
from new western states and therefore favored extensive westward mi
gration, an expansionist Indian policy, liberal land sales provisions,
navigation of the Mississippi River, and a democratic form of terri
torial government. From 1783-1784 the South held the upper hand,
but with the rise of Nationalism (i.e., the movement to replace the
Articles of Confederation with the Federal Constitution) and Southern
adoption of the Nationalist program. Congress enacted the Eastern
Nationalist western policy. The Land Ordinance of 1785, Indian Ordi
nance of 1786, Jay-Gardoqui Negotiations of 1785-87, and the North
west Ordinance of 1787 are all essentially Eastern Nationalist legis
lation for the West. The rise of Nationalism and adoption of the
Constitution were paralleled by adoption of the Eastern Nationalist
western policy.
But in the long run, the Eastern Nationalist western policy was a
failure. It did not conform to the realities of the frontier, or the
desires of the Westerners. As the nation moved west during the nine
teenth century, the Eastern Nationalist western policy was defeated,
as were the men who had created it.
n
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The old myth that the Confederation Congress was an
impotent body that did nothing but squabble, and that the
Confederation era was one of chaos and anarchy resolved by
the Constitutional Convention, has been effectively chal
lenged by several historians.

Merrill Jensen issued the

first rebuttal of this "Critical Period" school of Confed
eration history in the 1930s and *40s.^

More recently

Herbert James Henderson has argued that "to construe the
history of the Continental Congress as a kind of confused
journey toward the Convention of 1787 is anachronistic.
In actuality,

. ,

the Continental Congress was primarily a

revolutionary legislature, and in this context its record
2
was strikingly successful."
Indeed, the Confederation
3
Congress's
list of successes is quite impressive.
It

Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation (Madison,
1940); The New Nation. A History of the United States During
the Confederation. 1781-1789 (New York, 1950).
For the
"Critical Period" thesis, see John Fiske, The Critical
Period of American History, 1783-1789 (Boston, 1902), and
Jensen, New N a t i o n , xii, xiii.
2

Henderson, Party Politics, p. 1.

^The American Congress of 1776 to 1787 is usually called
the "Continental Congress" up until about 1783, and the "Con
federation Congress" thereafter--although both terms are often

declared American independence, administered the Revolu
tionary War and Continental Army, framed the alliance with
France, and, after winning the war, negotiated the Treaty
of Paris of 1783.

The list of domestic achievements follow

ing the war is also impressive, and is of fundamental impor
tance in the following essays.

For one of the greatest

achievements of the Confederation Congress was the creation
of the first American western policy.^
Organization of the West was a major preoccupation of
Congress during the 1780s.

As the Confederation Congress

attempted to devise a land policy,

regulate Indian affairs,

engage in diplomatic negotiations over the West, and insti
tute territorial government in the trans-Appalachian region,
disagreements and differences of opinion arose.

These dif

ferences led to the formation of rudimentary political fac
tions which held opposing attitudes towards development of
the West.

Although there are exceptions, the following gen

eralizations are applicable to Congressional factionalism
over the West in the 1780s.

The opposing sides of western

questions usually coalesced regionally, with the Easterners
opposing Southerners.

At the same time, this sectional

division contained ideological implications.

Most of the

Easterners who took a stand on the West were Nationalists
interchanged.
Since these essays are confined to the 1783-87
period, "Confederation Congress" will be used.
^Henderson, Party Politics, pp.

1-2.

or centralists, while their Southern opposition attracted
some Southern Nationalists and enjoyed the support of many
Antifederalists in Congress.^
During the 1783-84 period the Southern coalition held
the upper hand.

This development coincided with an overall

decline in Nationalist strength in Congress.

Thomas Jeffer

son of Virginia, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, and Anti
federalist David Howell of Rhode Island joined with others,
mostly Southern, to formulate a national western policy.
These men looked with hope to the West, and shared what
Henderson has termed "optimistic expectations of western
innocence and regeneration."

Moreover, they anticipated

political and economic benefits to accompany admission of
new western states.

Southerners looked forward to economic

and political allies in the trans-Appalachian frontier, and
Antifederalists like Howell believed western congressmen
The terms "Easterner," "Southerner," "Nationalist,"
and "Antifederalist" will be discussed throughout these
essays.
For the "Eastern-Southern" dichotomy in the Confed
eration Congress, see Henderson, Party Politics and footnote
#7 below.
"Easterner" is used here instead of "Northerners"
because it is the term used by most in the 1780s.
The "Na
tionalists" of the 1780s are defined in Jensen, New Nation,
xiii, xiv, 425.
"Nationalists" were those who favored increasing the power of the central government at the expense
of the states.
The Nationalists wanted to replace the
Articles of Confederation and, in 1787, pushed for ratifica
tion of the Constitution.
The terms "centralist" and "Fed
eralist" are modern-day synonyms for "Nationalist."
"Anti
federalists" is used in these essays to describe those states’
righters who opposed a strong national government.
Actually
these men referred to themselves as "Federalists."
See
Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists, Critics of the
Constitution (New York^ T5blj, v i i , x i i . But to avoid con
fusion , I will use the term which has been given to them by
o t he rs .

would help thwart the centralist tenets of the Nationalists.
After the creation of the National Domain, the Southerners
drafted the Land Ordinance of 1784, and secured passage of
J ef ferson’s territorial government Ordinance of 1784.
by the Spring of 1784,

Thus

it appeared as though the Southern

coalition had successfully laid the foundations for Ameri
can western policy.

But their ascendency did not last for

long.
As the centralist impulse increased in the 1780s, a new
group of men became the architects of American western
policy.

Men such as Rufus King, Nathan Dane, Gouveneur

Morris, Arthur St. Clair, George Washington, Edward Carring
ton, Henry Knox, James Duane, John Jay, William Samuel Jo h n 
son, and Timothy Pickering were all instrumental in the
creation of the first American western policy.

While not

solely responsible, these men held the key committee member
ships and chairmanships, advisory positions, and Confedera
tion cabinet posts instrumental in formulating policy for
the trans-Appalachian frontier.
characteristics.

These men share common

With the exception of Washington and

Carrington,^ they were all Northeasterners--residing in the
Middle and New England states.

They all belonged to what

^Washington and Carrington were both Virginia Nationalists,
and shared much in common with their political allies to the
North.
Washington’s attitudes towards the West provide a
classic example of a Southerner who advocated the Colonial
"New England" mode of expansion in the 1780s.
See Chapter 5
below.
It is no coincidence that the Federalist Party of the
17 90s, a political movement with a New England nucleus, had
a Southerner, George Washington, as its leader.

Henderson calls the "Eastern" party of Confederation poli7
tics.
Ideologically, they were all conservatives and
Nationalists--they advocated order and stability through a
O
strong, centralized National government.
Every one of
these men favored the Federal Constitution in 1787, and
each of them went on to become prominent members of the
Federalist Party.

In the following essays I will refer to

them as Northerners, Easterners, Northeasterners, New E n g 
landers, and Nationalists--but perhaps the most appropriate
term comes from combining the findings of Henderson and
Jensen:

these men were Eastern Nationalists.^

7
Henderson, Party Po litics, pp. 5-6: "What will be r e 
ferred to as the 'Eastern bloc* or 'party* can be discerned
in voting patterns during the entire history of Congress. . ,
Predictably, congressional parties were primarily regional
. . . Between 1784 and 1787 intersectional alliances were
less structured at first and then became increasingly
polarized along a North-South fault that had been implicit
in the partisan politics of Congress from the outset of the
Revolution."
O
For the "Nationalists," see footnote #5 above, and
Jensen, New N a t i o n , xiii-iv, 425.
^I have identified these Eastern Nationalists in C on
gressional roll-call votes by referring to the extensive
charts and graphs in Henderson, Party Politics.
Perhaps the
most valuable source was Appendix il, "Federalist Leaders,
1800-1816" in David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of Ameri
can Conservatism, The Federal Party in the Era of Jefferson
ian Democracy (_New York, 1965} , p p . 227-412".
Fischer 's
appendix contains short biographies of approximately 240
Federalists, including much valuable information concerning
their status in the 1780s, and their stand on the Federal
Constitution of 17 87.
Other sources used in identifying
Nationalists are Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American
Republic (Chapel Hill, 1969) and Jensen, New N at io n.

The Eastern Nationalists shared common attitudes towards
the West and westward expansion.

In the wake of the failure

of fiscal centralism (Robert M o r r i s ’ impost proposal in 1781),
most Nationalists looked to the West as a viable means of
national consolidation.

They hoped National supervision of

the West would bring prestige, revenue, and power to the cen
tral government.

But if these motivations made most Eastern

Nationalists expansionists, they were at the same time very
reluctant expansionists.

Indeed, the Eastern Nationalists

were not nearly as optimistic about westward migration as
their Southern opponents.

Most Easterners distrusted the

"lawless Banditti" of the West and feared new western states
would inevitably decrease the economic and political power of
the Northeast.

Some Easterners were avowed constrictionists,

and opposed all expansion.
view.

Yet most took a more pragmatic

They considered westward migration to be inevitable,

and planned a carefully controlled and regulated expansion
that would enhance the power and prestige of the central
government.

The Eastern Nationalists proposed a corporate

mode of expansion quite similar to the "New England" system
of colonial settlement.

The Easterners advocated a slow,

well-organized westward advance closely supervised by the
national government.

As the Massachusetts delegates wrote

Governor Hancock:
It has been a question, with the Eastern D ele
gates especially, whether peopling those new
regions with emigrants from the old States,
may not, in one point of view, be a disadvantage

to them.
But it has been found, that these
new lands are very inviting to settlers, and
that, if not regularly disposed of and gov
erned by the Union, they will in a very few
years, probably be seised upon and settled
in an irregular manner, and perhaps at no less
expence to Inhabitants of the old States.
Con
sidering these circumstances, the advantages
of regular settlements, of lessening, the p ub
lic debt and military expences on the frontier,
and of keeping, by such settlements, that
Country more effectually connected with the
Union, Congress have been induced to adopt
measures to establish Government, etc.,
there. . .

For the role of the West in Nationalist strategy, see
Henderson, Party P ol itics, p. 377:
"There were two avenues
toward National consolidation during the mid-eighties.
One
was the regulation of commerce and the other was the regula
tion of the West."
For Eastern antipathy towards the West,
see ibid., p. 409:
The new attitudes toward western govern
ment were "the afterthought of the optimistic expectations
of western innocence and regeneration of the Republic earlier
articulated by Jefferson and Howell.
Consequently, there
developed a movement in Congress to subdue the western threat
by tightening congressional control over the Northwest and
by reducing the number of possible states and making their
admission more difficult."
". . . Not all members of Con
gress during the succeeding years subscribed to such liberal
management of the turbulent west (as the Ordinance of 1784)
however.
In addition to the constrictionist tendencies of
members representing the Atlantic seaboard, manifested in
both the Northern stance during the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations
and the Potomac-Chesapeake geo-politics of Virginians such as
Henry Lee, there was a pervasive fear in the seaboard states
that migrants to the West were at best castoffs and at worst
disloyal people from the East.
That the frontier should have
been a scene of violence, litigation, and rumored sedition
confirmed more than created the fears of the East.
It was
only natural that New Englanders were the most alarmed about
the West and least sympathetic with the plight of its "law
less Banditti which forms the Law of those Settlements. . . .*
Also, ibid., p. 369: "Some Congressmen, particularly New
Englanders, strongly favored the development of compact
settlements in order to create communities that could be
given stability and coherence through early establishment of
schools and churches.
This view, especially when reinforced
by provisions reserving land in each township for the support
of education and religion, was opposed by libertarians who

8
Throughout the 1784-87 period the Eastern Nationalists
worked to implement their western program.

They advocated

a humanitarian Indian policy, and a revenue-oriented land
sales program.

They tried to appease Spain with offers to

surrender American navigation of the Mississippi for twenty
to twenty-five years, and they proposed to institute a
strong colonial territorial government in the transAppalachian West.

Nearly all of their efforts were opposed

by Howell, and a Southern coalition led by Jefferson, James
Monroe, William Grayson, Hugh Williamson, and Charles
Pinckney.As

time passed, the opposition decreased for

objected to such corporate arrangements.
The advocates of
rapid expansion for revenue often joined forces for different
reasons.
Libertarians who favored a minimum of restraint
might find common cause with speculators who wanted a free
hand to exploit the land."
^^One cannot state that the opposition to the North
easterners was overwhelmingly Antifederalist, but note that
half the opponents of the Eastern mode of expansion were
also Antifederalist leaders, i.e., Howell, Grayson, and
Monroe.
While the Antifederalist and "States' rights" posi
tion seems conducive to a less restrained mode of westward
migration, there is no consistent Antifederalist position on
the subject.
One problem is that the Antifederalists were
much more concerned with thwarting the Nationalist movement
in Congress than with the West.
At the same time some Ant i
federalist leaders, such as Elbridge Gerry and Richard Henry
Lee, thoroughly supported the Nationalist western policy.
Problems arise when one tries to find a consistent Libertarian
strain among Antifederalists, especially the leaders.
As
Staughton Lynd and Jackson Turner Main have pointed out, the
background and motivations of Antifederalist leaders were
often far different from those of their following among the
general populace.
See Jackson Turner Main, The Antifed
eralists Critics of the Constitution, pp. x-xi.

several reasons.

Most Southerners, especially the Virgin

ians, were so anxious to see new western states enter the
Union that they were willing to compromise over western
policy to secure that end.

They bargained in the belief

that any expansion was better than none.

The classic exam-

pie of this Southern "geo-political" strategy

12

was when,

in 178 5, the Southerners accepted a modified "New England"
mode of land sales in the Land Ordinance of 1785.
agreement did not last for long.

But this

The Jay-Gardoqui negotia

tions of 1786 again split Congress right down the middle
over the western question.

In the final analysis, it was

the rise of Southern Nationalism, particularly in Virginia,
that won acceptance of the Eastern Nationalist western
policy.

The controversy over the West was settled in the

"Compromise of 1787"

13

between Eastern and Southern Nation

alists meeting concurrently in the Constitutional Convention
and the Confederation Congress.

Thus the victory of the

Eastern Nationalist western policy is a window through which
one can view the overall Nationalist victory in 1787.

It is

no coincidence that the Federal Constitution and the North
west Ordinance were both drafted in the summer of 1787.
was directly related to the other.

One

Indeed, the whole western

question was a catalyst for the rise of Nationalism.
12

For the Southern "geo-political strategy" see Hender
son, Party Po litics, p. 415.
^^For the "Compromise of 1787," see Chapter

7, below.

10
Before proceeding, something must be said of the use
of the term ’’conservative" in the following essays.

A

premise of these essays is that the Nationalists, and more
particularly the Eastern Nationalists, were the "conserva
tives" of the Confederation era.

Many will disagree with

this analysis, but such disagreements are nothing new.
The leaders of America in the 1780s themselves could not
agree as to who was "conservative" and who was "radical,"
"liberal," or "Revolutionary."

Both Antifederalists and

Nationalists claimed to be the sole heirs of the American
radical Revolutionary ideology.

The

’p r o pe r’ designation

depended upon how one interpreted that Revolutionary
ideology--a most debatable subject, to be sure.

Thus, it

is only natural that disagreements continue today, espe
cially among historians.

The interpretation of Antifed

eralist and Nationalist ideology as either radical or con
servative is purely subjective.
As stated,

the West is a good window through which one

Jensen and Main, for example, contend that the N a 
tionalists were "conservatives" because they tried to tem
per the liberal-democratic aspects of Revolutionary
ideology.
In promoting the Constitution, they sought
order, stability, and security--the age-old goals of all
conservatives.
Jensen's view is questioned by Gordon S.
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787,
who considers the "Federalists" as the true radicals of
the 1780s.
For the dispute today over the nature of Con
federation politics in the 1780s, see Richard B. Morris,
"The Confederation Period and the American Historian," The
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series (1956):139-56.

11
can view the Eastern Nationalist social and political philos
ophy.

The Northeasterners feared the West.

They disliked

the lowly sort of people who were settling the transAppalachian frontier and feared grave political reversals
should they be granted the vote.

They believed westward

migration would somehow upset their section’s economic
supremacy.

To salve their fears, the Eastern Nationalists

sought to slow settlement and delay western growth through
a tightly controlled, forceful national western policy.
Perhaps

’control’ is a key word here.

The conservatives'

answer to the western problem, as with so many other prob 
lems, was control:

centralization of authority in a power

ful national government.

The conservatives who wrote the

Federal Constitution believed the ends of society could
best be achieved by a government that exercised greater c on
trol over m e n ’s lives.

The unpopularity of Eastern Nation

alist beliefs became increasingly obvious, and led to the
extinction of the Federalist party.

The decline of the

Federalists was paralleled by a repudiation of the Eastern
Nationalist western policy.

The centralist impulse, of

course, did not die with the Federalists.

It has been r e 

fined over the past two centuries and enjoys more support
today than ever before.

Indeed, the centralist impulse is

part and parcel of the American political tradition.

It

is debatable, however, whether the centralist impulse is at
all related to the radical political tradition of the Ameri
can Revolution.

CHAPTER I I
BEYOND THE ENDLESS MOUNTAINS
Cheer up, brother, as we go
O ’er the mountains, westward ho
Where herds of deer and buffalo
Furnish the fare
Then o'er the hills in legions boys
Fair freedom’s star
Points to the sunset region, boys
Ha, ha, ha-ha!
When w e ’ve wood and prairie land
Won by our toil
W e ’ll reign like Kings in fairy-land
Lords of the soill^
The Scotch-Irish pioneers of western Pennsylvania and
Virginia called the Allegheny Mountains and the northern
Appalachians the "Endless Mountains."

If there was an end

to these mountain ranges, very few white men in the m i d 
eighteenth century had seen it, or knew what lay beyond.
The unknown land was rich and green.

Much of the "Old North

west" was shaded by oaks and a variety of deciduous trees,
while near the Great Lakes there lay a great pine wilderness.
Throughout all of this country was interwoven open spaces of
deep black soil and rich prairie land.

Farther south lay

Quoted in John D. Barnhart, Valley of Democracy, The
Frontier Versus the Plantation in the Ohio Valley. 17751818 (Bloomington, 1953), p. 34.

12

13
Kentucky, Tennessee, and the frontier of the trans-Appalachian
Southwest.

Kentucky was a lush, rolling country covered by

forest and meadows, with cane ten to twelve feet high and
buffalo grass and clover.

Wildlife was plentiful.

There

were flocks of turkeys, partridges, and pheasants; squirrels,
raccoons, opossums, deer, bears, elk, and, until the 1790s,
herds of buffalo.

Through the heart of the trans-Appalachian

West flowed the "Beautiful River," the Ohio, stretching for
over a thousand miles until it entered the great Mississippi.
Indian tribes inhabited the banks of the Ohio or settled in
the forests and valleys of the West.

In the North were tribes

that spoke the Algonquin tongue--the Wyandots, Delaware,
Chippewa, and Shawnee nations of the Ohio Valley.

The Chero

kee, Choctaw, Creek, and Crow tribes built their unique so
cieties in the Old Southwest.

For hundreds of years, the

Indians, northern and southern, had the trans-Appalachian
West all to themselves.
relative solitude.
change.

They fished, hunted, and roamed in

But the middle eighteenth century brought

White men from the Eastern seaboard began to pene-

trate beyond the "Endless Mountains."

2

The first white men to see the Mississippi Valley were
early French and Spanish explorers--DeSoto, Marquette, and
LaSalle.
2

The French and Spanish each built several outposts

Frederick
tory (New York,
The Frontier in
1970) , pp. 2-3,

Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American H i s 1920), pp. 130, 160-62 ; Reginald Horsman,
the Formative Years, 1783-1815 (New York,
6.

14
in the Valley in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
but their preoccupations were trapping and trading, and
the Indians were not greatly affected by their presence.
The British entrance, however, radically changed the history
of the trans-Appalachian West.

By mid-century, and espe

cially after the French and Indian War, stories had begun to
circulate in the thirteen American colonies about the rich
lands beyond the mountains.

Men like George Washington b e 

came involved in land speculation schemes, and the Vandalia,
Illinois,

Indiana, and Wabash land companies were founded in

the 1760s and 1770s.
the land companies.

Daniel Boone himself was a scout for
By the late sixties and seventies, a

steady stream of actual settlers was crossing the Appalachians
and settling in the Bluegrass region of Kentucky.

The Brit

ish colonial administrators in America were appalled.
settlements were illegal

The new

(since all of the pioneers were

squatters) and they contradicted the claims of the various
land companies.

Much worse, they antagonized the western

Indian tribes, whose friendship the British were cultivating.
Thus the British western policy, starting with the Proclama
tion of 1763

(which forbade settlement beyond the Appalachians),

was avowedly constrictionist.
cared less.

The settlers could not have

As Lord Dunmore, the Royal Governor of Virginia,

observed in 1774, British efforts to halt expansion were,
insufficient to restrain the Americans; and
that they do and will remove as their avidity
and restlessness incite them.
They . . . for
ever imagine the Lands further off are still
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better than those upon which they are already
Settled . . . proclamations have been published
from time to time to restrain them:
But . . .
they do not conceive that Government has
any
right to forbid their taking possession of a
vast tract of country.
Americans continued to migrate,
As I.

the British notwithstanding.

R. Christie has shown, American opposition to British

western policy was one of the several

grievances that led to
3
the Declaration of Independence in 1776.
Settlement slowed during the Revolutionary War and then

resumed, with increased vigor, following the Treaty of Paris
of 1783.

This was the beginning of what became the "Great

Migration" of the early nineteenth century.

Who were the

settlers who intended to tame the Appalachian wilderness?
During these early years they were,

for the most part, men

and women of the upland South--North Carolina, Virginia, and
southwestern Pennsylvania.

Many were English, Scotch-Irish,

and German immigrants who had settled the frontiers of the
original colonies.
progression.

To journey farther west seemed a natural

They migrated for a number of reasons, most of

which boil down to dissatisfaction with their lives on the
seaboard.

Some left for religious reasons, or to escape the

law, taxes, and creditors.

All of them were restless, bored,

and wanted to improve their station in life.

They wanted

good land, and the rights and privileges that came with it.
For the West from 1763 to 1776, see Francis S. Philbrick, The Rise of the West, 1754-1850 (New York, 1965),
pp. 1-52; Lord Dunmore in ibid., p. 353; and I. R. Christie,
Crisis of Empire: Great Britain and the American Colonies.
1754-1783 (New York, 1966.
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And there was plenty of land in the West.^
There were several routes over the Appalachian M oun
tains.

Many of the Scotch-Irish moved south, down the

"Great Valley" of the Appalachians.

They either settled

in western Virginia or North Carolina, or moved overland
into Kentucky and Tennessee.

The Wilderness Road, blazed

by Daniel Boone in 1775, led into Kentucky.

Settlers

would start in North Carolina, travel the Holston River
through the Powell Valley and on to the Cumberland Gap.
From there the Wilderness Trail led them to the Bluegrass
country.

On this road it was "hardly possible for a carriage

to pass," according to one traveler.

And another described

it as the "longest, blackest, hardest road" in America.

One

other southern route, this one leading to Tennessee, appeared
with the opening of the Natchez Trace in 1788.

But for most

of the travelers, the goal was the Ohio--or some other navi
gable river to take them West.

Virginians went up the

Potomac and took the Cumberland Road across southwest Penn
sylvania.

Once at Pittsburgh they could journey down the

Ohio to Kentucky.

The most popular route of all was Forbes

Road--the old French and Indian War military road that
went from Philadelphia, over the Alleghenies, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.

From there one could take the Ohio River to

Turner, Frontier in American History, p. 164; Philbrick, Rise of the W e s t , pp. 98, 319; Horsman, Formative
Y e a r s . p. 21.
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’Philbrick,
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and provisions, and a swarm of young children," heading over
the mountain passes.

Whatever the route or means of over

land transportation, most were headed for the Ohio, and once
they reached it the mode of passage changed to one of any
number of river craft.
outs," and batteaus

Birchbark canoes, pirogues or "dug-

(an extra-large and sturdy canoe) were

common, but the most popular river craft by far were arks,
keelboats, and "flatboats."

A flatboat was a large, bulky

floating box made out of rough wood.

The flatboats had

enough space for a living quarters, small kitchen, and stor
age room for household goods and even livestock.

They cost

from fifty to a hundred dollars to build and could be torn
apart for use at journey's end.

May through September was

"flatboat season" on the Ohio, and in good weather the trip
from Pittsburgh to Louisville, Kentucky took seven to ten
d a y s .^
Most settlement during the 1780s was south of the Ohio-in Kentucky, that "new and beautiful country of canes and
turkeys."

Settlement via the Ohio River and the Wilderness

Road resulted in a total population of around twenty to
thirty-five thousand in 1785.

Harrodsburgh and Boonesborough,

both founded in 177 5, were joined in the 178 0s by a number of
new towns, including Louisville and Lexington.

To the south.

Ibid., pp. 306-14.
Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of
the West (New York, 1962), p. 145.
Roosevelt’s history is
perhaps one of the most readable as well as reliable his
tories of the trans-Appalachian West.
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the Tennessee country experienced considerable growth in the
eastern river valleys and on the Cumberland River, near
Nashville.

Wautauga, founded by James Robertson in the late

1760s, was joined in 1783 by the self-proclaimed "state" of
Franklin.

Land speculations by Robertson, William Blount,

John Sevier, and other North Carolineans spurred settlement
of that region.

Georgia boasted a population of 75,000,

but expansion into Alabama was slowed by the strong Spanish
presence, as well as Indian opposition.

The country was f er

tile, however, and Americans had already probed as far as
7
Natchez, Mississippi.
All of this southern settlement is often contrasted with
the relatively slow advance in the "Old Northwest" during the
1780s.

Confederation western policy and strong Indian resis

tance both served to limit settlement north of the Ohio.
even there the white presence grew.

Yet

The British occupied

their northwest posts, and French settlements in the region
included Detroit, Prarie DuChien, Kaskaskia, and Vincennes.
American trappers and traders frequented the region (as had
American militiamen during the Revolution), and the Ohio
River traffic bordered the Old Northwest.

Moreover, squatters

were daily crossing the Ohio, avoiding federal troops, settl
ing on lands, and fighting the Indians.
were poised and ready to join them.
7

And thousands more

Thus,

the

entire trans-

Horsman, Formative Y e a r s , pp. 2-3, 9; Philbrick, Rise
of the W e s t , pp. 80-91, 316; Roosevelt, Winning of the W e s t ,
p. 144.
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Appalachian West was alive with activity in the 1780s.

It

seemed to many "as if the old states would depopulate, and
the inhabitants be transplanted in the new."

Some indication

of the extent of the migration is the amount of river traffic.
Between 1786 and 1788,

some 16,000 settlers in over 800 boats

passed Pittsburgh on their way south.

The monthly average of

people migrating rose from 384 in March of 1787 to 1,053 in
June of 1788.

The 1790 national census showed 73,000 inhabi

tants in Kentucky and 35,000 in Tennessee.

To the north,

western Pennsylvania numbered 52,000 and the Old Northwest
contained 5,000 with the number climbing daily.

Indeed,

some 250,000 Americans had made new homes west of the Appala
chian watershed in the 1780s.

As Morris Birbeck observed.

Old America seems to be breaking up, and m o v 
ing westward.
We are seldom out of sight,
as we travel on this grand track towards the
Ohio, of family groups, behind and before
us. . . . Add to these the numerous stages
loaded to the utmost, and the innumerable
travelers on horseback, on foot, and in
light wagons, and you have before you a
scene of bustle and business extending over
„
three hundred miles, which is truly wonderful.
Meanwhile on the eastern seaboard, the Confederation Con
gress watched these developments with interest and concern.
Nearly everyone agreed that the national government would have
to play some kind of role in regulating this great westward
O

Horsman, Formative Y e a r s , pp. 5, 30-37;
Barnhart,
Valiev of Democracy, pp. 38, 40, 44;
Philbrick, Rise of the
W e s t . pp. 81, 90-91;
Morris Birbeck in ibid., p. 310.
Bir
beck* s observations were recorded in the early nineteenth
century while traveling from Philadelphia over Braddock’s Road,
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surge.

Congress would have to create a public domain, devise

a method for surveying and selling public lands, formulate an
Indian policy, and engage in diplomatic negotiations with the
Spanish in the Old Southwest.

Most important. Congress would

have to devise some form of territorial government so as to
establish the rule of law in the trans-Appalachian West.
Nearly everyone in Congress agreed these measures were neces
sary, but agreement ended there.

Great differences of opinion

over western policy divided the members of the Confederation
Congress.

Many had opposing ideas as to what form the we s t 

ward movement ought to take.

These differences of opinion

and ideas were frequently debated during the period from
1783 to 1787, when the Confederation Congress created the
first American western policy.

CHAPTER I I I
CREATION OF THE NATIONAL DOMAIN:

THE VIRGINIA

CESSION AND THE ORDINANCE OF 1784
There are at present many great objects before
Congress; but none of more importance, or
which engage my attention more than that of
the Western country. . . . The Western world
opens an amazing prospect as a national fund,
in my opinion; it is equal to our debt.
As a
source of future population and strength, it
is a guarantee to our independence.
As its
inhabitants will be mostly cultivators of the
soil, republicanism looks to them as its
guardian.
-,
David Howell of Rhode Island, 1784
The heavy westward migration following the Revolution
created many new problems for the Confederation Congress.
But Congress could not act until it gained legal jurisdic
tion over the trans-montane West--Congress needed legal
title to a truly National Domain.

The major roadblock to

creation of the National Domain was opposition from some of
the thirteen states.
which was Virginia,
Appalachian IVest.

Several states, the most important of
laid claim to portions of the trans-

They claimed jurisdiction over those

areas, and refused to cede them until Congress met certain
conditions.

Thus the issue

of the state land cessions and

^David Howell to ?, in Edmund Cody Burnett, e d ., Letters
of the Members of the Continental Congress (Washington, D.C.,
1936), VII:451.
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creation of the National Domain is a natural starting point
in an investigation of American western policy.

Congress

could not sell lands, negotiate with the Indians and Spanish,
or establish territorial governments in the West until the
National Domain came into being.
This chapter will focus on two important events in the
creation of the National Domain and western policy:

The

Virginia land cession and the territorial government Ordi
nance of 1784.

Congress discussed these two matters during

the early 1780s and engaged in partisan debate.

"Landed"

states Opposed "landless" states and agricultural interests
opposed land speculators.

Politically, the debate in Con

gress was between a Southern-Antifederalist coalition and
Eastern Nationalists and Maryland land speculators.

Men

like Thomas Jefferson and David Howell believed the National
Domain should exclude land speculators, and that territorial
government should be democratic.

Eastern Nationalists and

their allies wanted a policy favorable to land speculators
and a strong, federally controlled territorial government.
This basic division is indicative of a South vs. East regional
split over western policy that continued throughout the 1780s
and the early national period.
1784 was an ebb year for the Eastern Nationalists.
Failure of Morris*
party in disarray.

impost and fiscal centralism left their
The weakness of the Nationalists was

furthered by the western question and land cession debates.
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which split the party into Northeastern and Southern £actions.

2

Thus, when Thomas Jefferson came to serve in Con

gress in 1784, that body was quite receptive to his liberal
program for westward expansion.

The decline of Nationalist

strength and the influence of Jefferson combined to d i s 
courage land speculators and secure passage of the Virginia
land cession in 1784.

Moreover, Jefferson, Howell, and

others were able to draft a remarkably democratic form of
territorial government for the trans-Appalachian West--the
Ordinance of 1784.

[P]owerful confederated Land Jobbers . . .
have long had in contemplation immense
possessions in this ceded country, under
pretence of Indian purchases, and other
plausible, but not solid titles . . . . The
modes and methods,
which these artists
pursue, are well understood. . . . They p r e 
tend great friendship and concern for the
Independency, the Union, and Confederation
of America, but by circuitous means, attack
and destroy those things, that are indis
pensable to those ends. . . . Now when
Virginia, has yielded half, and more than
half of her Charter claim, the argument
will be applied to the terms as improper.
3
Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams, 1784
The state land cessions, of which the Virginia cession
of the Old Northwest is the most important, are highly com^Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, The Beginnings of the
Military Establishment in America (New York, 1975), pp. 53-54;
Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 141, 338-39.
^Quoted in Merrill Jensen, "The Creation of the National
Domain, 1781-1784," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXVI
(December 1939): 326.
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plicated affairs that span the entire Revolutionary era.
The purpose here is to make some sense out of the compli
cated series of events that led to the creation of the
National Domain on March 1, 1784.

The land cession contro

versy paralleled the Revolutionary War and was a thorn in
the side of the wartime Congress.

The events surrounding

the cessions can be divided into two chronological periods:
(1) from the outbreak of the Revolution to 1781, when V i r 
g i n i a ’s first cession was rejected by Congress; and (2) from
Spring of 1781 until March 1, 1784, when Congress finally
approved the Virginia cession.^

Several themes that run

throughout the debates are the conflicting claims of V i r 
ginia, Massachusetts,

Connecticut, and New York to the Ohio

Valley ; insistence of the ’’landless" states (Maryland, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania)

that the Ohio country be ceded for

the common benefit of all members of the Confederation; e f 
forts of American land-jobbers and speculators
from the "landless" states)

(most of them

to influence Congressional policy;

the counter-efforts of Virginians and other Southerners to
Although Congress accepted Virginia’s cession on March 1,
1784, the cession was later revised and resubmitted.
This
followed the Monroe committee recommendation that the Old North
west be divided into "no more than five and no less than three"
new states.
Since this proposed division contradicted the
original Virginia cession (which called for numerous small
states in the trans-Appalachian W e s t ) , it had to be redrafted
and accepted once again.
See Chapter 7 below.
The heated
debates over the Virginia cession, however, occurred during
the 1776-1783 period.
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secure a liberal western policy;

the effect all of this had

in delaying ratification of the Articles of Confederation
and formation of a national western policy; the importance
of the cessions debate in the Northeast-South dichotomy in
national politics; and the role of the debate over the West
in the evolution of a Nationalist movement in the Confedera
tion Congress.

Only with all these factors in mind can one

embark on an investigation of the Virginia cession and the
creation of the National Domain.^
When the Americans declared themselves independent in
1776, four of the thirteen new states claimed portions of
the Old Northwest.

Virginia, Massachusetts, and Connecticut

all claimed overlapping portions of the Ohio country according
to the terms of their colonial charters, while New York based
a claim in the same region on a dubious purchase from the
Iroquois Confederation.

These four states are known as the

The best secondary accounts of the land cession contro
versy are Thomas Perkins Abernethy, Western Lands and the
American Revolution (New York, 1937); and Merrill Jensen's
articles, "The Cession of the Old Northwest," Mississippi
Valley Historical Review XXIII (June 1936):27-49, and "Crea
tion of the National Domain," pp. 323-42.
^North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia all claimed
portions of the Old Southwest territory, but the main focus
of this essay (and other essays in this thesis) will be the
Old Northwest.
Because the Southern states refused to cede
their lands, much of the western legislation was applicable
only to the Ohio country.
South Carolina ceded its western
claims in 1787, and North Carolina ceded the Tennessee region
in 17 92.
But the entire Southwest did not legally become part
of the National Domain until Georgia ceded its claims in 1802.
Note that the Indian title to the trans-Appalachian, the
most solid title of all the claimants, is not discussed in
this essay.
See Chapter 4 below.
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"landed" states of the Revolutionary era, and can be con
trasted with the "landless" states of New Jersey, Pennsyl
vania, and Maryland.

During the 1776-1783 period a great

rivalry grew among and between these landed and landless
states as they argued over who should benefit from land
I

sales in the trans-Appalachian West.

Most Americans, includ

ing those in the landed states, believed the western lands
should be ceded to the Confederation and sold to benefit all
of the thirteen United States.

The desired cessions and

sales might have occurred had not the whole issue been com
plicated by land speculators and profiteers from Pennsylvania,
7

New Jersey,

and Maryland.

During the 1770s the Indiana,

Illinois-Wabash, and Vandalia land speculation companies from
these three landless states negotiated numerous questionable
land purchases with the Indian tribes in the Ohio Valley.
These companies'

"titles" conflicted with and compounded the

confusion generated by the Virginia, New York, Connecticut,
and Massachusetts claims to the region.

The landed states

refused to recognize each other's claims, and Virginia re 
fused to cede its lands to Congress so long as there was any
chance that the speculators' claims might be recognized as
n

There were Southern land speculators, of course, and
William Blount, the Franklinites, John Sevier, and the Yazoo
profiteers are just a few of the more infamous.
Those who
invested in Northwest lands, however, were mainly Eastern
(with the important exception of Maryland) and included
Hamilton, Morris, Duer, Pickering, and other Nationalists.
Land speculation was a common occupation among Eastern
Nationalists.
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S T A T E LAND C L A I M S AN D C E S S I O N S AFTER 1783
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valid.

The Virginians had the most solid claim to the transO
montane region,
and resolved to not cede their title until
the land speculators’ purchases were declared null and void.
The Virginia Gazette sounded their battle cry:
Notwithstanding the impudent assertions . . .
industriously circulated by the lordly claim
ants of millions of acres of that western
territory. . . . We can assure the public
that the honourable Congress, as a body, has
taken no step to confirm the claims of these
politic individuals, who at the expence of
millions yet unborn, would erect themselves
into petty Sovereigns, and defeat the good
purpose for which so many brave men have shed
their dearest blood."
As the Revolutionary War commenced,

so too did the bitter

struggle over western lands and the determination of a C on
federation pdlicy for the trans-Appalachian frontier.
Land disputes came immediately to the fore while the
Articles of Confederation were being written.

Nationalists

and speculators from the landless states insisted the Articles
of Confederation include a provision giving the Confederation
Congress complete autonomy over the Ohio Valley.

Eastern N a 

tionalists were particularly interested in a measure that
^Most thought the Virginians' claim most valid because:
(1) their colonial charter (one of the first granted) included
Ohio lands; (2) their state bounded much of the Ohio country;
(3) Virginia pioneers inhabited the region; and (4) the V i r 
ginia militia established a semi-permanent military presence
there during the Revolution.
^Jensen, New Na ti on , pp. 350-52; Edmund Cody Burnett,
The Continental Congress (New York, 1941), p. 536; Horsman,
Formative Y e a r s , pp. 30-31; Jensen, "Cession of the Old North
west," pp. 27-28; Julian P. Boyd, ed.. The Papers of Thomas
Jefferson (Princeton, 1953), V I : 572.
The Virginia Gazette
quote is in Boyd, Papers of J ef ferson. VI :572.
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would strengthen the power and prestige of the national
government.

They had considerable support in Congress

since Nationalist delegates Thomas Johnson, Charles Carroll,
Samuel Chase, James Wilson, Samuel Wharton, and Robert Morris
all supported enthusiastically a measure which would benefit
land companies in which they were all major stockholders.

In

opposition to these profiteers stood David Howell of Rhode
Island, Thomas Jefferson, Arthur Lee, James Madison, and
many other Southerners.

The land issue not only split Con

gress into Eastern and Southern factions, but eventually
divided the Nationalist party into Northern and Southern
camps.Those
those without

states with claims to the West outnumbered

(counting the Southern states with claims to

the Old Southwest), however, and defeated the proposed amend
ment to the Articles of Confederation, seven to six.

M ar y 

land was so angry that it refused to ratify the Articles,
thus beginning a battle that lasted for eight long years.
Since Congress would not accept its terms, Virginia continued
to control and administer the trans-Appalachian West.

Numer

ous Virginia pioneers lived in this region and needed protec
tion from the British-Indian alliance on the frontier.

Thomas

For Nationalist efforts to strengthen the national
government through acquisition of a public domain see Merrill
Jensen, "The Idea of a National Government during the Ameri
can Revolution," Political Science Quarterly LVIII (1943):
356-79.
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 338-39.
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Jefferson,

the governor of Virginia from 1776-1780, organized

a military expedition of Virginia militiamen under Colonel
George Rogers Clark that scored military victories at
Kaskaskia and Fort Vincennes in 1779.

Besides protecting

Americans in that region, Jefferson's policy served also to
cement Virginia's claim to the Old Northwest by virtue of
military occupation.

But the Virginians' good fortunes ended

when General Cornwallis attacked the Tidewater in 1780.

Most

of the state militia was on the frontier with Clark, and
Virginia was overrun by Redcoats; Jefferson fled the capitol,
and Colonel Clark's mission aborted.
ginians

Thus by 1780, most V i r 

felt the Old Northwest was an administrative, finan

cial, and military headache that should be relinquished to
the Confederation Congress as soon as possible.

But they

still insisted that the speculators' purchases "be deemed
and taken as absolutely void," and the battle in Congress
ragedj on. 12
Problems created by Maryland's refusal to ratify the
Articles of Confederation combined with Congress's financial
woes and an overall desire to settle the western lands ques
tion to bring about a new series of negotiations in the C on
tinental Congress during 1780.

New York made the first move,

and ceded its claims to the trans-montane West on February 19,
12Marc Anthony Lewis, "Thomas Jefferson and Virginia's
Pioneers," Mississippi Valley Historical Review XXIV (1948):
555, 563-64, 567, 582-88; Jensen, "Cession of the Old North
west," pp. 30, 34.
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1780.

New York's surrender of its dubious purchases was

not of much importance, however, nor were the claims of
Massachusetts and Connecticut.^^

Virginia was the key to

the cession question because that state possessed the most
valid title and exercised de facto control over the region.
The Virginians hoped they might at last win out, and
Theodoric Bland wrote optimistically to his fellow Virginian,
Arthur Lee, that the "covert manoevers of the Land Jobbing
Companies are so well known and so fully discovered that
their abettors will hardly be enough to oppose [a cession]
in its fullest latitude."

On April 28, 1780, the Virginia

legislature drafted a cession proposal that surrendered all
of its western claims except Kentucky and a small military
reserve north of the Ohio.

The Virginians called for the

establishment of independent states in the West and reasserted
their demand that all speculators' purchases be declared null
and void.

Congress debated the Virginia proposal and on

The New York claim, based on an illegal purchase from
a handful of Iroquois Indians, was never given much credence
by Congress.
See Chapter 4 below.
The importance of New York's
1780 cession (which was not accepted) is that it was a political
maneuver to gain Southern support for New York's fight with
Massachusetts over the Vermont country.
Congress did not a c 
cept New York's cession until 1786, well after the Public
Domain was established.
The Massachusetts and Connecticut claims also did not
carry much weight except among Easterners seeking to lessen
Virginia's influence in the land question.
Congress accepted
the Massachusetts cession in 1785, while the Connecticut c es
sion was accepted in 1786.
For more information concerning
this confusing assortment of cessions see Jensen, "The Cession
of the Old Northwest;" "Creation of the National Domain;" and
Abernethy, Western Lands.
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October 10, 1780 agreed.
That the unappropriated lands that may be
ceded or relinquished to the United States,
by any particular state . . . shall be d i s 
posed of for the common benefit of the
United States, and be settled and formed
into distinct republican states, which shall
become members of the federal union, and have
the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and
independence, as other states.14
This resolution was still too vague to satisfy the V i r 
ginians ; they wanted specific guarantees against land-jobbing.
But the speculators and Eastern delegates refused to provide
any such assurance.

Finally, on January 2, 1781,

the Virginia

legislature officially ceded all of its claims to the region
north of the Ohio, but included the controversial stipulation
"that all purchases and deeds from any Indian or Indians, or
from any Indian nation or nations, for any lands within any
part of said territory
void and of no effect."

[shall be] deemed and declared absolutely
Maryland subsequently ratified the

Articles of Confederation, but the land speculation interests
refused to accept the Virginia cession so long as it contained
such obnoxious stipulations.

Thus the first five years of

debate over western lands left Congress in much the same state
of confusion as that in which the debate had begun.

Maryland

Jensen, "Cession of the Old Northwest," pp. 42-43;
Jensen, "Creation of the National Domain," p. 326; Burnett,
Continental Congress, pp. 495-99; Congress’s resolution in
John C. Fitzpatrick, ed.. Journals of the Continental Con
gress (Washington, D.C., 1934], X V I 11:915.
Nearly half of
the members of Congress opposed this resolution.
Eastern
Nationalists particularly feared the creation of new western
s tates.
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ratified the Articles of Confederation, but the landless
states insisted on a stipulation-free cession.

The Virginians

were just as determined to hang on to the Old Northwest until
the plans of the land investors could be thwarted.

So, as

the Revolutionary War dragged on, Americans continued to
bicker among themselves over the future course of that terri
tory west of the Appalachian mountains.
It seems ironic that Virginia had tremendous difficulty
making a gift of such a vast and rich territory as the Old
Northwest.

Yet the terms of the Virginia cession precluded

Congressional approval.

As soon as Maryland ratified the

Articles of Confederation that state began to reiterate its
demand for a "conditionless" cession of the Ohio Valley.
Thus the Confederation Congress of 1781-1784 spent a great
deal of time debating over the Virginia cession.

The Nation

alists and speculators in Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsyl
vania squared off against the Southerners and their Anti
federalist allies.

Each side had enough votes to prevent

the other's victory, but not enough to implement its own d e 
signs.

While the Virginians held to their hard line, the

land companies waged a two-pronged attack.
gress to either

They urged Con

(1) assert its claim to sovereignty over the

Old Northwest on the legal basis that Great Britain had g o v 
erned the territory and that the Congress, not Virginia, was

^^Jensen,
4 4 - 4 5 , 47.

"Cession of the Old Northwest," pp. 34, 37,
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the logical successor to the British; or (2) demand a
stipulation-free cession from the Virginians.

They did not

follow either tactic consistently over the next three years,
and both views were espoused as expediency dictated.
In the Fall of 1781 Congress appointed a committee to
discuss the western land problem

and make recommendations.

According to James Madison, this committee was "systemati
cally and notoriously opposed" to the Virginia claim; its
members were all from the landless states of Maryland, New
Jersey, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania,

Pre

dictably, the committee’s November 3, 1781 report supported
the Indiana Company's purchases in the Old Northwest and
dismissed Virginia's claims to the region as "invalid."
Moreover, the committee refused to recognize the land grant
Governor Thomas Jefferson made to those who had fought at
Kaskaskia and Vincennes with George Rogers Clark.

The East

erners did not have the votes to have this report approved,
however, and the situation remained unchanged.

In April of

1782 Arthur Lee of Virginia demanded that all debate over
the West be halted until each member of Congress declared
(in a roll-call vote) whether or not he owned stock in any
of the companies affected by the debates.

This "purifying

declaration" of Lee's "was evaded by three days chicane,"
Ibid., pp. 32-35; Burnett, Continental Congress,
p. 536; Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., "Jefferson, The Ordinance
of 1784, and the Origins of the United States Territorial
System," The William and Mary Quarterly XXXIX (April 1972):
236; Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, V I : 572.
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and finally dropped altogether.

Yet both sides were growing

weary from the six years of battle.

The Virginia state

assembly urged settlement of the dispute so they would "not
again be left in uncertainty on that subject."

Moreover,

the end of the Revolutionary War made Congress daily aware
of the problems of finance,

Indian relations, diplomacy,

land for Revolutionary veterans, and illegal settlement of
the trans-Appalachian frontier--none of which could be reme
died

until

it

approved the Virginia cession.

Madison wrote Edmund Randolph:

As James

"Every review I take of the

Western territory produces fresh conviction that it is the
true policy of Virginia as well as the United States to
bring the dispute to a friendly compromise."

17

By the Spring of 1783 there was some light at the end of
the tunnel.

The war was over, and Congress's desperate

financial straits necessitated action.

Nearly everyone

favored western land sales to raise money, especially those
Antifederalists who opposed Morris and the Nationalists'
post proposal and taxation schemes.

im

At the same time, the

military land bounties could not be granted until Congress
approved the Virginia cession.

George Washington addressed

this problem in a letter to the Indian Affairs committee in
October of 1783,

and warned of imminent Indian warfare lest

Congress restrain the trespassing "banditti" of the West.
l^Jensen, "Creation of the National Domain," pp. 328, 331 ;
Jensen, "Cession of the Old Northwest," p. 48.
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On June 6 a Congressional committee had recognized the v a 
lidity of Virginia's claim, and at the same time arrived at
a formula by which Congress could satisfy Virginia's demands
without making any specific guarantees.

That summer Congress

sent a report to the Virginia legislature outlining the terms
under which its cession would be accepted.

18

Congress's acceptance of the Virginia cession on March 1,
1784 was not a victory of the principles for which that state
fought for seven years.

There was no ironclad provision in

the cession prohibiting land-jobbing and speculation in the
Ohio Valley.

All the Virginia cession included was a provi

sion tacitly excluding land companies from the transAppalachian W e s t .

Nothing in the cession invalidated the

purchases of the Illinois-Wabash, Vandalia, and Indiana land
companies.

Virginian Joseph Jones wrote Madison that the

18

Jensen, "Creation of the National Domain," pp. 334,
338 ; Jensen, "Cession of the Old Northwest," p. 48.
19

See Journals of the Continental Congress, XXVI:114:
"That all lands within the territory so ceded to the United
States and not reserved or apportioned to any of the before
mentioned purposes [Virginia military reserve, George Rogers
Clark land bounties, etc.] or disposed of in bounties to the
officers and soldiers of the American army, shall be consid
ered as a common fund for the benefit of the United States.
. . and shall be faithfully and bonafide disposed of for that
p u r p o s e , and for no other purpose whatsoever."
(Emphasis
mine.)
The previous cessions all contained a provision spe
cifically nullifying purchases made from the Indians.
See
Journals of the Continental Congress, X X V :5 61-6 3. Virginia's
political hopes in the West can be seen as a motivation for
the stipulation in their March 1 cession that the ceded terri
tory be formed into states "not less than one hundred, nor
more than one hundred and fifty miles square" to be admitted
into the union with full rights.
See Chapter 7 below.
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proposed cession did not "fully remove the fears of our p e o 
ple respecting the Indian purchases and grants to companies."
Yet others believed the cession was in the spirit of the
original demands.
tired of haggling.

At any rate, the Virginians were sick and
They foresaw future political and e c o 

nomic benefits to come with westward expansion, and they
wanted to expedite the matter with a cession.

On December 20,

1783 their legislature issued a final cession of their claims
to the territory northwest of the Ohio River:
although the terms do not come fully up to
the propositions of this Commonwealth, they
are conceived on the whole, to appear so
nearly to them, as to induce this state to
accept thereof, in full confidence that Con
gress will in justice to the State, for the
liberal cession she hath made, earnestly
press upon the other states claiming large
tracts of waste and uncultivated territory,
the propriety of making cessions equally
liberal, for the common benefit and support
of the Union.
Thomas Jefferson presented the cession to Congress on March 1,
1784.

After New Jersey raised some objections. Congress r e 

jected it by one vote!

Later the same day Pennsylvania, h o w 

ever, changed its vote, and at long last Congress accepted
the Virginia cession and created the National Domain.
20

20

For Virginia's political and economic motives, see
Henderson, Party Po li ti cs , pp. 370-71.
According to Hender
son, the Virginians thought they would gain political muscle
from new western states and economic benefits via commerce
with the West over the Ohio-Kanawha-Monangahelo river sys
tems.
Other information contained in this paragraph is
drawn from Burnett, Continental Congress, p. 597; Jensen,
"Creation of the National Domain," pp. 338-42; Merrill D.
Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography
(New York, 1970), p. 279; Dumas Malone, Jefferson the V i r -
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So ended one of the most drawn-out and bitter struggles
in the history of the early American republic.

21

In the

long run, the Virginians’ struggle proved to be in vain.
The sale of millions of acres of Ohio Valley lands at seven
to eight cents an acre to John Cleve Symmes, the Scioto
Associates, and the Ohio Company in 1787 in every way v io
lated the spirit of the Virginia land cession of 1784.

But

the land speculation interests did not have as much politi
cal support in the Spring of 1784 as they had later.
spokesmen,

Their

the Eastern Nationalists, were no longer strong

in Congress.

There was not, according to David Howell, "the

least tincture of their poisonous influence."

22

The vacuum

created by this Nationalist ebb was soon filled, however, by
a more liberal faction including many Southerners and Anti
federalists.

The 1784 Congress held a more optimistic view

of westward expansion.
Howell,

Led by Thomas Jefferson and David

the Confederation Congress began to draft a radical

territorial government ordinance for the West:

the Ordinance

of 1784.

ginian (Boston, 1948), p. 412 ; Boyd, Papers of Jefferson,
pp. VI :571, V I 1 :4 ; Journals of the Continental Congress.
XXVI:113.
21
22

See footnote number four above.

Kohn, Eagle and S w o r d , pp.
Po l it ic s. pp. 338-39.

53-54; Henderson, Party
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But we have an immensity of land courting
the industry of the husbandmen.
Is it best
then that all our citizens should be e m 
ployed in its improvement, or that one half
should be called off from that to exercise
manufactures and handicraft arts for the
other?
Those who labor in the earth are
the chosen people of God if ever he had a
chosen people, whose breasts he has made
his peculiar deposit for genuine virtue.
It is the focus in which he keeps alive
that sacred fire which might otherwise es
cape from the face of the Earth.
Thomas Jefferson, 1785^^
March 1, 1784 is an important date in the history of
the trans-Appalachian frontier.

On that day. Congress a c 

cepted the Virginia cession and examined the first committee
draft of the Ordinance of 1784.

The Ordinance of 1784, p r o 

posing a form of government for the western territories, was
the product of discussion and debates that had begun in
colonial times.

Franklin's Albany Plan (1754) and the Procla

mation of 1763 both addressed the problem of territorial
government, and one of the causes of the American Revolution
was disagreement over British administration of the West.
After 1776, numerous individuals submitted territorial govern
ment proposals to the Continental C o n g r e s s , y e t

that body

23
William Peden, ed., Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the
State of Virginia (New York, 1954), pp. 164-65.
^^Arthur Bestor, "Constitutionalism and the Settlement
of the West: The Attainment of Consensus, 1754-1784," in
John Porter Bloom, ed., The American Territorial System
(Athens, Ohio, 1974), pp. 13-44.
For a complete discussion

42
could do nothing until the state land cessions were complete
and Congressional authority over the West firmly established.
Vi rg i n i a ’s cession combined with other factors to make terri
torial government a first-priority matter for the Confedera
tion Congress in March of 1784.
Many American leaders argued in 1783 and 1784 that it
was necessary to establish immediately some order over unruly
frontiersmen so as to expedite land sales and prevent an
Indian war.

Most of the Congressional delegates from the

Northeast were wary of the westward movement.
wanted land revenues,

Although they

they were afraid of the economic and

political consequences of westward expansion, and looked upon
the "white savages" of the frontier with apprehension.

One

Congressional delegation was alarmed because over 400 V i r 
ginians had illegally crossed the Ohio, and "committed many
wanton and unprovoked acts of cruelty against the Indians."
The New York delegates warned that the West was "daily over
run by lawless men who endanger by their Rashness a new
Indian war."

If Congress was planning to sell lands and

keep peace with the Indians,
be controlled.

these squatters would have to

In September and October of 1783 an Indian

Affairs committee chaired by New York Nationalist James Duane
discussed many of these problems.

25

David H ow el l’s protests

of territorial government proposals during the Confederation,
see Chapter 7 below.
Z^The Duane committee was controlled by the Nationalists.
For a complete discussion of the importance of this committee
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notwithstanding,

the Indian Affairs committee reported that

to provide for "security against the increase of feeble,
disorderly, and dispersed settlements in those remote and
extended territories ; against the depravity

of manners

which they have a tendency to produce

or against

...

. . .

frequent and destructive war with the Indians," Congress
must create a strong territorial government to police the
western frontier.

This Indian Affairs committee report

led to the appointment of Thomas Jefferson, David Howell,
and Jeremiah Chase to draft and submit an ordinance for the
government of the western territory.

Thus, Congressional

desire to clamp down on the westerners led to the appoint
ment of Jefferson, Howell, and Chase.

But if Congress

wanted to get tough with the Westerners,

it certainly picked

the wrong men for the job.^^
When Thomas Jefferson came to serve in the Confederation
Congress in late Fall of 1783, his reputation as a Revolu
tionary radical and author of the Declaration of Independence
served to make him a dominant figure in that body.

To say

that Jefferson was keenly aware of and in favor of western

in the formulation of the American Indian and western policies,
see the first section of Chapter 4 below.
^^For Congressional attitudes towards the West in 178384, see Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress. VII;
289, 290, 300-301; Robert F . Berkhofer, Jr., "The Republican
Origins of the American Territorial System," in Allan G. Bogue,
éd.. The West of the American People (Itasca, Illinois, 1970),
pp. 152-61.
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development is to state the obvious.

27

During the six months

he served in Congress at Annapolis, Jefferson played instru
mental roles in the drafting of Indian treaties, land policy,
and the Ordinance of 1784.

There has recently been some

controversy as to just how great a part Thomas Jefferson
played in drafting the Ordinance of 1784.

Robert F. Berk

hof er, Jr. argues convincingly that Jefferson was not the
sole author of that document.

Several of the provisions of

the Ordinance were proposed by others prior to 1784, and com
mittee member David Howell figured importantly in drafting
the Ordinance.

Although Jefferson's fame has no doubt led to

an exaggeration of his importance in formulating western
policy, the fact remains that he did chair the three-man co m 
mittee that drafted the Ordinance of 1784, and over half of
the original ideas of the Ordinance were his.

It is no coin

cidence that the Ordinance of 1784 appeared in Thomas Jeffer
son's handwriting when submitted to Congress on March 1,
1784.^®
Congress read the first draft of the Ordinance of 1784
on March 3. Unlike its successor, the Northwest Ordinance of
77

For Thomas Jefferson and the West, see Lewis, "Jeffer
son and Virginia's Pioneer, 1774-1781," pp. 551-588; E. Whit
ney Griswold, "Jefferson's Agrarian Democracy," in Henry C.
Denthoff, e d . , Thomas Jefferson and American Democracy
(Lexington, Massachusetts , 1971) , pp . 43, 47 , 51, 57 ; B oy d ,
Papers of Thomas Je f ferson. V I ; 581; and, most importantly,
Peden, Notes on the State of V ir gi n i a , pp. 164-65.
7R

The best articles on the Ordinance of 1784 are by
Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr.
See "American Territorial System,"
and "Origins of the U.S. Territorial System," pp. 231-262.
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1787,

the Jefferson-Howell Ordinance applied to all of the

trans-Appalachian frontier, not just

the Old Northwest.

And unlike its forerunner, the Indian Affairs committee r e 
port of 1783, this document emphasized natural rights, and
was egalitarian and democratic.

Basically, the proposed

Ordinance embodied three aspects :

(1) a delineation and

naming of fourteen new states to be created in the transAppalachian West;

(2) general rules for an evolution from

temporary to permanent governments and statehood for the
westerners; and

[3) articles of compact to which the new

western states would have to subscribe.

29

The part of the report delineating and naming states
was Jefferson's creation.

Fourteen new states were to be

formed in the West, and arranged in a symmetrical pattern
described by committee member David Howell:
It is proposed to divide the country into
fourteen new states in the following m a n 
ner.
There are three tiers of states:
One in the Atlantic [the original thirteen],
one on the Mississippi, and a middle tier.
The middle tier is to be the smallest and
form a balance betwixt the two more powerful
ones.
Because he had little physiographic knowledge of the region,
Jefferson bounded the new states in a scientifically concise
manner, using lines of longitude and latitude as borders.
Each state was to be approximately 2° tall and 3° wide, and
2Q

For the three different versions of the Ordinance of
1784 as it evolved from a committee report to the final
Ordinance, see Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, VI:603-1S.
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their arrangement was such as to give the new American repub
lic a scientific, orderly, and balanced appearance.

Fear of

conflict between small and large states influenced Jefferson,
as did his conviction

(drawn from Montesquieu) that govern

mental units must be small in order to remain republican.
His proposed names for ten of the states are said to have
drawn guffaws from contemporaries.

Sylvania, Michigania,

Cherroneseus, Assenesipia, Metropotamia, Illinoia, Washing
ton, Saratoga, Polypotamia, and Pelisipia all exhibit a
strange combination of Indian roots. Revolutionary kudos,
and classical endings.

But the predetermination of the loca

tion and names of the states was done, according to Howell,
so that "Settlers would know exactly, by name or by number,
in which little republic they lived, so they could move
quickly about the business of erecting governments."

This

first part of the proposed Ordinance of 1784 was no less than
a grand scheme for the trans-Appalachian West based upon
Thomas Jefferson's notions of geographic balance and repub
lican theory.
Political motives seem to have played a partial role in
the first and second aspects of the proposed Ordinance.
members of Congress during the 1780s

Most

believed that new

western states would be allies of the South in the sectional
30Berkhofer, "Origins of the U.S. Territorial System,"
pp. 241-49; Berkhofer, "American Territorial System," pp.
154-55; Peterson, Jefferson and the New N a ti on , p. 281; Philbrick, Rise of the West, p. 125; Burnett, Continental Congress,
p. 598.
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politics of the Confederation Congress.

Thus, one may inter

pret the first part of Jefferson’s plan, calling for fourteen
new western .states, as an attempt to insure future Southern
political power in Congress.

Jefferson’s ally David Howell

and other Antifederalists in Congress were certainly interested
in lessening the political weight of the Nationalist Northeast.

31

At the same time the government provisions of the

proposed Ordinance had great political implications.
This second aspect of the Jefferson-Howell Ordinance
demonstrates the extent to which the Jefferson committee
ignored the instructions of its forerunner, the Indian A f 
fairs committee of 1783.

Nowhere in this first committee

draft of the Ordinance of 1784 is there provision for govern
ment controlled by anyone other than those actual settlers
who would inhabit the trans-Appalachian West.

The committee

granted white male suffrage even though it was not practiced
in any of the original thirteen states in 1784.

Moreover,

there was no minimum requirement for the number of people
necessary to form a "temporary” government, so whenever a
number of settlers in a proposed state felt inclined, they
could hold a meeting and form a state government.

They had

to use one of the constitutions of the original states as a
governmental basis, and elect a state legislature to admin
istrate governmental affairs.

They were also to elect a

representative to serve in the Confederation Congress who
^^Henderson, Party Politics, p. 373
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would be able to debate, but would have no vote.

When the

population reached 20,000, the temporary government stage
ended and the state could write a permanent constitution
and form a permanent government.

This second stage ended

when the population of the state reached that of the least
populous of the original thirteen states
population of 60,000 in 1784).

(Delaware had a

Then the new western state

would be admitted to the Confederacy with the same rights,
privileges, and responsibilities as the original thirteen.
By this plan Jefferson and Howell hoped to provide for swift
admission of new western states into the national political
32
pr o c e s s .
The final thrust of the March 3 report was a "Charter
of Compact," consisting of principles and precepts to which
the new western states would be bound.

They must always

remain a part of the United States, and accept responsibility
for a portion of the Confederation's debt.

Their state g ov

ernments were to be republican, and subject to the jurisdic
tion of the Confederation Congress.

The final two Articles

of Compact were Jefferson's own radical contributions.

The

first of the two forbade citizenship in a western state to
any person holding an hereditary title.

This provision aimed

^^Berkhofer, "Origins of the U.S. Territorial System,"
p. 246; Berkhofer, "American Territorial System," p. 155.
Pop
ulation estimates of the original thirteen states were inaccu
rate during the 1780s, and Jefferson seems to have anticipated
much more westward migration than actually occurred.
This is
why Monroe and other Southerners favored lowering the popula
tion requirements for statehood in 1786.
See Chapter 7 below.
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at the quasi-aristocratic Society of Cincinnati, to which
many Eastern Nationalist Revolutionary War officers belonged.

33

But the final and most startling Article of C o m 

pact stated, "That after the year 1800 of the Christian era,
there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in
any of the said states."

Jefferson, a Southern slaveholder,

could see the tragic consequences of Negro slavery in the
United States.

In this proposed draft of the Ordinance of

1784, he tried to check the growth of slavery before it was
too late.

Had this final Article of Compact remained,

slavery would have been illegal in the entire western fron
tier, north and

south, and the course of American history

would have been

greatly altered.

After Congress read this first committee draft of the
Ordinance of 1784 on March 3, the debate began.

Although

several Easterners objected to the liberal governmental
provisions,

the

delineation and

initial debate centered around the

proposed

naming of states.

South

Since North and

Carolina, and Georgia had yet to cede their western lands
to Congress, many delegates believed Jefferson’s predeter
mined arrangement of states to be an example of "counting
33

For the Society of Cincinnati, see the first section
of Chapter 5 below.
^^Berkhofer, "American Territorial System," p. 155.
Jefferson discusses his attitudes towards slavery in Peden,
Notes on the State of V i rg i n i a , pp. 162-63, 292.
For more
information concerning the issue of slavery in the terri
tories, see Chapter 7 below.
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o n e ’s chickens before they were hatched."

Congress voted to

begin the new state boundaries from 45® latitude down rather
than 30° up; thus the Old Northwest could be bounded and
settled while Southwestern claims were being resolved.
delegates also objected to the proposed state names.

Some
Most

thought Je f fe rs on ’s names were too fanciful, and voted to
omit them from the Ordinance.

With these objections recorded,

the Jefferson-Howell-Chase committee reconvened on March 17,
rewrote the Ordinance of 1784, and submitted it once again on
March 22.

Nearly a month passed before Congress commenced a

more heated debate over the nature of government for the
western territories.
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The most important debates over the Ordinance of 1784
took place from April 19-23.

There was considerable argu

ment at that time over the provisions pertaining to heredi
tary titles and slavery.

More important, many Eastern delegates

wanted to strengthen national control over the Westerners.
The article prohibiting hereditary titles was first to go.
Jefferson wrote that Congress struck the clause, "not from
an approbation of such honors, but because it was thought
an improper place to encounter them."

There was sharp divi

sion over the question of slavery in the territories.
Southern delegates

(with the exception of Jefferson, Monroe,

and Hugh Williamson)

squared off against the Northeast in a

^^Berkhofer, "Origins of the U.S. Territorial System,"
pp. 249, 255; Rav Allen Billington, Westward Expansion (New
York, 1974) , p. 212.
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heated debate.

The anti-slavery article needed seven votes,

but received only six.

Jefferson was keenly disappointed

over the outcome, as is indicated in a letter to James Ma d i 
son.

"The slavery issue," he wrote,
was lost by an individual vote.
Only ten
states were present.
The 4 Eastern states,
N. York, Penn'va, were for the clause.
Jersey would have been for it, but there
were but two members, one of whom [Beatty]
was sick in chambers.
South Carolina,
Maryland, and iVirginia! voted against it.
North Carolina was divided as would have
been Virginia had not one of its delegates
[Monroe] been sick in bed. . . . Thus we
see the fate of millions yet unborn hanging
on the tongue of one man, and heaven was
silent in that awful moment.

Jefferson again expressed his disappointment when the Pennsylvania Packet published,

erroneously, the "final" version of

the Ordinance of 1784, failing to omit the hereditary titles
and slavery articles.

He wrote sarcastically to a friend

that the Packet *s version was,
certainly no act of Congress's because it
contained a provision or two not quite
within their level of politics . . . two
of which as this forgery pretends were an
exclusion of hereditary honours, and an
abolition of slavery.
When the true act
shall be published you will find no such
petty ideas in it.36
A final series of objections resulted in increased powers
for the Confederation Congress in controlling Westerners.
^^Berkhofer, "Origins of the U.S. Territorial System,"
p. 249; Malone, Jefferson the Vi rginian, p. 414; Burnett,
Continental Congress, p. 599; Jefferson to Madison, April 25,
1784, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VI:499500; Jefferson to Francis Hopkinson, May 3, 1784, in ibid.,
V I : 511-12; Peterson, Jefferson and the New N a t i o n , p. 283.
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Many Congressmen, mostly Eastern but including some South
erners, believed that some checks should be put on the
turbulent West.

Delegates Samuel Chase, John Beatty, and

Elbridge Gerry spearheaded a drive to add four conservative
new provisions to the Articles of Compact.

The first p r o 

hibited local interference "with the primary disposal of
soil by the United States in Congress assembled, nor with
the ordinances and regulations which Congress may find neces
sary for securing the title in such soil to bona fide p u r 
chasers."

A second amendment prohibited taxation of lands

belonging to the United States, while a third stipulated
"the lands of non-resident proprietors shall in no case be
taxed higher than those residents within any new state."
And the conservatives had one final objection to the c om
mittee version of the Ordinance of 1784.

Many in Congress,

especially the Eastern Nationalists, wanted a stronger fed
eral presence in the West to counter the lawless tendencies
of the frontier settlers.

These attitudes were the basis

of D u a n e ’s Indian Affairs report recommending a strong,
nationally controlled territorial government.

The conserva

tives opposed J ef ferson’s recommendations for complete selfgovernment in the West, but they were opposed by many South
erners and Antifederalists who favored local autonomy.

As

a compromise, Elbridge Gerry offered an amendment that
allowed the Confederation Congress to intervene and restore
order should any difficulties arise before the temporary
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governments were formed in the West.

This motion, opposed

by Howell but not Jefferson, declared,
measures not inconsistent with the prin
ciples of the Confederation, and necessary
for the preservation of peace and good
order among the settlers in any of the
said new states, until they shall assume
a temporary government as aforesaid, may
from time to time be taken by the United
States in Congress a s s e m b l e d . 37
Thus eight major changes were made to the original c o m 
mittee version of the Ordinance of 1784:
state names were dropped;
daries was changed;

(1) the proposed

(2) the mode of delineating boun

(3) Congress deleted the hereditary

titles and (4) slavery provisions;

(5) the states were denied

the power to tax federal lands and

(6) the lands of "non

resident proprietors;"

(7) state interference with Confedera

tion land sales was prohibited; and

(8) Congress took m e a 

sures to control lawless pioneers before a temporary government was established.
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With these major changes incorporated. Congress approved
the Ordinance of 1784 on April 23, 1784.^^

In its final

form, the document was not so radical or democratic as the
first committee draft.

Some historians contend that Jeffer

son himself shares partial responsibility for the conservative
37Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, VI:613-1S.
^^Ibid., V I : 603-15; Berkhofer, "American Territorial
System," p. 156.
39journals of the Continental Congress, XXVI:279.
For a
complete text of the Ordinance of 1784, see the Journals,
XXVI:275-79.
The final vote was ten to one.

55
turn of the Ordinance.

Indeed, Jefferson seconded Elbridge

G e r r y ’s motion to prohibit taxation of lands of non-resident
proprietors; and he voted in favor of the provision allowing
Congressional intervention before a temporary government
could be formed.

Yet Jefferson's actions were perhaps only

manifestations of a necessity to compromise.

His ideal plan

of government for the West was the first draft of the Ordi
nance submitted on March 1, 1784.

Any subsequent changes

were wrought by the need to incorporate differing points of
view into the document.

Moreover, Jefferson’s actions b e 

tween March 1 and April 23 simply do not evidence that much
of a shift in opinion.

He continued to fight for the exclu

sion of titled aristocracy, and advocated rapid admission of
fourteen new western states into the union.

His vote in

favor of the Gerry amendment did not compromise his original
intentions, because that amendment only allowed Congressional
intervention before formation of a temporary government.

One

must remember that there was no minimum population require
ment for the formation of temporary governments under the
Ordinance of 17 84.

Temporary governments could have been

formed as soon as a few hundred settlers had a mind to do so.
Considering the Westerners' proclivity for forming states and
writing constitutions during the 1780s, the period of federal
policing would surely have not lasted for long.

Even as

^^Berkhofer, "Origins of the U.S. Territorial System,"
pp. 250-53.
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amended the Ordinance of 1784 was a radical document.

It

granted white male suffrage long before any state in the
union did so, and it provided for immediate self-government
for western settlers.

Had it remained in effect, the

Jefferson-Howell Ordinance of 1784 would have been a classic
example of Revolutionary radicalism in legislative form.

By the summer of 1784, the Confederation Congress had
created a national domain and adopted an Ordinance for gov
erning the western territories.

Yet the Congress accom

plished this o n l y after eight years of bitter and divisive
debate between Eastern Nationalists and Southerners.

Ac cep

tance of the Virginia cession and the Ordinance of 1784 shows
that in 1784 the Southerners had won a victory--but it was a
temporary victory.
effect.

The Ordinance of 1784 was never put into

Congress ignored it for three years, largely because

of conditions on the frontier, and then replaced it with the
Northwest Ordinance of 178 7.

The Northwest Ordinance appears

neo-colonial when contrasted with its 1784 forerunner.

By

instituting a federally controlled territorial government and
property qualifications for voting and office-holding. Con
gress took the heart out of the Jefferson-Howell plan.

Pas

sage of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was a Nationalist
victory,

and is indicative of changing political trends in

the Confederation Congress.

That document could never have

passed in 17 84, because the Nationalist star had waned in
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that year.

Robert Morris was a lame duck, and most of the

Nationalists had gone home.
question itself.

The final blow was the western

The Virginia cession debate split the

Nationalists right down the m iddle--North vs. South.
Virginia Nationalists James Madison and Arthur Lee broke
ranks with their former Eastern allies James Wilson, Charles
Carroll and Samuel Wharton.

The decline of the Nationalists

was only temporary, to be sure, but in viewing it we can see
the evolution of Confederation party politics.

The Nation

alists could not strengthen the central government or imple
ment their western policy until they won a majority once
again.

And they could not win a majority until the nation

started moving towards centralism, and the split with the
South was repaired.

^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 338-39.

CHAPTER I V
INDIAN POLICY IN THE CONFEDERATION CONGRESS
Although the disposition of the people of
the States to emigrate into the Indian
country cannot be effectually prevented,
it may be restrained by postpoining new
purchases of Indian territory, and by p r o 
hibiting citizens from intruding on Indian
lands.
It may be regulated by forming
colonies under the direction of the govern
ment and by posting a body of troops to
execute their orders.
As population shall
increase and approach the Indian boundaries,
game will be diminished and new purchases
may be made for small considerations.
This
has been and probably will be the inevitable
consequences of cultivation.
It is, how
ever, painful to consider that all the
Indian tribes, once existing in those states
now the best cultivated and most populous,
have become extinct.
If the same causes
continue, the effects will happen and, in
short period the idea of an Indian this side
of the Mississippi will be found only in the
pages of the historian.
Henry Knox, Secretary of War^
White-Indian relations during the Confederation are one
small segment of a story that began at Jamestown in 1607 and
has not ended.

In colonial times, the British government

formulated an Indian policy and established Northern and
Southern Indian departments to treat with the natives.

^Walter H. Mohr, Federal Indian Relations,
(Philadelphia, 1933), p. 171.
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They

1774-1788
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came to recognize Indian "right of soil" and established a
precedent of bona fide purchase of title to Indian lands.
Although disagreements and wars were frequent, the British
believed the Indians had a right of occupancy.

This is why

the American colonists most often attempted to secure Indian
lands by purchase rather than conquest.

However, encroach

ments increased as the colonial population climbed higher,
and the British efforts to halt migration proved futile. King
Phillip's War, Bacon's Rebellion,
Pontiac's Conspiracy,

the French and Indian War,

and the western theatre of the American

Revolutionary War created an enmity between white Americans
and native Americans that endured throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

2

When the American Revolution ended, thousands of pioneers
poured over the Appalachians into the Indian country.

In 1784,

George Washington observed,
Men in these times . . . roam over the Country
on the Indian side of the Ohio, mark out lands,
Survey, and even settle them.
This gives
great discontent to the Indians and will,
unless measures are taken to prevent it, in
evitably produce a war with the western tribes.
2

For more information concerning colonial Indian rela
tions, see Bernard Sheehan, "Indian-White Relations in Early
America: A Review Essay," William and Mary Quarterly XXVI
(July 1969); Gary B. Nash, "The Image of the Indian in the
Southern Colonial Mind," ibid., XXIX (April 1972); Nancy 0.
Lurie, "Indian Cultural Adjustment to European Civilization,"
in James M. Smith, e d . , Seventeenth Century America, Essays
in Colonial History (Chapel Hill, 1959).
See also "Colonial
American Indian Policy," in Francis S. Prucha, American Indian
Policy in the Formative Years, the Indian Trade and Intercourse
Acts. 1790-1854 (Lincoln, 1962), pp. 1-40.
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By 1785 there were an estimated 50,000 settlers in western
Pennsylvania and the Ohio country,
in Kentucky, Tennessee,

and tens of thousands more

and the Old Southwest.

War appeared

to be inevitable, but an Indian war would be disastrous to
the new United States Confederation.

Because the Americans

were bankrupt and without an army, it was essential that Con
gress devise an Indian policy that would keep the United
States at peace with the western Indians.

The Americans

wanted land for revenues and westward expansion, but they
also wanted peace with the Indians.

To Congress fell the

task of obtaining both.
From 1783-1786 the Confederation Congress tried in vain
3
to create a workable Indian policy.
The debates over Indian
affairs brought forth sectional disagreements that evidenced
the Northeast-South split in Confederation politics.

While

the Southerners wanted immediate expansion, and advocated an
aggressive Indian policy, the Eastern Nationalists favored a
more cautious stance.

Initially the overconfident Congress

The best secondary work dealing with Confederation Indian
Policy is Reginald Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Pol
icy, 1785-1812 (East Lansing, 1967).
See also Prucha, Indian
P o li cy ; Mohr, Federal Indian Relations. The Indian point of
view is best documented in Randolph C. Downes, Council Fires
on the Upper Ohio: A Narrative of Indian Affairs in the Upper
Ohio Valley (Pittsburgh, 1940).
The intellectual history of
white attitudes towards the Indian is best interpreted by
Bernard Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy
and the American Indian (Chapel Hill, 1973).
See also Roy
Harvey Pearce, Savagism and Civilization. A Study of the Indian
and the American Mind (Baltimore, 1953).
All of the above
works, particularly Horsman's, form the base upon which this
essay is built.
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acted belligerently in negotiating with the Northern and
Southern Indian tribes.
of conquest"

They demanded Indian land by "right

(in the Revolutionary War), and arbitrarily dic

tated treaties to the Indian nations.

The Confederation

failed in its attempt to implement this ill-conceived aggres
sive policy because it lacked the revenue and power necessary
for its execution.
lands to Congress,
affairs.

Some states refused to cede their western
and claimed "state sovereignty" in Indian

And the greatest impediment to Confederation policy

was fierce Indian resistance--the Northern and Southern
tribes refused to acknowledge American claims to their ances
tral domains.

Angered by white encroachments and encouraged

by Great Britain and Spain,

the Indians struck back.

The

commencement of Indian hostilities in 1786-1787 marked the
collapse of the Confederation Indian policy.
The Indian warfare of 1786-1787 coincided with the reemergence of the Nationalist faction in Confederation politics.
These conservatives believed the United States needed a power
ful, centralized national government,

and sought to replace

the Articles of Confederation with a stronger "Constitutional"
mode of administration.

The Nationalists espoused their views

in the Confederation Congress and implemented them in all
areas of policy making.

Of particular importance to this

essay is the Eastern Nationalist attempt to reform Confedera
tion Indian policy.

These Northeasterners tried to make Indian

policy more just, and advocated cash purchase of Indian lands.
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The Eastern Nationalists wanted western lands for revenue and
expansion, but their philosophy of westward expansion was not
so aggressive as that of their Southern colleagues.

They

clung to ideals calling for fair treatment of the Indians,
and most were caught up in the humanitarian movement of the
period.

The Eastern Nationalists wanted Indian lands, but

they also wanted a clear conscience.

The irreconcilable nature

of their goals became obvious during the early national period.^

There was, of course, one group of Americans that cared
not a whit for the ideal of just and humane treatment of the
Indians:

The frontier settlers.

The pioneers did not serve

in Congress, nor did they ever appear at formal negotiations
with the Indian tribes.

Yet their very existence in the trans-

Appalachian Indian country made these pioneer yeomen the major
force in American Indian relations.

To be sure. Congress could

pass laws requiring fair treatment of the Indians--but what
good were those laws without the support of the frontiersmen?
As hundreds of thousands of pioneers streamed into the transAppalachian West,

the frontier settlers became the de facto

The Eastern Nationalists were not the only Americans
whose attitudes towards the Indians were based on humanitarianism.
According to Bernard Sheehan, this philanthropic motive
crossed party lands and included "Men so disparate as Timothy
Pickering and Thomas Jefferson."
See Sheehan, Seeds of E x 
tinction. p. 6.
I believe the Eastern Nationalists were more
inclined to this position for a number of reasons.
See the
text and notes to section 3 of this essay.
The concept that
many Americans wanted both land and a "good conscience" is
that of Reginald Horsman.
The idea that most of these men
were Eastern Nationalists is my own.

63
architects of American Indian policy.

Congress could only

follow their lead and try to temper their excesses.

Ideals

of justice and humanity did not stop land-hungry pioneers
from trespassing onto, and stealing Indian lands.

And fron

tier opinions soon became the opinions of a majority of Ameri
cans.

There was no stopping westward expansion--and there

was no stopping cultural genocide that it entailed.

Every advantage, that could be expected or
even wished for, would result from such a
mode of procedure.
Our settlements would
be compact, government well established,
and our barriers formidable . . . the In
dians, as has been observed in General
Schuyler's letter, will ever retreat as
our settlements advance upon them . . . our
settlements will as certainly cause the
savage as the wolf, to retire ; both being
animals of p r e y , though they differ in
shape.
r
General George Washington, 1783
The end of the American Revolution marked the beginning
of a new era in white-Indian relations on the North American
continent.

Although most of the American Indians were allies

of Great Britain during the Revolutionary War, there was,
surprisingly, no mention of the Indians in the Treaty of
Paris of 1783.

To make matters more complex. Great Britain

arbitrarily ceded all of the Indians' land, from the Appala
chians to the Mississippi,

to the new United States of America,

The Indians could not understand how a treaty signed thousands
^Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, p. 8.
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of miles away could take from them their ancestral domain-particularly since the British and Indians militarily con
trolled the trans-Appalachian West at the close of the Revolu
tion.

The ambiguity of the Treaty of Paris set the stage for

an inevitable showdoim between the white man and the red man
in the Mississippi Valley.^
The clash began immediately after the Revolutionary War,
when thousands of pioneers moved west into the Indian terri
tory.

The Indians were enraged by this advance onto their

hunting grounds, and prepared to go to war to defend their
lands.

Although the pioneer squatters were not averse to war,

the leaders of the United States government definitely were.
A long, expensive Revolutionary War had just ended, and the
American Confederation needed peace badly.

To be sure, the

Americans claimed all of the trans-montane West by right of
conquest and the Treaty of Paris.

And they looked to the Ohio

Valley as a valuable source of land revenues, and an area for
future expansion.

But for the time being American expansion

must be without war.

One of the first important jobs of the

Reginald Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest,"
William and Mary Quarterly XVIII (1961):38; Horsman, Expansion
and American Indian P o l i c y , pp. 3-5; Downes, Council Fires,
p. 279. Downes notes a Wyandot plea to their defeated British
allies: "We don't know how to act 'till we hear from you,
and as we have gone hand in hand together, we hope to continue
so, and that you'll not allow your poor children to be crushed
under the weight of their enemies . . . Father depend upon it,
we have great reason to expect [the Americans] shortly-Father! Should a treaty of Peace be going on we hope your
children will be remembered in that treaty."
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in the regulation of Indian Affairs.

Article IX of the Articles

of Confederation stated ambiguously, "The United States in
Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive
right of . . . managing all affairs with the Indians, not m e m 
bers of any state, provided that the legislative right of any
7
State within its own limits be not infringed or violated."
The interpretations of this clause varied, as Nationalists and
Antifederalists disagreed as to just how much authority the
central government should have in such matters.

Finally, Con

gress decided the Indian situation necessitated action by the
national government.

They placed regulation of Indian affairs

under Secretary of War Henry Knox, and instructed him to n e g o 
tiate treaties with the Northern and Southern tribes.
tions of these treaties was imperative;

Negotia

the United States had

to establish permanent boundaries between themselves and the
Indian country.

But before negotiations could begin, a n a 

tional Indian policy had to be formulated.

In the Fall of

1783 Congress set out to create the first American Indian
policy.

8

Q
The committee on Northern Indians

was dominated by Eastern

7
Henry Steele Commager, e d . , Documents of American History
(New York, 1963), 1:111-15.
O
Mohr. Federal Indian Relations, p. 176; Harry M. Ward,
The Department of W a r , 1781-1795 (Pittsburgh, 1962), p. 55.
Knox's other duties included protecting settlers from Indian
attacks and evicting squatters from Indian lands.
Knox was
an Eastern Nationalist who favored centralization of Indian
affairs.
See section 3 below.
^The "Northern" tribes included the Six Nations, or
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Nationalists,^^ and the Northeastern perspective is apparent
in the proceedings of the committee with a few important e x 
ceptions.

The committee was greatly influenced by letters

from Nationalist Generals George Washington and Phillip
Schuyler of the Continental Army.

Washington's attitudes

towards westward expansion closely resembled those of many
Eastern Nationalists, and were fully stated in his letter
of September 7, 1783.^^

Washington had just returned from

a trip west, and reported that a "parcel of banditti" was
"skimming and disposing of the cream of the country" and
trespassing on the Indian lands.

General Washington warned

that if war was to be averted the national government would
have to assert its authority over the Westerners.

He

Iroquois Confederacy, and the Ohio Valley tribes.
The Six
Nations were the Mohawks, Onandogas, Senecas, and Cayugas
(who allied with the British during the Revolution), and the
Oneidas and Tuscaroras (American allies).
The Ohio Valley
tribes included the Wyandot, Delaware, Chippewa, Ottawa,
Shawnee, Miami, Wea, Piankashaw, Potowotomi, and Kickapoo
t ribes.
^Slembers of the committee on Northern Indians were
James Duane (chairman), Richard Peters, Daniel Carroll,
Benjamin Hawkins, and Arthur Lee.
Duane, Peters, and Carroll
were from the Northeast, and all five men belonged to the
Nationalist coalition.
^^George Washington to James Duane, September 7, 1783, in
Jared Sparks, ed.. The Writings of George Washington (Boston,
1838), VIII :477-484•
This important letter contains Washing
ton's ideas about westward expansion as well as his suggestions
for Indian policy.
The Duane committee did not accept all of
Washington's recommendations, however.
He advocated purchase
of Indian lands:
The "soil they live on can be had by purchase
at less expence" than war.
See Horsman, Expansion and American
Indian P olicy, p. 8. Washington's recommendations were adopted
in full by Nathan Dane and the Eastern Nationalist coalition in
1786-87.

68
believed American expansion must be gradual and controlled;
settlements should be supervised and compacted.

Territorial

government must be strong, and the boundaries between whites
and Indians clearly defined.
the same way.

12

General Schuyler felt much

He believed the United States could expand

peacefully westward onto Indian lands, but only if the e x 
pansion was gradual and closely regulated.

In his "Thoughts

Respecting Peace with the Indians" Schuyler spelled out a
plan for American Indian policy and westward expansion.

The

Indians would be told that since they were on the losing side
in the Revolution, the United States could rightfully take
possession of all their land west to the Mississippi.

How

ever, since the United States were "just and benevolent" they
would take only some of the land, allowing the Indians to
keep the rest.

Schuyler reasoned this same process could be

repeated over and over again, and the Indians driven farther
west as their lands were whittled away.

Thus the United

States could gradually expand, eventually acquiring all of
the Indians'

land without the cost of purchase or the tragedy

and expense of war:
[F]or as our settlements approach their coun
try, they must, from scarcity of game which
that approach will induce, retire farther
back, and dispose of their lands, unless they
dwindle comparatively to nothing as all sav
ages have done, who gain their Sustenance by
the chase, when compelled to live in the
12
Washington to Duane, September 7, 1783, in Sparks,
Writings of Washington, VIII :477-484.
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vicinity of civilized people, and thus
leave the country without the expence of
purchase, trifling as that probably will
be.
Schuyler and Washington's recommendations were typical
of many Northeasterners'

attitudes about westward expansion.

They wanted to expand, but only gradually, as in the colonial
"New England" tradition.

But the committee on Northern In

dians took a more aggressive stance, as would the Southerndominated Congress of 1784-85.

Contrary to Washington's

recommendation, the committee dismissed the need to purchase
title from the Indians.

The report of the committee on

Northern Indians called for a treaty conference to be held
with the Six Nations and the Ohio Valley tribes.

Those

tribes were to be informed of Great Britain's cession, and
told the United States claimed all of the trans-Appalachian
West by right of conquest.

Since the Americans

preferred

"clemency to rigor," the Indians would be granted peace,
and some lands on which to live.

The peace would begin with

an Indian land cession, however.

The Indians could not have

"any reasonable objections" to this, since they had lost the
Revolutionary War "and they possess no

other means to do

this act of justice than by compliance with the proposed
boundaries."

The report also discussed the specifics of the

boundary, provided land for the Oneidas and Tuscaroras
1%
Journals of the Continental Congress. XXV:680; Mohr,
Federal Indian Relations, pp. 97 , 100; Horsman, Expansion
and American Indian P o l i c y , p p . 5, 7-8.
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(American allies during the Revolution), and outlawed pr i 
vate purchases,

squatting, and trespassing on Indian lands.

This committee report on Northern Indians marked the formu
lation of an American Indian policy.

It remained to be seen

how Congressional logic would fare on the Northern frontier.
The committee on Southern Indians^^ did not submit its
report until May 28, 1784, and Congress did not accept it
until March 15, 1785.

The report was offered over the objec

tions of Georgia and North Carolina, both of whom refused to
cede their western lands to Congress and thereby denied Con
federation authority to legislate for Indians residing within
their boundaries.

Despite these objections. Congress adopted

a Southern Indian report quite similar to the October 15
report on the Northern tribes.

The Southern tribes were to

meet in council with American commissioners to form a treaty.
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXV:680-94.
Horsman. Expansion and American Indian Policy, pp. 10-11 ;
Prucha, Indian Policy, pp. 32-33; Ward, Department of W a r ,
p. 61.
The proposed boundary line would have run up the
Miami, Mad, and Maumee Rivers to Lake Erie.
This line was
soon abandoned when the Confederation demanded more territory
one year later.
The Oneidas and Tuscaroras were supposed to
keep all of their lands, but by the early nineteenth century
both tribes were confined to reservations.
Several other p r o 
visions provided for an Indian trade committee and called for
a committee to form a government for the trans-Appalachian
West.
The latter was chaired by Thomas Jefferson, who wrote
the Ordinance of 1784 the following spring.
See Chapter 3
a b ov e.
^^The Southern Indians were the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw,
and Chickasaw tribes in present-day Tennessee, Georgia, A l a 
bama, East Mississippi, and North Florida.
See R. S. Cotterill,
The Southern Indians: The Story of the Civilized Tribes Before
Removal (Norman, 1954).
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The commissioners were to tell them the United States needed
land for its soldiers,

settlers, and for payment of its debts,

Because the Southern tribes had lost the Revolutionary War
they must cede some of their lands to the United States:
The committee are of the opinion that care
should be taken neither to yield nor require
too much; to accomodate the Indians as far
as the public good will admit, and to avoid
the hazard of war, the expenses of which may
exceed the value of the acquisition sought
for; but it is supposed that when they shall
have been informed of the damages which our
citizens have sustained from their irruptions
and those of their British ally, all unrea
sonable objections will be suppressed.
The March 15 report contained provisions for regulating
trade, the return of prisoners of war, and guarantees for
Southern representation at the negotiations.

But Georgia’s

and North Carolina's opposition to the Confederation "inter
vention" was ominous.

No one knew how much force Confedera

tion Indian policy would have in the South.
Thus by the Spring of 1785 the Confederation Congress
had created an American Indian policy.

Congress ignored

W ashington’s recommendation to purchase title, and the d e 
cline of the Nationalist faction after 1783 led to an

Journals of the Continental Congress, XXVII:453-58;
Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, p. 139; Horsman, Expansion
and American Indian P o l i c y , pp. 9-11, 13-14.
Members of
the Southern Inaians committee were Richard Beresford,
Jeremiah Chase, Thomas Jefferson, Richard Spaight, and Jacob
Read.
Georgia and North Carolina’s objections notwithstand
ing, the committee’s report catered to the more aggressive
tenets of Southern expansionists.
Every member of the com
mittee was from the South.
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ill-conceived policy that was aggressive and often bellig
erent.

The United States demanded Indian land cessions on

the basis of right of conquest, but hoped to avoid war by
allowing the Northern and Southern tribes to keep some of
their lands.

This new Congressional policy completely

ignored colonial precedents recognizing Indian "right of
soil."

It was based upon right of conquest, but ignored the

fact that the British and Indians militarily controlled the
West at the close of the Revolution.

And many other impedi

ments loomed in the future of Confederation Indian rela
tions;

(1) the reluctance of Georgia and North Carolina to

cede their western lands;

(2) the haziness of Article IX,

and state opposition to Confederation intervention in Indian
affairs;

(3) growing westward migration, and the unjust con

duct of frontier settlers towards the Indians;
financial woes of Congress;

(4) the

(5) the forboding presence of

both Spain and Great Britain in the heart of Indian country;
and, most important of all,

(6) the resolve of the Northern

and Southern Indian tribes to fight to retain their lands-all of these forces promised to work against a successful
Indian policy.

And all of these factors were evident when

Congress implemented its Indian policy in the mid-1780s.

1 7

Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest,"
p. 38; Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy,"
pp. 9-11.
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You are mistaken in supposing that . . . you
are become a free and independent nation,
and may take what terms you please.
It is
not so.
You are a subdued people.
You have
been overcome in a war, which you entered
into with us, not only without provocation,
but in violation of most sacred obligations,
lv*hen we offer you peace in moderate terms,
we do it in magnanimity and mercy.
If you
do not accept it now, you are not to expect
a repetition of such offers. . . . We shall
now, therefore, declare to you the condi
tions, on which you can be received into the
peace and protection of the United States.
The American Indian Commissioners
at Fort Stanwix, 1784
At the Fort Stanwix conference your commis
sioners settled everything as they thought
would best suit them, and be most conducive
to their interests.
They pointed division
lines and at once confirmed them without
waiting to hear our opinion of it and whether
it would be approved by us or not, holding
that our country was added to them by the
King of England.
The language confused the
minds of our chiefs and deterred them from
making any reply; they kept saying if we did
not consent to their proposals, that their
warriors were at our backs and that we should
receive no protection from the King of Eng
land.
Such has been the language of your
commissioners at every treaty held with
us. . . . We are of the same opinion as the
people of the United States:
You call yo u r 
selves free and independent.
We, as the
ancient inhabitants of the country and sov
ereigns of the soil, say that we are equally
free as you or any other nation under the sun.
The Northern Tribes to the .
Secretary of War^
The Iroquois Confederacy and the Ohio Valley tribes
^^Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, p. 122; Horsman,
Expansion and American Indian P ol i cy , p. 15.
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readied themselves for their first council with the Ameri
can Indian commissioners.
(on the Ohio)

In a mass meeting at Sandusky

in 1783, the Six Nations and the Northwest

tribes formed an Indian confederation led by Mohawk chief
Joseph Brant.

Encouraged by several British officers, the

Indians vowed to not cede any lands to the United States
without the approval of their entire confederation.

They

set the Ohio River as the boundary beyond which the Ameri
cans could not pass.

When the United States called a

council at Fort Stanwix

(in the Mohawk Valley of New York)

in October of 1784, all the leaders of this Northern c on
federacy attended.

By the time the American commissioners

arrived, however, winter was approaching, and the Ohio
Valley tribes had gone home.

Thus from Brant's viewpoint

there could be no valid treaty or land cessions.

The Ameri

cans were determined to get a treaty, however, and threatened
military reprisal if they did not get their way.

Although

only a fraction of the Northern tribes remained, the Treaty
of Fort Stanwix was negotiated in October of 1784.
After several delays,
sioners

20

19

the five Confederation commis-

(three Southerners and two Northerners) gathered

Downes, Council F i r es , pp. 289-92,
The Treaty of
Fort Stanwix of 1784 is not to be confused with the Treaty
of Fort Stanwix negotiated between the British and the
Northern tribes following the French and Indian War.
20

The five Indian commissioners were George Rogers
Clark, Oliver Wolcott, Benjamin Lincoln, Richard Butler,
and Arthur Lee.
One of the delays at Stanwix was the problem
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the partial representatives of the Six Nations together
and informed them of the new American policy.

The Six N a 

tions strongly opposed the United States demands.

Corn-

planter, the Seneca chief, protested, "We Indians love our
lands.

We warriors must have a large country to range in,

as indeed our subsistence must depend on our having much
hunting ground."

The Americans

countered that the Indians

were a "defeated and subdued people".

They were being

offered "moderate terms," thanks to American "magnanimity
and mercy."

According to the American negotiators, the Six

Nations were not being asked to cede their lands, for they
had no lands to cede:

"We have given the hostile part of

the Six Nations some of the country which we have conquered
from them."

By this stage of the negotiations all pretence

of parley was cast aside.

The Americans talked belligerently

and threatened war if the Indians did not meet their demands.
They ended the discussions arbitrarily, stating:

"We shall

now, therefore, declare to you the conditions, on which you
can be received into the peace and protection of the United
of state sovereignty.
New York had not yet ceded its western
lands to Congress, and several New York state Indian commis
sioners arrived to negotiate a separate treaty with the Six
Nations.
When the New York negotiations finally collapsed,
the national commissioners took over.
New York did not cede
its western land claims to Congress until 1785.
See Chapter
3 above, as the state land cessions are particularly relevant
to the issue of sovereignty in Indian affairs.
The Southern
land cessions proved to be the most troublesome in regard to
Indian relations.
See Horsman, Expansion and American Indian
P o l i c y , p. 16; Downes, Council F i r es , p. 295; Mohr. Federal
Indian Relations, p. 109.
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S t a t e s . "21
In the Treaty of Fort Stanwix,

the partial representa

tives of the Six Nations yielded all their claims to lands
west of the western Pennsylvania border.
2?
peace, and some lands on which to live. “

They received
These terms were

quite similar to those reached three months later by A meri
can commissioners Richard Butler, Arthur Lee, and Samuel
Holden Parsons at Fort McIntosh

(on the upper Ohio, just

within the Pennsylvania state line).

Again, threatening

language exacted from small segments of the Wyandot, Dela
ware, Ottawa, and Chippewa tribes a cession which they and
their confederates immediately disavowed.

The one Northern

commissioner. Nationalist Samuel Holden Parsons of Massachu
setts, saw the folly of the American position:

"It is not

21

Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, pp. 16,
19; Downes, Council F i r e s , pp. 290, 295; Prucha, Indian Policy,
p. 34; Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest," pp. 3839.
For Congressional instructions to the American commis
sioners at Fort Stanwix, see Monroe to Jefferson, July IS,
1785, in Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed.. The Writings of
James Monroe (New York, 1898), 1:95. Also, Madison to Jeffer
son, October 11, 1784, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of
James Madison (New York, 1901), 11:80: "We found a small p or
tion only of the Six Nations assembled; nor was the number
much increased when we quitted the business. . . . What the
upshot of the Treaty will be is uncertain. . . . These ob
stacles will be rendered much more embarassing by the instruc
tions to the Commises which I am told leave no space for
négociation or concession, 5 will consequently oblige them in
case of refusal in the Indians to yield to the ultimate hopes
of Congress to break the Treaty.
But what will be the conse
quences of such an emergency?"
22

The tribes also agreed to return all American prisoners
of war.
For the Oneidas and Tuscaroras, see footnote number
14, above.
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my province to call in question the propriety of our p r o 
ceeds, yet . . .

is it not more expedient to give content

to the Indians by purchasing such tracts as they will sell
than to hold out an idea which fires their pride and alarms
their fears and will probably deluge our frontiers with
blood?”

But Lee and Butler declared, "we claim the country

by conquest, and are to give, not to receive."

Indian ob

jections were overruled and the Treaty of Fort McIntosh was
signed on January 21, 1785.
cult task:

This left one final but diffi

negotiating a cession from the most powerful of

the Ohio Valley tribes, the Shawnee.

21

Commissioners George Rogers Clark, Richard Butler, and
Samuel Holden Parsons met with some of the Shawnee at Fort
Finney

(at the mouth of the Great Miami in the Ohio country)

in late January of 1785.
mands,

After the Americans made their d e 

the Shawnee chief Kekewepellethe rebutted,

us this country.

"God gave

V»’e do not understand measuring out the

lands, it is all ours.

You say you have goods for our women

"The Treaty of Fort McIntosh," Archer B. Hulbert, ed.,
Ohio in the Time of the Confederation (Marietta, 1918), pp.
77-80.
See Washington to Richard Henry Lee, December 14,
1784, in Sparks, Writings of Washington, IX:76: "These p e o 
ple have given, I think, all the United States could reason
ably have expected of them."; William D. Pattison, Beginnings
of the American Rectangular Land Survey System. 1784-1800
(Chicago, 1957), p. 14; Mohr, Federal Indian Relations,
pp. 109-11; Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy,
pp. 19-20; Downes, Council Fires, p. 292.
For a good first
hand account, see Samuel Holden Parsons to William Samuel
Johnson, October 27, 1785, in Charles S. Hall, ed.. The Life
and Letters of Samuel Holden Parsons (New York, 1968), p. 475.
Parsons was a Revolutionary War officer. Nationalist, surveyor,
member of the Cincinnati, and a founder of the Ohio Company.
See Chapter 7 below.
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and children; you may keep your goods, and give them to
other nations.

We will have none of them."

commissioners grew angry.

The American

They threatened to burn the

Shawnee villages if they did not sign:

"The destruction of

your women and children depends on your present choice.
Peace or war is within your power."

These threats and the

presence of American troops evidently had some impact, as
Shawnee resistance collapsed.

They agreed reluctantly to

cede all their lands west of the Great Miami River in the
Treaty of Fort Finney,

signed January 31, 1785.^^

On the surface it appeared that by early 1785 the Con
federation accomplished all of the stated goals of its
Northern Indians committee report.

American Indian commis

sioners negotiated treaties with Indians at Forts Stanwix,
McIntosh, and Finney--and the United States gained cessions
to thirty million acres of the Ohio country.
this apparent success lay serious problems.

But underneath
Many of the

Northern tribes had not attended the treaty councils and did
not consider themselves bound by the provisions.

Congress

ignored B r an t’s confederacy, yet most of the confederacy's
members still insisted on an Ohio River boundary.
Americans'

The

belligerency had created much animosity among the

Northern tribes.

Moreover,

the United States had forced its

Clark and Butler were Southerners, Parsons was from
the Northeast.
See Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons: Horsman,
Expansion and American Indian P ol ic y, pp. 22-23; Mohr, Fed
eral Indian Relations, p. 115; Downes, Council F i r es , pp. 29597 .

79

f N io g o fo

D#ko*$
I Ft. F fo n k lin

* Fl. McînfoiK
\ P iU itu r o S

O viofonon

|W h o c » n g

/OP6HEQ
Ft. H a rm o f

A m o fic o n F o rt* on<J S e llle m e n ts
Brtltsh Post»

Ft. S te u b e n
\Q t k o t k io

L e x in g to n

L o u ttv iil

F o rt S îo n w lx T r e a ty lin e
F o rt M c ln to jK T re a ty lin »
F o rt F in n e y T re o ty Line
C la rk ( M llifo r y R oute)
L o g a n ( M llifo r y R oute)

^

B o o n e s b o ro u g S

Tndinn Relations in the N o rth w est, 1 7 8 3 -1 7 8 7

Billington,

will

u p o n the

up.

For

Westward

Indian s,

the

sh ock

the N o r t h e r n

, .

1784-1786
combined

it

somewhat
t he a u d a c i t y

soon awaken and

take

of C o n f e d e r a t i o n r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e S o u t h e r n

Cherokees,

C h i c k a s a w s , Cr ee ks ,

is c o n f u s i n g and f r u s t r a t i n g .
to p r e c l u d e

A lt h o u g h Congress
s t ro n g

t he y w o u l d

to b a c k

25

The history
tribes--the

tribes were

of B r i t i s h d e s e r t i o n and

of the A m e r i c a n t h r e a t s - - b u t
th eir v e n g e a n c e .

206.

bu t ha d no m i l i t a r y m u s c l e

the t im e b ei ng ,

m e s m e r i z e d by

E x p a n s i o n , p.

I

was

a successful

and

C h o c t a w s --f r o m

A n u m b e r of f a c t o r s

I n di a n p o l i c y

in the

s l ow and had no m o n e y to f i n a n c e

s o u t h e r n po l ic y ,

the m a j o r

impediments

to

South.
a

effective

25.
hvard D e p a r t m e n t of W a r , p. 66; H o r s m a n , E x p a n s i o n and
A m e r i c a n Tm l i a n P o l i c y , p . 22; M o n r o e to J e f f e r s o n , M a y 11,
1 786 , in H a m i l t o n , W ri t i n % s of. M Ç_n_roe , 1:126.
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Indian relations came from the Southerners themselves.

Land

speculators like North Carolina's sometime governor and
congressman William Blount were feverishly acquiring illegal
title to millions of acres of Indian land.

James Robertson

and the Franklinites were seizing Cherokee domain in what is
now Tennessee and North Georgia,

Since Georgia and North

Carolina refused to cede their western lands to Congress,
they maintained that the Confederation had no legal authority
to regulate Indian affairs within their state boundaries.

In

direct contradiction of Congress's interpretation of Article
IX and the national Indian policy, the Southern states nego
tiated numerous treaties with unrepresentative fragments of
the Southern Indian tribes.

Spanish intrigues in the South

west and Indian outrage over white settlement combined with
all of this interference to thwart the efforts of the Confederation's Southern Indian commissioners.

27

Those commissioners were chosen on March 5, 1785, when
Merritt B. Pound, Beniamin Hawkins. Indian Agent (Athens,
Georgia, 1951), p. 26.
Blount's appetite for Indian lands
was so infamous that among the Southern tribes he was known
as the "Dirt King" or the "Dirt Captain"!
27

Cotterill, Southern Indians, p. 65; Pound, Beniamin
H a w k i n s . p. 40; Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, pp. 141, 166;
Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, p. 37.
Some
illegal treaties negotiated by Southern states include
Georgia's treaty with the Cherokees and a few Creeks (May 31,
1783); Virginia's treaty with the Chickasaws (November 1783);
the Franklin-Cherokee Treaty of Chota Ford (July 1786); the
Georgia-Creek treaty of November 3, 1786; and the Treaty of
Shoulderbone (November 178 6).

81
Congress appointed Benjamin Hawkins, Daniel Carroll, William
Perry, Andrew Pickens, and Joseph Martin to treat with the
Southern tribes.

28

Not all of the tribes were interested in

negotiating, however.

The proposed council with the powerful

Creeks at Galphinton was canceled when only a handful of
Creeks appeared.

The overwhelming majority of Creeks fol

lowed the lead of their shrewd chieftan, Alexander McGillivray.
McGillivray,

a half-breed and full Colonel in the

British

army during the Revolution, was enraged by Georgia's encroach
ments on the Creek domain.

In 1784 McGillivray put the Creeks

on a war footing, secured Spanish aid, and laid the foundation
for a Southern Indian confederation.

That confederation issued

a proclamation denying the validity of the United States claim
to their country:
28

Burnett, Continental Congress, p. 628.
Originally,
Congress appointed only three commissioners--two Northerners
and one Southerner.
But the Southern states objected strenu
ously and Congress added two more commissioners (one each
from Virginia and North Carolina). Georgia was still unrep
resented, however, and their Congressman, William Houston,
wrote: "As we are much connected with the Southern Indians
I took the liberty to mention that I thought a commissioner
ought to be appointed from our State, but I was seriously
replyed to for suggesting that the least countenance ought
to be given so unworthy a state, and one that had not taken
a single federal measure."
Congress eventually appointed a
Georgian half-breed (McIntosh) to fill a vacancy on the
commission.
The most knowledgeable of all the Southern commissioners
was Benjamin Hawkins of North Carolina.
Hawkins, a Nationalist
and delegate to the Constitutional Convention, had a firsthand
acquaintance with the Indian situation and strove to bring a
degree of justice into Southern Indian affairs.
He violently
opposed the land speculators and was resultantly loathed by
most North Carolinean and Georgian politicians.
See Pound,
Benjamin Hawkins.
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We the chiefs and warriors of the Creek or
Talapuche, Chickasaw, and Cherokee nations do
most solemnly protest against whatever title,
pretension or demand the American congress may
establish for or against our territory, settle
ments, and hunting grounds, by virtue of said
Peace treaty between the King of Great Britain
and the American states, declaring that since
we are not party to it, thus we are determined
to pay no attention. . . . His Brittanic
Majesty has never posessed, either through
cessions, sale, or conquest, our territory,
nor that of which said treaty s p e a k s . 2 9
The negotiations with the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chicka
saw tribes at Hopewell

(in South Carolina)

in the winter of

1785-86 were much more successful than the Galphinton fiasco.
Benjamin Hawkins wrote that the Hopewell treaties aimed at
preserving the rights of the Southern t r i b e s . T h e three
T *1
treaties
provided for the return of prisoners of war, trade
regulation, punishment of trespassers on Indian lands, and a
liberal boundary settlement between the Indians and the Southern
states.

Unfortunately,

the Southerners' opposition to the

29

Creek Declaration in Mohr, Federal Indian Relations,
p. 144.
See also ibid., pp. 142, 148; Cotterill, Southern
Indians, p. 63.
The Creeks' refusal to parley at Galphinton
forced the Congressional commissioners to move on, but it did
not stop the Georgians from immediately negotiating an illegal
land cession from two malleable Creek chieftans. Fat King and
Tame King.
Much of McGillivray's opposition to the Americans can be
attributed to his own extensive land claims in the area.
^^See Hawkins to Jefferson in Pound, Benjamin Hawkins, p. 52,
^^The Americans negotiated three treaties at Hopewell,
one each with the Cherokees (November 18, 1785); Choctaws
(January 3, 1786); and Chickasaws (January 10, 1786).
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treaties rendered them virtually unenforceable.

Although the

commission took much of the Indians' land, it was not nearly
so much as Georgia and North Carolina wanted (North Carolina had
passed an act in 1783 declaring all the Cherokee claims within
their bounds null and void).

The state legislatures of

Georgia and North Carolina immediately disavowed the Treaties
of Hopewell and registered official protests.

In Congress,

William Blount complained that the treaties contained "several
stipulations that infringe and violate the legislative rights"
of North Carolina.

Hugh Williamson and John Ashe of North

Carolina proposed a "Resolution, purporting Congress's dis
avowal of such part of the Hopewell Treaty as ceded certain
Territory within the limits of the State as hunting grounds,
and sta[ting] our Claim to same.
where North Carolina left off.

..."

Georgia took up

One month after Hopewell, the

Georgia state legislature resolved that all treaties made by
the Confederation inconsistent with the "sovereign territorial
and legislative rights and privileges" of Georgia were "hereby
declared null and void."^^
52

Horsman, Expansion and American Indian P olicy, p. 29;
Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, ^
151; Horsman. Formative
Y e a r s . p . 9; John Ashe to Governor Richard Caswell (NC), in
Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress. VIII:639.
See
also Hugh Williamson to Governor Samuel Johnston (NC), ibid.,
pp. 789-90:
Williamson assured the North Carolineans, the
"Treaty of Hopewell will never operate against the Territorial
Claims of the State whenever she thinks fit to make them."
Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, p. 147.
Note that the politi
cal ideology of s tates’ rights and nullification had clearly
emerged in the South by the 1780s.
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Creek nations from the Old Southwest--even at the cost of war.
There were many causes for the Indian hostilities that
broke out on the Northern and Southern frontiers after 1784.
The ominous presence of the Spanish^^ and the British^^ in the
heart of Indian country was certainly a factor.

Both nations

33

The Spaniards' claims in the Old Southwest caused
them to view American expansion with great alarm.
Spanish
efforts to close the Mississippi River to American commerce
combined with an Indian policy aimed at thwarting American
westward expansion.
For Spanish relations with the South
ern tribes, see Arthur P. Whittaker, The Spanish-American
Frontier, 1785-1795: The Westward Movement and Spanish Re
treat in the Mississippi Valley (Boston, 1927), and The
Mississippi Ouestion, 1795-1803 (New York, 1934); Samuel F.
Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty (New York, 1926); Laurence Kinnaird,
e d . , Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794, 3 vols.,
American Historical Association Annual Report, 1945, II-IV
(Washington, 1946-49); Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, p. 142;
Pound, Beniamin H a w k i n s ; Cotterill, Southern Indians. See
also Madison to Jefferson, November 1, 1787, in Burnett,
Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII:
"We hear from
Georgia that that state is threatened with dangerous war
with the Creek Indians.
The alarm is of so serious a nature
that law martial has been proclaimed, and they are proceed
ing to fortify even the Town of Savannah.
The idea there
is, that the Indians derive their motives as well as their
means from their Spanish neighbors.
Individuals complain
also that their fugitive Slaves are encouraged by East
Florida.
The policy of this is explained by supposing that
it is considered as a discouragement to Georgians from
settlements near the Spanish boundaries."
^^For British-Indian relations, see Andrew C. McLaughlin,
"The Western Posts and British Debts" in the American Histori
cal Association Annual Report 1894 (Washington, 1895), pp.
413-44; A. L. Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and
British North America
(New Haven, 1940); G. S. Graham, "The
Indian Menace and the Retention of the Western Posts,"
Canadian Historical Review XV (March 1934):46-48; Orpha E.
Leavitt, "British Policy on the Canadian Frontier, 17821792: Mediation and an Indian Barrier State," Wisconsin His
torical Society, Proceedings, 1915 (Madison, 1916), 151-185;
Clarence W. Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics (Cleveland, 1917).
The British exercised an even greater influence over the
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had solid claims to territory in the Mississippi Valley; both
were eager to encourage Indian resistance to the American ad
vance by providing arms and ammunition, moral support, and
vague promises of military backing in the event of an allout war.

Yet most of the blame for Indian hostilities in

the mid-1780s can be placed directly on Americans.

Indeed,

the main factor leading to the bloody outbreaks was the bel
ligerent Confederation Indian Policy of 1783-1786.

The

Northern and Southern tribes refused to accept American claims

Indians of the Ohio country than did the Spanish over the
Southern tribes.
For reasons of diplomacy and commerce (i.e.,
fur t rade), Great Britain maintained a powerful military
presence in the Northwest, in direct violation of the Treaty
of Paris.
The British refused to evacuate seven of their
military posts in the Ohio Valley (Forts Oswego, Oswegatchie,
Niagra, Presque Isle (Erie), Sandusky, Detroit, and Michimackinac) and were thus a constant factor in American relations
with the Northern tribes.
Although refraining from a direct promise of military
support. Great Britain diplomatically convinced the Northern
Indians that they (the British) would somehow help the tribes
prevent American settlement beyond the Ohio.
They supplied
the tribes with trade goods and encouraged an Indian confed
eration and military alliance.
In this way Great Britain
kept the Northern tribes on a war footing without overtly
encouraging hostilities.
Throughout the 1780s, the British
watched the United States-Indian struggle from the vantage
point of their Northwest posts--and viewed the commencement
of the warfare for which they shared a partial responsibility.
Most historians have viewed the British Indian policy criti
cally.
They contend the British policy was based upon sel
fish commercial and diplomatic motives.
A. L. Burt, however,
credits Great Britain with unselfish motives in their 1780s
Indian policy.
He contends that the fur trade and 'power
plays' were of secondary importance, and that British 'guilt'
for the predicament of the Northern tribes was their main
motivation.
Since the American government was weak, and in
capable of effecting an equitable Indian policy. Great Britain
decided to stay in the Northwest to provide a balance of power
and thereby prevent destruction of the Indians.
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to their ancestral domains, disavowed the treaties of 17841786 (treaties which many of them had not signed), and d e 
clared war on the American intruders.

The Confederation

Congress was left to reap the tragic consequences of its
unrealistic Indian policy.
The Six Nations and Northwest tribes prepared for war
at a grand council at Britain's Fort Detroit in December of
1786.

Under the leadership of Joseph Brant, the tribes sent

an angry letter to the Confederation Congress.

They dis

avowed the Treaty of Paris, repudiated the treaties of Forts
Stanwix, McIntosh,

and Finney, and demanded that all American

land surveyors immediately cross back over the Ohio River.
The Northern confederation protested the American policy of
treating with separate tribes, insisting any Indian land ces
sion must be approved by the entire Northern Indian confederacy.
Brant and his allies called for new negotiations and a new
treaty--a treaty that would prohibit American settlement beyond
the Ohio.

If their demands were not met, the angry Northern

tribes promised to wage war and drive the Americans out by
f orce.

^^Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest," p. 40;
Prucha, Indian P o l i c y , p. 35.
^^Downes, Council F i re s , pp. 296, 299; Mohr, Federal
Indian Relations, p. 123; Horsman, Expansion and American
Indian P o l i c y , p. 23.
Tribes attending the Detroit council
were the Iroquois Confederacy, i.e., Seneca, Mohawk, Tuscarora,
Oneida, Cayuga, Onandoga nations, and the Wyandot, Delaware,
Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Poawatomi, Miami, Cherokee, Wea,
and Piankashaw of the Ohio country.
Several British officers
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Surprisingly,

the records of the Confederation Congress

show no acknowledgment of the Detroit proclamation until seven
months later.

In July of 1787 William Blount wrote that Con

gress had received a letter from Brant "counched in hostile
language.

. . . ”

He also said that reports from Kentucky and

Georgia indicated trouble, and there was "much Reason to fear
that Hostilities will shortly commence.

. . . ”

It was too

late to appease the enraged Northern and Southern tribes.

As

James Manning of Rhode Island observed.
The Savages have begun their barbarous depre
dations on our western frontiers, but probably
not without Provocation from some of the law
less Banditti which forms the Law of those
Settlements.
Many of the innocent must doubt
less be involved in ruin in consequences of
it.
The wretched deranged State of finances
of the federal Government will allow us, if
disposed, to allow these People but feeble
aids.37
American resistance to the Northern Indians' forays was

were also in attendance.
The surveyors to which Brant alludes
were surveying the Seven Ranges of the Ohio Valley
to besold
under the Land Ordinance of
1785.
See Chapter 5 below. For
conflicts between surveyors and Indians, see Pattison, Ameri
can Rectangular Land Survey System.
^^Mohr, Federal Indian
Relations,pp. 121-22;
Philbrick,
Rise of the W e s t , p. 142; William Blount to John Gray Blount,
July 19, 1786, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress.
VIII:624; James Manning to Hezekiah Smith, June 8, 1786, in
ibid., 362; James Monroe became quite aware of the foul mood
of the Northern tribes when
he traveled West in 1784.
See
Monroe to Jefferson, August
9, 1784, in Hamilton, Writings of
M o n r o e . 1:39:
"It is possible I may lose my scalp from the
temper of the Indians, but
if either a little fighting or a
great deal of running will save it I shall escape safe." Two
months later the Monroe party was "fir'd on by those Indians;
Mr. Teller § two men Killed, 8 a 4th. wounded."
Ibid.,
November 1, 1784.
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unorganized,
good.

ineffectual, and most often did more harm than

The Confederation Congress divided. Northeast vs. South
*7 0

over whether to aid the besieged settlers.

The best the

bankrupt Department of War could do was send two infantry
companies to the falls of the Ohio where they maintained a
purely defensive stance.

Virginia, however, organized two

offensive strikes under General George Rogers Clark and
Colonel Benjamin Logan in the summer of 1786 and November of
1787.

Clark enraged the Shawnee by burning several of their

villages, but his planned invasion of the Wabash country
fizzled.

Colonel L o ga n’s attack along the Great Miami aimed

at punishing warlike Mingos and Cherokees, but all Logan
managed to do was murder Melonthee, a Shawnee chief who was,
in fact, an American ally.

The net result of the Clark and

Logan raids was to unite all of the Northern tribes in their
hatred of the United States--stiffening their determination
to fight and thwart American expansion.
Meanwhile in the South, marauding bands of Cherokees
raided the North Carolina and Tennessee settlements, particu?O
Henderson, Party Politics, p. 385.
See also Rufus
King to Elbridge Gerry, June 8, 1786 in Burnett, Letters of
the Continental Congress, VIII:624:
"The lawless and probably
unjust conduct of the inhabitants of Kentucky towards the
Indians has lately occasioned the loss of a number of valuable
lives on the Frontiers of Virginia . . . the Govr: and the
Delegates of Virginia clamour for war against the Indian
Towns . . . .
I am decidedly against any such wars, and I at
present understand the Situation and State of Affairs."
7 Q

Ward, Department of War, p. 66; Mohr, Federal Indian
Relations, p. 126; Horsman, Expansion and American Indian
Policy, p. 33.
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larly those within Franklin.

The Creek Council declared war

against Georgia on August 2, 1786 and, on order from McGil
livray, Creek war parties terrorized the Southeastern frontier,
the Cumberlands, and burned Greensboro, Georgia to the ground.
The situation was so serious in Georgia that the state legis
lature declared martial law and ordered all slaves within six
teen miles of Savannah to fortify the town.

Georgians sent

urgent appeals to Congress, asking for aid, but Congress re
fused to help.

Some delegates charged that had Georgia coop

erated with the Confederation, "they would have avoided the
bloody War in which they are now involved in consequence of
their own violations of the Treaties held by the commissioners
of the United States with the Indians."
wanted to help,

Even if Congress had

it was incapable of acting.

Nationalist

Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire summed up the situation when
he wrote,

gloomily.

How these things will end time must reveal,
but if we are much longer to be unblessed
with an efficient National Government, des
titute of funds and without public Credit,
either at home or abroad, I fear we shall
become contemptible even in the eyes of the
Savages themselves.40
The warfare of 1786-1787 marked the collapse of the first

Cotterill, Southern Indians, pp. 70, 74; Ward, Depart
ment of W a r , pp. 70-71; Pound, Beniamin Ha wkins, p. 53; Vir
ginia Delegation to Edmund Randolph, December 11, 1786 in
Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII:687-88;
Nicholas Gilman to John Sullivan, November 7, 1787, in ibid.,
VIII:676.
See also Madison to Jefferson, November 1, 1787,
in ibid., VIII:663.
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Confederation Indian Policy.

In the beginning the policy

seemed a success, but Congress made tragic miscalculations.
In their haste to obtain western lands the American commis
sioners negotiated belligerently and with only small frag
ments of the Indian tribes.

They claimed all of the West

even though the Indians controlled the region.

The Northern

and Southern tribes were stunned initially by the audacity
of the American position, but they soon awakened.

Angered

by Indian commissioners and frontiersmen, and encouraged by
Britain and Spain, the Northern and Southern tribes retali
ated violently.

The United States found themselves embroiled

in an Indian war--a war for which the bankrupt Confederation
Congress was totally unprepared.
The collapse of Confederation Indian policy was just one
of the problems of the Confederation government.

Disunity,

lack of revenue, the split over state sovereignty--these
difficulties plagued all aspects of Confederation policy, not
just Indian affairs.

The alleged failure of the government

under the Articles of Confederation to resolve these problems
brought about the reemergence of a group of leaders, the
Nationalists, who attempted to strengthen the coercive powers
of the national administration.

By 1787 the Nationalists

were advocating the Federal Constitution as the answer to
A me r i c a ’s woes.

In the meantime they tried to strengthen the

^^Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, pp. 15,
30-31; Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest," p. 39.
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Confederation, centralize administration, and limit state
sovereignty.

Some of them, the Eastern Nationalists,

tried

to change American Indian policy.

The committee conceive that it has long
been the opinion of the country, supported
by Justice and humanity, that the Indians
have just claims to all lands occupied by,
and not purchased from them.
Nathan Dane, 1787
Report on Southern Indians
The utmost good faith shall always be ob
served towards the Indians; their land and
property shall never be taken away from
them without their consent; and in their
property, rights, and liberty, they shall
never be invaded or disturbed, unless in
just and lawful wars authorized by Congress;
but laws founded on justice and humanity shall
from time to time be made, for preventing
wrongs done to them, and preserving peace and
Friendship with them.
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787
The collapse of Confederation Indian policy coincided
with the reemergence of the conservative or Nationalist faction
in Confederation politics.

The Nationalists, relatively inac

tive since 1783, renewed their efforts to secure a stronger
central government.

Many of the Nationalists served in Con

gress during 1785-1787,

and their philosophy can be seen in

the western policy of that period.

Prucha,

Eastern Nationalists like

Journals of the Continental Congress, XXXIII:485;
Indian Relations, pi TE~.
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John Jay, Henry Knox, Rufus King, Timothy Pickering, and
Nathan Dane only reluctantly favored westward expansion, and
some of them were against it altogether.
expansion,

If there was to be

these Eastern Nationalists wanted it to be gradual,

well-organized and onto speculator-owned lands under juris
diction of a strong territorial government.

George Washington

agreed with these men, and wrote James Duane urging that settle
ments be "compact" and "government well established."

Timothy

Pickering asked Congress to make sure "the settlement of
that country may be effected with regularity."

To allow the

West to be overrun with scattered settlers was, according to
Washington,

"inconsistent with the wisdom and policy which

our true interest dictates.
The Nationalists'

attitudes towards the West naturally

affected their views on American Indian p o l i c y . T h e

Nation

alists, particularly the Easterners, thought the Indian
hostilities of 1786-87 were the inevitable result of unre
strained westward migration.

In seeking to control that

George Washington to James Duane, September 7, 1783, in
Sparks, Writings of Washington, VIII:480; Timothy Pickering to
Elbridge Gerry, March 1, 1785, in Timothy Pickering, The
Timothy Pickering Papers (Boston, 1896), reel 5, p. 347; Wash
ington to Williamson, March 15, 1785, in Sparks, Writings of
Was hi ng to n. IX:105.
For the Nationlists and the West, see
Jensen, New N a t i o n , pp. 122-25, and Kohn, Eagle and Sword.
^^See Washington to Duane, September 7, 1783, in Sparks,
Writings of Wa shington, VIII:484:
"The settlement of the
western country, and making a peace with the Indians are so
analagous, that there can be no consideration of the one,
without involving the other."

94
expansion they advocated a more just and equitable Indian policy.
Indeed, the conservative Nationalists held some of the most
enlightened views toward the American Indian of the early
national period.

There are several reasons for this.

The

relative isolation of New England from the frontier meant that
many Eastern Nationalist leaders had no serious Indian threat
within their borders.

Their social and religious backgrounds

certainly made them more receptive to humanitarian notions
concerning the red man.
ing, King, and

Eastern Nationalists like Jay, Picker

Dane formed the nucleus of the anti-slavery

movement in the United States, and they shared a similar sym
pathy for the plight of the Indians.

Rufus King wrote of the

"lawless and probably unjust conduct of the inhabitants of
Kentucky towards the Indians," and John Jay evinced both his
humanitarianism and his Nationalism when he observed;
The western Indians are uneasy and seem in
clined to be hostile.
It is not to be won
dered at.
Injustice is too often done them,
and the aggressors escape with impunity; in
short, our governments, both particular and
general, are either so impotent or so very
gently administered as neither to give much
terror to evil-doers nor much support and
encouragement to those who do well.45

Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, in King, Correspondence
of Rufus K i n g , 1:180; John Jay in Henry P. Johnston, e d . , The
Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay (New York, 1890) ,
111:249.
For humanitarianism, see "Humanitarianism and Sentimen
tality" in Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American
Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel H i l l , 1968),
p p . 365-72 : "The growth of humanitarianism, one of the most
profound and least explicable develpments of the eighteenth
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century . . . was quietly but effectively equalitarian . . .
a number of circumstances combined to nurture an especially
strong humanitarian movement in America. . . . Ironically,
the presence of two more primitive races tended to stimulate
humanitarianism."
See also Bernard Sheehan, Seeds of Extinc
t i o n , p. 4:
"The elimination of savagery, many reasoned,
could be accomplished in more refined and humanitarian ways.
The Indian need not be destroyed . . . the white man had a
moral obligation to see that the tribesmen survived."
Shee
han argues that Federalists and Antifederalists alike were
caught up in the humanitarian attitudes towards the Indian:
"Men so disparate as Timothy Pickering and Thomas Jefferson
thought and acted in concert on the question of the Indians."
Ibid., p. 6.
I would contend that several circumstances combined to
render the Eastern Nationalists more responsive to a humani
tarian Indian policy.
As mentioned, the isolation of New
England is important, as was involvement in the anti-slavery
movement.
See Jordan, White Over Black, pp. 365-72.
Although
some Southerners, most notably Jefferson, had some doubts about
slavery, the Manumission Society of the 1780s was an entirely
New England affair, with John Jay as its first president.
Besides Jay, King, Pickering, and Dane, Eastern Nationalist
anti-slaveryites included Alexander Hamilton, Samuel Hopkins,
James Pemberton, Benjamin Rush, and Noah Webster.
It was
Eastern Nationalists who revived Jefferson's plan to outlaw
slavery in the territories and incorporated that provision
into the Northwest Ordinance.
See Chapter 7 below.
But the most convincing proof of Eastern Nationalist
affinity for a just and equitable Indian policy exists in the
writings of the time.
Most of the documents that evidence any
compassion or sympathy for the plight of the Indian were
written by either Easterners or Nationalists.
See King to
Gerry, June 8, 1786, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental
Congress. VIII:624, or footnote number 36; see John Jay to
John Adams in Johnston, Correspondence of John J a y , 111:215:
"The newspapers herewith sent will give you information in
detail of Indian affairs, but they will not tell you what
however is the fact, that our people have committed several
unprovoked acts of Violence against them.
These acts ought
to have excited notice of the government and been punished in
an exemplary manner."
Or Alexander Hamilton in Harold Syrett
et al.. The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1969),
111:468:
"The attempt at the expulsion of so desultory a
people is as chimerical as it would be pernicious.
It has
not a single object for the acquisitions of their lands is
not to be wished 'till those now vacant are settled." See
also Theodore Sedgwick, 4th. Congress, Annals of Congress
(April 1796), p. 900, in the Epilogue to these essays, below.
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An equitable Indian policy fit perfectly into the Eastern
Nationalists’ overall plan for the development of the West,
as the Indians were certainly the most effective means of
controlling westward migration.

They formed a formidable

barrier and discouraged encroachments by frontier settlers.
If the Indians were dispossessed, then there would be nothing
to restrain the Westerners.

"Tho numbers in defiance of the

authority of the States, cross the Ohio,” observed Timothy
Pickering,
ground."

"yet few would be hardy enough to settle on Indian
But if all the Indians’ lands were taken "to the

Mississippi,
of it."

like lawless emigrants will spread over the whole

And Rufus King queried, "Would not the Indian Claims

prevent emigration on the Western Side of the Ohio?"^^

The

One of the foremost advocates of a just Indian policy
was Henry Knox, the Nationalist Secretary of War.
Knox was
zealous in his eviction of squatters from the Indian country
and in protecting the rights of the Indians.
See Mohr, Fed
eral Indian Relations, p. 171:
"It is, however, painful to
consider that all the Indian tribes once existing in those
states now the best cultivated and most populous, have become
extinct.
If the same causes continue, the effects will hap
pen and, in short period the idea of an Indian this side of
the Mississippi will be found only in the pages of the his
torian."
See also Prucha, Indian Policy, p. 41:
"The Indians
have constantly had their jealousies and hatred excited by the
attempts to obtain their lands.
I hope in God all such de
signs are suspended for a long period."
Another Nationalist humanitarian was Indian agent Ben
jamin Hawkins of North Carolina.
See Hawkins to Jefferson,
1786, in Pound, Beniamin Hawkins, p. 52:
"You will see by
the Treaties which I enclose how attentive I have been to the
rights of these people; and I can assure you there is nothing
I have more at heart than
the preservation of them.
It is a
melancholy reflection that the rulers of America, in rendering
an account to Heaven of the aborigines thereof, will have lost
everything but the name. . . ."
46pickering to King,

in King, Correspondence of Rufus
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Eastern Nationalists wanted gradual expansion, closely super
vised by the federal government--expansion that appeased the
Northern and Southern tribes and prevented an Indian war.
This led them to repudiate the disastrous Indian policy of
1783-1786.

From 1786 through 1787, the Eastern Nationalists

attempted to change American Indian policy--to make it more
just and less aggressive.

In the Ordinance of 1786, the

Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and the Southern and Northern
Indian Affairs Reports of August 1787, they advocated a more
centralized and equitable Confederation Indian policy.

They

reintroduced the British recognition of Indian right of soil
and the necessity of bona fide purchase.
t ives’ efforts were in vain.

But the conserva

No amount of reason could re

strain the restless pioneers, and these aggressive frontiers
men made an equitable Indian policy impossible.
The Ordinance of 17 86, "an ordinance for regulating the
Indian department," reflected the attempt to formulate a
truly uniform and centralized Indian policy.

This Ordinance

was drafted by Rufus King, and a committee consisting of
William Samuel Johnson, Charles Pinckney, John Kean, and
James Monroe.

The Ordinance of 1786, accepted by Congress on

K i n g , 1:103; King to Pickering, in ibid., 1:104-5.
See also
Pickering to King, June 4, 1786, in ibid., 1:106-7:
"If
such savage emigrants encroach on the Indian territory, or
commit any outrages, nothing short of a military force will
be able to bring them to Justice . . . to prevent [Indian
wars] resulting from such emigrations I could wish the
Indians might be expressly authorized by treaty, to break
up every settlement within their territory."
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August 7, contained two major thrusts:

(1) The establishment

of a centralized, national Indian department; and (2) Regula
tion of trade with the Northern and Southern tribes.

C on

gress created a Department of Indian Affairs under the
authority of Henry Knox, the Secretary of War.

The Indian

Department consisted of a Northern and a Southern district
(as in the British colonial system), each with a superinten
dent responsible only to Knox.

The superintendent had to

take a loyalty oath and post a $6,000.00 bond to guarantee
good conduct.

The Ordinance was quite explicit about trade.

Only United States citizens could trade with the Indians,
and they must have a license.
plus a $3,000.00 bond.

The license fee was $50.00,

Congress forbade the use of liquor

in the white-Indian transactions, and finally:

"Any trader

or other person employed by a trader, treating an Indian in
an unjust manner shall on due proof thereof being made be
deprived of his license or fined.
The Southern states were naturally quite hostile to such
a measure,
affairs.

since it threatened their sovereignty in Indian
Timothy Bloodworth of North Carolina tried to amend

the Ordinance and reduce national authority in licensing
traders and conducting negotiations with the Indians.

But

Journals of the Continental Congress, XXXI:49-53 and
XXX:37 0; Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Poli cy , p. 33;
Prucha, Indian Po l i c y , p. 56; Mohr, Federal Indian Relations,
p. 105.
The superintendent's salary was $1,000 per year.
The first appointees were Richard Butler in the North and
James White in the South.
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only North Carolina,
ment.

48

Georgia, and New York voted for the amend-

Representatives William Houston and William Few of

Georgia moved to omit that portion of the Ordinance of 1786
pertaining to Indians south of the Ohio, but their measure
was also defeated.

In a final compromise, however, the

Southerners inserted a provision requiring the Southern Indian
superintendent to "act in conjunction with the authority of
[the] state" whenever execution of the Ordinance interfered
with the "legislative right of a state."

This hazy stipulation

weakened the Ordinance's centralizing effect, but the Indian
Ordinance of 1786 was nevertheless a step in the direction of
a strong and equitable national Indian policy.
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provides another good
example of Eastern Nationalist Indian policy.

In drafting a

plan of government for the Ohio country, the Nationalists in
Congress showed their desire for gradual, well-ordered expan
sion into the trans-Appalachian West.

The system of govern

ment they instituted was much like the British colonial system
and lent itself to political control by Northeasterners and
landed interests in the Ohio V a l l e y . T h e

Northwest Ordinance

of 1787 espoused a humane attitude towards the Indians.
4-8
New York desired lands from the Six Nations and often
allied with Georgia and North Carolina in arguing for state
sovereignty in Indian affairs.
New York did not cede its
western land claims until 1786.
See footnote number 20,
a bove.
^Journals of the Continental Congress, XXX:419, and
XXXI :4 85, ~4"93".
^^See Chapter 7, below.
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Expansion was still the goal, but the Northeastern plan for
expansion was less belligerent and more tempered than previous
Confederation policy.

Congress recognized Indian rights of

prior occupancy and proposed cash purchase.

Negotiations and

bargaining would replace a policy of overt dictation.
the Congress pledged,

And

somewhat optimistically, the "utmost

good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians; their
land and property shall never be taken from them without their
consent.

. . .

The warfare on the Southern and Northern frontiers in
1786 and 1787 produced two committee reports that most accu
rately reflect the Confederation Congress’s changing attitudes
towards Indian affairs.

Both reports

(August 7 and 9, 1787)

were drafted by Nathan Dane, and came from committees dominated by Easterners and Nationalists.

52

The report on Southern

Journals of the Continental Congress. XXXII:340.
The
provision concerning Indians in the Northwest Ordinance was
probably written by Rev. Manasseh Cutler, a Massachusetts
Nationalist and lobbyist for the Ohio Company in Congress.
See Chapter 7, below, and Jay A. Barrett, The Evolution of
the Ordinance of 1787 (New York, 1891), pp. 69-70, 72.
See
also Prucha, Indian P o li cy , p. 37; Ward, Department of W a r ,
p. 68; Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, p. 37;
Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest," p. 40.
^^Journals of the Continental Congress. XXXIII:4SS-63,
477-81.
Members of the committee on Southern Indians were
Dane, Dyre Kearny, Edward Carrington, William Bingham, and
Melancton Smith.
All except Smith were Nationalists--all
except Carrington Easterners.
The Northern Indian Affairs
committee members were Dane, Benjamin Hawkins, John Kean,
William Irvine, and Edward Carrington.
While Hawkins, Kean,
and Carrington were from the South, Hawkins and Carrington
were Nationalists and Kean was an Independent.
William Irvine
was a Pennsylvanian who later joined the Jeffersonians.
Nathan Dane exercised considerable influence in drafting both
r e po rt s.
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Indians was a response to Georgia’s appeal for military aid
to battle the Creeks.

The committee rejected

this plea,

and blamed the Georgians for the outbreak of hostilities:
Various circumstances shew that the Indians,
in general, within the United States want
only to enjoy their lands without interrup
tion. . . . [But] several tribes complain
that their land is taken from them . . . their
is sufficient evidence to show that those
tribes do not complain altogether without
cause.
An avaricious disposition in some of
our people to acquire large tracts of land
and often by unfair means appears to be the
principal source of difficulties with the
Indians.
The committee’s solution to the problem was further centraliza
tion of Indian affairs.

They contended that Article IX called

for Congressional control of Indian policy.

Georgia and North

Carolina’s claims of state sovereignty had produced nothing
but "confusion,
making

disputes,

and

embarassments."

The powers for

war and peace with the Indians, purchasing their lands,

evicting squatters, and fixing boundaries with them "appear to
the committee to be indivisible," and rightly belonged to the
Confederation Congress.

Georgia and North Carolina’s failure

to keep peace with the Southern tribes was sufficient proof
they were incapable of managing their own Indian affairs.
committee recommended,

in conclusion,

that Georgia and North

Carolina cede their western lands to Congress and accept a
centralized national Indian policy.

The

As for the requested

military aid, "Congress can never employ the forces of the
Union in any cause, of the justice of which they are not
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fully convinced.
On August 9, Nathan Dane's committee on Northern Indian
affairs issued a report that carried the new policy recommenda
tions one step further.

The report reviewed the dismal state

of Northern Indian affairs, noting the war posture of the
angry Northern tribes, Brant's confederacy, and the Indians'
repudiation of the treaties of Forts Stanwix, McIntosh, and
Finney.

The committee recommended a reappraisal of American

Indian policy.

If total war was to be avoided, the United

States would have to start all over again.

A new treaty

should be negotiated with all of the Northern tribes, as per
B r a n t ’s demand.

Moreover,

instead of a language of superiority and com
mand; may it not be politic and Just to treat
the Indians more on a footing of equality,
convince them of the Justice and humanity of
the United States as well as their disposition
to promote the happiness of the Indians?
and
instead of attempting to give lands to the
Indians to proceed on the principle of fairly
purchasing them and taking the usual deeds.54
Thus, for the first time in the new nation's history.
Congress advocated acquiring Indian lands by bona fide purchase
of t i t l e . F a c e d with the collapse of the aggressive 1783-1786

^^Journals of the Continental Congress, XXXIII :455-63.
^^Ibid., pp. 477-81; Horsman, Expansion and American Indian
P ol ic y, p. 41; Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest,"
p. 41.
^^This return to the old British policy represents an
Anglicization of American Indian policy.
Washington, of course,
had advocated purchase four years earlier in his September 7
letter to Duane.
But Congress thought, as did Schuyler, that
even purchase was unnecessary.
Thus Congress finally accepted
Washington's unheeded advice.
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policy and an Indian war, the Eastern Nationalists transformed
American Indian policy and attempted to make it more equitable.
Expansion was still the goal, but the Northeasterners planned
for the post-1787 expansion to be less ruthless than the u n 
restricted flood of migration that followed the Revolution.
Now expansion was to be slow and organized, and into terri
tories where a solid government was waiting.

Of course this

"new" expansion necessitated Indian land cessions, but they
were to be obtained from the Northern and Southern tribes by
fair purchase in honest negotiations.

After selling some of

their lands, the Indians would live on the millions of acres
to the west of the American settlements.

There would be plenty

of land for all--or so the Eastern Nationalists thought.

No one in 1787, particularly the Eastern Nationalists, had
any idea of the proportions the westward movement would take.
Over the next quarter of a century hundreds of thousands of
American pioneers crossed the Appalachians and settled in the
Mississippi Valley.

The red man's civilization was inevitably

crushed by this expansion.

The Confederation decision to pur

chase Indian lands in 1787 was a step in the direction of an
equitable Indian policy, but viewed in the total perspective
its effects were miniscule.

Americans may have salved their

consciences by introducing purchase money into their trans
actions with the Indians, but the fact remains that the Indians
did not want to sell their lands at all.

It mattered little to

104
the Indians whether the loss of their ancestral domains was
occasioned by sale, coercion, or outright seizure.

The con

flict between white Americans and native Americans over land
had no solution.

The introduction of purchase money by the

Americans only tended to shadow that unalterable fact.^^
The 1788-1789 American Indian policy is a good example
of this phenomenon.

To be sure. Congress reintroduced the

practice of purchasing Indian lands.

But they all but ignored

the other recommendations of the Northwest Ordinance and the
Dane committees calling for "Justice and humanity" and the
"utmost good faith" in dealing with the Northern and Southern
tribes.

Resultantly,

there was little, if any, change in the

overall relationship between whites and Indians.

In the winter

of 1788-1789 Ohio territorial governor Arthur St. Clair nego
tiated two treaties with the Northern tribes at Fort Harmar.
The treaties of Fort Harmar were dictated, and their terms were
nearly identical to those of Forts Stanwix, McIntosh, and
Finney.

The only difference was the payment of $9,000.00 to

See Jordan, White Over B l a c k , p. 350:
"During the post
war years of governmental drift and economic depression, mor e
over, the rhetoric of natural rights became increasingly
irrelevant to the n a t io n’s problems.
Americans found the
philosophy of natural rights, bedrock of the Revolution, could
not be made to serve as the cornerstone for effective govern
ment."
See also, Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, p. 11:
The
humanitarians of the early national period could "be accused
of treating the natives more like a precious abstraction than
a living human being.
For the Indian it wanted only the best,
but that meant ultimately the elimination of the tribal order,
for which the Jeffersonian age must bear its share of the
responsibility.
Its crime was a willful failure of the in
tellect but not of the will."
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the Northern Indians,

Again, many of the tribes did not

attend the councils, and those who did were coerced into
signing.

Money was given to salve the Indians’ anger and

the A me ricans’ consciences.
changed.

American Indian policy had not

The only difference was that the Americans now had

an excuse not to feel guilty.
In the South the new Confederation policy did little to
remedy the chaos of the 1780s.

North Carolina and Georgia

continued their aggressive behavior towards the Southern
tribes and the Confederation Congress was powerless to stop
them.

Secretary of War Knox accused North Carolina of "the

most unprovoked and direct outrages against the Cherokee In
dians," concluding that "all other tribes will have good
grounds not only according to their o\m opinion but according
to the impartial judgements of the civilized part of the human
race for waging perpetual warfare against the citizens of the
United States."

The Americans did not secure treaties with

the Southern tribes until 1792.

But these treaties. Northern

and Southern, were only stop-gap measures.

The frontier

breathed a sigh of relief and awaited the policy of the new
c7
federal government.
^^For the Treaty of Fort Harmar (1788-89), see Mohr,
Federal Indian Relations, pp. 128, 133, 137-38; George Mor
gan to Sam Adams, 1792:
"we attempted to patch the business
at Fort Harmar where but few of the natives attended and
none were fully represented; here the treaty was negotiated
and speeches and explanations made to the Indians in the
French language through a Canadian interpreter who had to
guess at his meaning for he can neither write nor speak the
language so as to make himself understood in any matter of
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The policy of the 1790s was much the same as the old.
Although the conservative Federalists would have liked to
limit expansion onto Indian lands,

58

they were powerless to

stop the dynamic force of the westward movement.

With the

rise of the Jeffersonians, the frontier settlers gained a
more sympathetic hearing in Congress.
the frontiersmen were always the ^

And in the long run,

facto architects of

American Indian policy.

Full-scale war soon broke out on

the Northern frontier,

climaxing in Anthony Wayne's victory

at Fallen Timbers in 1795.

The Southern Indians’ resistance

collapsed after Andrew Jackson's victory at Horseshoe Bend
in 1814.

Thus the Eastern Nationalists' plans for an orderly

and peaceful westward advance came to naught.

The number of

Americans who cared whether or not the United States expan
sion entailed honor and fair treatment of the Indians dwindled
to relatively nothing.
Indian

By the 1830s, treaties, wars, and

'removal' had effectively cleared the eastern half of

the Mississippi Valley of its original inhabitants.

The ex

tirpation of their western breathren was left to a new genera
tion of Americans.

that importance.
It was a misfortune he could find no other
medium."
See also, Downes, Council Fires, pp. 304, 306, 308;
Cotterill, Southern In dians. p. 86; Horsman, Expansion and
American Indian P o licy, pp. 47-50; Pound, Beniamin Hawkins,
p. 60; Ward, Department of W a r , p. 74; Horsman, "Indian Policy
in the Old Northwest," pp. 41-42; Mohr, Federal Indian Rela
tions . p. 171.
ro

For Federalist Indian policy, see the Epilogue, below.

CHAPTER V
SALES OF THE PUBLIC LANDS
To hit upon a happy medium price for the
Western lands, for the prevention of m o 
nopoly on one hand, and not discouraging
useful settlement on the other, will, no
doubt, require consideration;
but ought
not, in my opinion, to employ too much
time before the terms are announced. The
spirit of emigration is great.
People
have got impatient, and, though you c a n 
not stop the road, it is yet within your
power to Mark the way; a little while,
and you will not be able to do either.
George Washington to Richard
Henry Lee, 1784^
Land has always been of utmost importance in the Ameri
can experience.

It lured millions of emigrants from Europe,

and sent them westward to populate the continental United
States.

In America,

land became the avenue to opportunity--

opportunity to achieve prosperity, prestige, and the social
and political equality that accompanied them.

As soon as

Americans learned the 'art* of acquiring Indian title, they
began to devise methods for parceling out their vast domain.
Colonial Americans, particularly those in the Middle and
Southern colonies, established precedents for cheap or free

^Washington to Lee, December 14, 1784, in Sparks, Writ
ings of George Washington, IX:81.
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land, and preemption and "squatter's rights."
Britain,

When Great

in its quest for colonial revenues, tried to change

this policy,

the colonists objected strenuously.

Objections

to British land policy were one of the many grievances that
led to the Revolution in 1776.
The National Domain became a reality when the Confedera
tion Congress

acquired the state land cessions and Indian

title to the Old Northwest in the 1780s.

Although the thir

teen individual states adopted radical land policies in the
1780s, the Confederation Congress followed a different
route.

2

The need for revenue resulted in a Congressional

policy of using public land sales to fund the national debt.
Congress still had considerable options in land policy, how
ever.

Most of these choices revolved around the "New England"

vs. "Southern" systems of land disposal.

Was settlement to

advance slowly by compact groups onto 30,000-acre "townships,"
as in New England?

Or would settlement be in a less organized

manner onto smaller individual lots, as in the South?

These

were the opposing views around which the land policy debate
revolved.
2

The members of the two sides varied, but basic

There are numerous works which discuss Confederation
land policy, but many are superficial and repetitive.
The
books used for this essay are Payson J. Treat, The National
Land System. 1785-1820 (New York, 1910); Pattison, American
Rectangular Land Survey S ystem. See also Henry Tatter,
"State andpederal Land Policy During the Confederation,"
Agricultural History IX (October 1935); Amelia Clewley Ford,
Colonial Precedents of our National Land System as It Existed
in 1800 (Madison, 1910).
The latter is a doctoral disserta
tion done under Frederick Jackson Turner.
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patterns emerged.
and Southerners;

The debate was between Northeasterners
land speculators and western settlers;

conservatives and liberals; Eastern Nationalists and a
%

Southern-Antifederalist alliance.
Thomas Jefferson and Hugh Williamson wrote a Southernoriented Land Ordinance of 1784, but Congress never accepted
it.

Many Eastern Nationalists opposed this Southern plan,

and demanded a land system more akin to the New England mode
of land disposal.

As the two factions debated in 1785, their

differing philosophies toward westward expansion became ob 
vious.

While the South advocated rapid, and loosely organized

expansion, the Easterners insisted on a very slow, gradual
westward advance--closely regulated by a strong national
For the basic dichotomy over land legislation, see Roy
M. Robbins, Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1956
(Lincoln, 1962), p. 9:
"The fact is that much of the history
of the national land system centers around the struggle b e 
tween these two forces of squatterism and speculation, between
the poor man and the man of wealth . . . the opening of vacant
lands to the westward always stimulated a peculiar democratic
levelling influence . . . but the forces of order, on the
other hand, contended that free land would destroy the politi
cal and economic values upon which the government was founded."
See also Turner, Frontier in American History, pp. 25-26:
"Efforts to make this domain a source of revenue, and to
withold it from migrants in order that settlement might be
compact were in vain.
The jealousy and fears of the East were
powerless in the face of the demands of the frontiersmen. . . .
The reason is obvious; a system of administration was not what
the West demanded; it wanted land." Also Tatter, "Land Policy
During the Confederation."
Tatter calls the Confederation Con
g r e s s ’s policy "rank imperialism."
This Progressive interpre
tation of East vs. South and West; Rich vs. Poor; Privilege
vs. Democracy, etc. is, of course, oversimplified.
But when
it is refined and the exceptions pointed out, however, its
basic premises still hold true.
This writer considers himself
to be a "tempered" Turnerian.
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government.

Whereas the South looked forward to new western

states entering the Union,

the Northeast feared this would

result in a decrease in their economic and political suprem
acy.

Both sides wanted revenues from public land sales, but

for opposite reasons.

The Eastern Nationalists believed

land sales would provide an independent revenue, thus strength
ening the national government.

Southerners and Antifederalists

favored land sales in order to avoid the impost and taxation
schemes of Morris and the Nationalists.^

The opposing sides

did finally compromise, however, and passed the Land Ordinance
of 1785.

This revenue measure was a victory for the New E n g 

land system of land development.
settled.

Yet the issue was far from

Widespread squatting and illegal settlement during

the 1780s and

’90s lead to a collapse of the Confederation

land policy.

It soon became obvious that ’’New England town

ship planting" would not work in the trans-Appalachian West.

Is it consistent with good policy or free
government to establish a perpetual revenue?
For the political implications of the land question,
see Henderson, Party Po litics, pp. 368-77.
According to
Henderson the New England system ’’was opposed by libertarians
who objected to such corporate arrangements.
The advocates
of corporate development did not necessarily oppose expansion,
but their policy coincided with that of the constrictionists.
By the same token, democrats and advocates of rapid expansion
often joined forces for different reasons.
Libertarians who
favored minimum restrain might find common cause with specu
lators who wanted a free hand to exploit the land. . . . "

Ill
. . . the idea of Congress selling out
the unlocated lands has sometimes been
dropped, but we have always met the hint
[with such] determined opposition that I
believe it will never be proposed.
I am
against selling the lands at all.
The
people who migrate West . . . will be sub
ject to their proportion of the Continental
debt until paid.
They ought not to be
subject to more.
They will be a people
little able to pay taxes.
There is no
equity in fixing upon them the burden
of this war, or any other proportion than
we bear ourselves.
By selling the lands
to them, you will disgust them, and cause
an avulsion of them from the common Union.
They will settle the lands in spite of
everybody.
_
Thomas Jefferson, 1776
The thirteen American colonial governments faced the
problem of land sales, distribution, and settlement in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The challenges of

creating a land policy were met in various ways, but basic
patterns emerged.

The Royal and Proprietary colonial

governors sought to gain substantial revenues from their
vast domains.

This is particularly true of the proprietors,

like Penn and Lord Baltimore, who entertained ideas of r e 
establishing some sort of feudal or manorial system wherein
they could "quitrent" lands to "vassals” in the American
wilderness.

But efforts to collect quitrents and sell lands

usually proved futile.

There was considerable trespassing

and squatting on Crown lands, and colonial governors found
it impossible to police their vast frontiers.

By the

^Tatter, "Land Policy During the Confederation," p. 184,
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eighteenth century, "preemption” (first choice when the lands
were put on sale) for squatters, the "headright" system, and
land grants to those who provided an Indian buffer all came
to be.

Thus, much land in colonial America was either cheap,

or given away for free.

As colonial American society evolved,

cheap or free land became one of its marked characteristics.
But irregardless of price, the colonial governments needed
surveys, boards of land policy, and land offices to manage
their domains.

They needed some sort of administrative

apparatus for locating and parceling out lands to settlers
and buyers.

Two diverse systems were adopted by the Northern

and Southern colonies, and each system catered to the exi
gencies of its particular section.

The two modes of land

administration became known, respectively, as the "New Eng
land" and "Southern" systems.^
The "New England" land system was well suited to the
prudent society of the Puritan Northeast.
the concept of settlement in groups;
squatting was strictly forbidden.

It centered around

individual migration and

If a number of people

For colonial land policy, see Ford, Colonial Precedents;
Malcolm J. Rohrbough, The Land Office Business (New York,
1968), pp. 3-25; Philbrick, Rise of the W e s t , p. 106; Everett
Dick, The Lure of the Land: A Social History of the Public
Lands from the Articles of Confederation to the New Deal
(Lincoln, 1962), pp. 3-11; Payson J. Treat, "Origins of the
National Land System Under the Confederation," in Vernon
Carstensen, ed.. The Public Lands (Madison, 1963), p. 9;
Benjamin Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies (New
York, 1924), p. 347; Marion Clawson, Uncle Sam's Acres (New
York, 1951), introduction.
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desired to leave their town, they were required to incorporate
and apply to the colonial legislature for a tract of land, or
"township," usually near or adjacent to their present residence.
These townships were previously surveyed rectangles, often six
miles square

(thirty-six square miles), with individual lots

one mile square within.

A group of settlers could remove to a

township if they agreed to make improvements, build schools,
and establish a church.

The New England system thus provided

for compact settlements, orderly migration, protection against
Indians, and mutual help during the severe Northern winters.
It was perfectly suited for the New Englanders--a people who
in the seventeenth century tended towards community life be7

cause of their lifestyle and the exigencies of their situation.
An entirely different land system evolved in the society
of the American South.

In the Southern colonies, the less

hostile Indians, mild climate, and plantation type of agricul
ture favored scattered settlements and development of country
over town.

People did not settle in groups, but rather as

individual farmers.

They located lands and claimed them in

discriminately instead of in contiguous parcels.

Since there

was no prior survey, settlers simply obtained a warrant

(known

also as certificates, caveats, and grants) for a specified
amount of land from the colonial government.

After so doing.

7
Treat, National Land System, p. 23; Treat, "Land System
Under the Confederation," p. 9; Robbins, Our Landed Heritage,
p. 7; Hibbard, Public Land Policies, introduction.
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the settler could pick and choose the land he desired from
any that was unsettled, and stake a claim--usually by marking
several trees with a tomahawk; hence "tomahawk rights."
After describing his bounds on the warrant, the settler
registered the purchase and took possession of the land.
This style of "indiscriminate location" was well suited to
the individual settler, and was adopted by the backcountry
yeoman as well as the planters of the Southern colonial
f rontier.^
Both Northern and Southern systems had their advantages
and disadvantages.

While the New England system provided

for secure title and orderly settlement, the Southern mode
encouraged initiative and resourcefulness, and put no re 
straints on liberty.

While the former encouraged community

life, the latter led to individual plantations and an inde
pendent backcountry yeomanry.

One possible disadvantage of

the Northern system was that it restrained the freedom of
those who wished to set out on their own.

On the other hand.

O
Treat, National Land System, p. 24; Treat, "Land System
Under the Confederation," p. 10; Hibbard, Public Land Poli
cies . pp. 36-37; Robbins, Our Landed Heritage, p. 7. The
Middle Colonies also practiced the Southern mode of distribu
tion.
See David Howell to Jonathan Arnold, February 21, 1784,
in Pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey S ystem, p. 39.
Howell favored this system because, "In this way the good land
is looked out and seized upon first, and the land of little
value and of all shapes and sizes, left in the hands of the
public.
But this, I am told, soon rises in value, and is
bought by the owners of the adjacent good lands, in their own
defence."
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the Southern mode
is that it catered, realistically, to the inclination of the
pioneers to settle along the rich creek beds, leaving less fer'
tile lands vacant.
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the loosely structured Southern system led to improper sur
veying and inaccurate records.

This caused a multitude of

conflicting claims and legal disputes as well as monopoliza
tion and fraud.

Both the New England and Southern modes of

land distribution contained positive and negative elements,
and each was the product of the culture from which it evolved.
Perhaps the only similarity between the toivnship system of
the Northeast and the indiscriminate location system of the
South was that they both provided their respective westward
settlers with the opportunity to settle on good lands, usually
at a low price if not for free.^
The availability of cheap lands ended temporarily prior
to the American Revolution, when the British Lords of Trade
turned to land sales in their quest for colonial revenue.
The Proclamation of 1763, Orders - in-Council, and the Quebec
Act

(1774) all contained provisions aimed at prohibiting

settlement beyond the Appalachians so as to promote the sale
of Crown lands to the East.
rates
shire)

The British set exorbitant

(for example, five pounds sterling per acre in New Hamp
to insure high proceeds from these sales.

colonists were outraged, and refused to obey.

But the

They continued

to settle illegally on Crown lands, and many removed to the
trans-Appalachian West.
financial failure,

English land policy was not only a

it was one of the grievances enumerated in

^Treat, National Land System, pp. 24-26; Robbins, Our
Landed Heritage", p~^ 71
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the Declaration of Independence.^^
Throughout the Revolutionary and Confederation period,
the thirteen United States adopted their own radical land
codes.

The Virginia assembly declared in 1776, "that all

persons who are actually settled on any unlocated or unappro
priated lands in Virginia shall have the preemption or the
preference in the grant of such lands."

Thomas Jefferson

announced the same year that he was "against selling the
lands at all."

One year later the Virginians granted all

squatters the right of preemption at two and one-half cents
an acre.

This liberal policy was similar to those in most

of the other states throughout the late 1770s and 1780s.
North Carolina granted settlers up to 640 acres (with an addi
tional 100 acres for a wife and each child) at forty schillings
an acre, and Pennsylvania sold its western lands at thirtyfour cents an acre.

New York was selling its upstate land at

twenty cents to one dollar an acre, with credit, while M assa
chusetts reduced its Maine lands to fifty cents an acre.
Maryland joined in granting preemption rights, and nearly all
of the other states' policies favored cheap lands and easy

Ford, Colonial Precedents, p. 84; Robbins, Our Landed
H e r i t a g e . p. 1; Rohrbough, Land Office Business, p. 6; H i b 
bard, Public Land Po licies, p. 144; Tatter, "Land Policy
During the Confederation," pp. 177-78.
Tatter contends that
Confederation land policy was modeled after the policy which
Great Britain tried to institute prior to the Revolution--a
policy that contradicted colonial precedents and the policies
of the thirteen states during the Confederation era.

117
credit.

While these radical land codes were partly a m an i 

festation of Revolutionary ideology, they were not without
precedent.

As noted, cheap or free land was a common fea

ture of many of the colonial land systems.

Indeed, one

historian contends that no principle in the history of the
public lands in America is older or of more general applica
tion than that of giving away the public domain.
While the thirteen states created radical land sales
programs during the late 1770s and 1780s, the Confederation
Congress adopted a far different policy.

Before 1784, the

Congress had no land policy at all, as there was no National
Domain.

Not until Congress acquired the various state land

cessions and Indian title
come into being.

(1783-1785) did the National Domain

Prior to the creation of the National D o 

main, however, several proposals emerged concerning public
lands policy.

These plans were indicative of the course that

Confederation land policy would follow.

The Confederation

Congress was destitute of funds, numerous "banditti" were
settling the West, and the officers of the Continental Army

Shaw Livermore, Early American Land Companies (New York,
1939), p. 132; Robbins, Our Landed Heritage, p. 10; Tatter,
"Land Policy During the Confederation," pp. 180-81.
Massa
chusetts legalized squatting in Maine, but mostly because the
Maine lands belonged to the Tories.
In Vermont, the settlers
used "squatter's rights" as their legal basis in declaring
themselves independent from New York, New Hampshire, and
Massachusetts.
The Republic of Vermont's land policy was
radical.
See also. Ford, Colonial Precedents, pp. 83, 89,
95; Robbins, Our Landed H er i t a g e , p. 9. Virginia's Kentucky
lands were often given away, as was the case in North Carolina
and Georgia,
The "cheap land" thesis is that of Amelia Clewley
Ford.
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were clamoring for their land bounties and back pay.

These

conditions figured importantly in three separate land policy
proposals made to Congress between 1781 and 1783.

By

examining the Peletiah Webster Plan, the "Financier's Plan,"
and the "Army Plan," one can view the origins of the first
Confederation land policy.
One of the first proposals for a national land system
was in a pamphlet published in 1781 by Peletiah Webster, a
Philadelphia essayist and political thinker.

Webster decried

proposals by some Eastern constrictionists to sell or mortgage
the trans-Appalachian West to Britain or Spain, saying, "It
would be like killing the goose that laid an egg every day
in order to tear out at once all that was in her belly."
Instead he viewed the public domain as a valuable source of
revenue, and proposed land sales and settlement via a mode
that closely resembled the colonial New England system of
land administration.

Webster's plan called for prior survey

into townships, sale at auction to the highest bidder

(one

Spanish dollar per acre m i ni mu m) , gradual settlement of one
tier of townships at a time, salt and mineral reserves for
the federal government, and mandatory improvements by each
purchaser.
emption,

Webster aimed at discouraging squatting and p r e 

"For I esteem this very wrong and injurious to the

public, which rather deserves punishment than reward."
Peletiah Webster's desire to use the National Domain for
revenue purposes was echoed by Theodoric Bland and Alexander
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Hamilton on July 5, 1783.

They introduced a resolution in

Congress, the "Financier’s Plan," which proposed that land
revenues be used to finance the Confederation government.
Like Webster, the advocates of the Financier’s Plan called
for the New England township system, prior survey, and sales
by auction.

And they proposed specifically that additional

land bounties be paid to all army officers in lieu of the
"half pay and arrears" owed them.

The resolution proposed

awarding $30.00 worth of land for every dollar owed by Con
gress.

Thus both the "Webster Plan" and the "Financier’s

Plan” advocated a revenue-oriented land policy based on the
New England system of land administration.

12

One of the most influential groups in determining Con
federation land policy was the officer corps of the Conti
nental Army.

Because of the military land bounties awarded

during the Revolutionary War, these men had a great stake in
the distribution of the National Domain.

The ancient policy

of awarding land for military service was practiced exten
sively during the Revolution, when both Congress and the
state governments awarded lands to their respective soldiers
and officers.

Virginia was one of the most generous, allotting

"Peletiah Webster on Our Western Unlocated Lands (1781),"
in Hulbert, Ohio in the Confederation, pp. 17-29; Ford, Colo
nial Precedents, p~^ 55 ; T a t t e r , "Land Policy During the Con
federation"; Treat, National Land System, p. 16; Marshall
Harris, "Origins of the Land Tenure System in the United States
(Ames, 1953), pp. 387-88; "Financier’s Plan," in Hulbert, Ohio
in the Confederation, p. 35; Pattison, American Rectangular
Land Survey S ystem, p. 20; Treat, National Land Po licy, p. 19;
Harris, Land Tenure Sy s t e m , p. 388.
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200 acres to privates,

400 to non-commissioned officers,

5,000 to Colonels, and 1,500 acres to general officers.
Other states were nearly,

if not more liberal.

1^

Pennsyl

vania's officers received 2,000 acres while in North Caro
lina they received 12,000.

The national government was not

to be outdone, however, and in September of 1776 the Conti
nental Congress attempted to encourage enlistments in the
Continental Line by offering land bounties to volunteers.
Privates received certificates for 100 acres. Colonels got
500 acres, and Major-Generals,

1,100.

The fact that at this

time there was no public domain from which these lands could
be drawn does not appear to have restrained the Continental
Congress's generosity.

Neither did the fact that the Indians

controlled all of the trans-Appalachian West.

Congress a s 

sumed that when the time came, the states would donate the
necessary land and the Indian title would be extinguished.^^

13

Virginia stipulated that its soldiers could collect on
their bounties in the "Virginia Military Reserve," to be com
posed of lands included within Virginia's claims by her colo
nial charter.
Many of the claims were satisfied with lands in
Kentucky, but Virginia's intention that all of the lands
granted to soldiers be "good" lands (i.e., river bottom land)
caused complications for the Virginia cession of 1784.
Vir
ginia refused to cede her claims to the area NW of the Ohio
unless Congress promised to reserve "good" lands in the Ohio
country for Vi rginia’s soldiers who were unable to locate
"good" lands within the boundaries of that state.
Congress
finally accepted this provision, and the Virginia Military
District in Ohio became a reality on the Land Ordinance of 1785.
^^Rudolph Freund, "Military Bounty Lands and the Origins
of the Public Domain," in Carstensen, The Public L a nd s , p. 19;
Hibbard, Public Land P ol ic y, p. 32; Treat, National Land Sys
tem . pp. 230-35.
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As the war drew to a close, many of New England’s Con
tinental Army officers banded together to plan the most
effective use of their military land bounties.

Many of the

officers were impoverished by the war and wary of the impend
ing return to civilian life.

Some believed the nation was

ungrateful for their services, and looked to the West and
western lands for a "fresh start."

Yet the officers’ dis-

gruntlement had political ramifications that reached far
beyond the issue of public lands.

Their experiences in the

Continental Line left them little respect for the weak Con
federation government.

The Continental Army officers were,

almost to a man. Nationalists who favored a strong centralized
government.

During the 1780s, ex-officers like Washington,

The connection of the Continental Army with the N a 
tionalist faction in Congress was first suggested by Jensen
in The New N a t i o n . The best treatment of the subject is in
Kohn, Eagle and S w o r d . Kohn contends that the Continental
Army officers' corps formed the nucleus for the Nationalist
effort and went on to join the Federalist party during the
1790s.
Although the main concern of his book is the a r m y ’s
efforts to create a strong military establishment (i.e.,
standing army) in America, he alludes to several matters
which concern western lands.
Some Continental Army officers
who were important Nationalists were General George Washing
ton, Henry Knox, Rufus King, Timothy Pickering, John Marshall,
Jonathan Dayton, Arthur St. Clair, Benjamin Lincoln, Rufus
Putnam, Henry Knox, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, William Duer,
Alexander Hamilton, James McHenry, and David Humphreys.
These officers undoubtedly favored a strong national gov
ernment.
This is largely because of the many administrative
problems encountered by the army because of the alleged impotency of the Confederation.
Lack of pay, supplies, recruits,
etc. caused many problems, and most of those problems were
blamed on the Congress.
Knox said, "Americans will have fought
and bled to little purpose if the powers of government shall
be insufficient to preserve the peace." See Kohn, Eagle and
S wo rd . p. 11.
To argue for a peacetime army in 1783 was to
favor giving the national government added authority, a symbol
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Arthur St. Clair, Timothy Pickering, Rufus King, Samuel
Holden Parsons, Rufus Putnam, Alexander Hamilton, and Henry
Knox retained their military friendships and comaraderie.
They formed the Society of Cincinnati, a fraternal organiza
tion of officers aimed at maintaining these bonds of friend
ship while at the same time speaking out on political issues
of the day.

The Cincinnati, as it was called, was denounced

by Sam Adams, Jefferson, and others as a political pressure
group and "military aristocracy"

(membership in the Cin

cinnati was passed down to the eldest son in each family).
Because of the Society of Cincinnati's great interest in the
West, Jefferson attempted unsuccessfully to insert a provision
into the Ordinance of 1784 prohibiting citizenship in the West
to any person holding an hereditary title.

The Society of

Cincinnati grew, however, and in the 1780s was a major force
behind the "Army Plan" of land policy submitted to Congress
in the Newburgh Petition of 1783.^^
of ultimate sovereignty--the power of the sword.
Militias,
on the other hand, were creations of the states and were op
posed by the Nationalists.
It is no coincidence that studies
of Pennsylvania and New York debates over the ratification of
the Constitution show a distinct dichotomy between Continental
Army and militia veterans.
If one accepts the Jensen-Kohn thesis, the importance of
the army in creating the national Western policy (Washington's
influence, as well as that of King, Pickering, Knox, Schuyler,
the Newburgh Petitioners, and the Ohio Company) is an impor
tant factor in the overall Nationalist tone of that policy as
it stood by 1787.
^^Kohn, Eagle and S w o r d , p. 13:
"By maintaining the
associations of the war, the Cincinnati proved an institutional
and emotional bond between the Continental Army and the [Na
tionalist] faction."
Jefferson wrote Washington in 1784 that
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The officers' first try at influencing Congressional
land policy took place at the army cantonment of Newburgh,
on the Hudson,

in December of 1782.

One historian has called

the Newburgh Convention a "conspiracy."

He contends the

"Newburgh conspiracy was the closest an American army has
ever come to revolt or coup d'etat."

17

This is debatable.

he opposed the Cincinnati because the order's philosophy ran
counter to the idea of the "equality of man . . . § particu
larly the denial of preeminence by birth." The nation's
foremost civilian Revolutionary also maintained that the
society created "a distinction between the civil and the
military."
See Ford, Writings of Jefferson, 111:464-70.
San Adams' views on the Cincinnati can be found in two let
ters to Elbridge Gerry in April of 1784 in Henry Alonzo
Cushing, ed.. The Writings of Samuel Adams (New York, 1908),
IV:298: "I look upon it to be as rapid a Stride toward an
hereditary Nobility as was ever made in so short a Time. . . .
"It appears wonderful that they could imagine a People who
had freely spent their Blood § Treasure in Support of their
equal rights § Liberties could so soon be reconciled to the
odious hereditary distinctions of Families.
This Country
must be humiliated and debased to a great Degree, before they
will patiently bear to see Individuals stalking about with
their assumed Honorary Badges 8 proudly boasting "These are
the Distinctions of our Blood." Adams applauded Jefferson's
attempt to exclude the Cincinnati from citizenship in the
West: "I hope Congress will not fail to make this an indis
pensable condition" of the Ordinance of 1784.
According to
Freund ("Military Bounty Lands," p. 27), Jefferson was well
aware of the political implications of the "Army Plan" and
the role of the Society of Cincinnati in those plans.
This
was the rationale behind his efforts to prevent the rise of
a military "aristocracy" in the West.
See also Kohn, Eagle
and S w o r d , p. 12: For "most Federalists . . . the attraction
and fascination with armies went much deeper.
Federalists
viewed society as an integrated, stable organization in which
individuals deferred to their superiors . . . they emphasized
order, tradition, natural distinction among men. . . . Strik
ingly these same values personified the eighteenth century
military officer."

17

Kohn Eagle and S word, p. 17.
For a discussion of the
Newburgh "conspiracy," see Jensen, New Nation, pp. 72, 76-77.
The longest treatment is in Kohn, Eagle and Sword, Chapter I.
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The Newburgh petitioners were certainly very vocal in their
demands for back pay, a stronger central government, and a
permanent standing army.

Of importance to this essay, h o w 

ever, is the Newburgh officers' demand, in a petition to
Congress, for federal lands in the West.

General Rufus

Putnam and Colonel Timothy Pickering drafted this so-called
"Army Plan" of Newburgh calling for "A New State Westward of
the Ohio."

They proposed to people the Ohio country with

loyal army veterans who would defend the territory against
Indians and "banish forever the idea of our Western territory
falling under the domination of European powers."

The Army

Plan called for a tract of about 17,500,000 acres, to be
managed in the New England style of land development.

It

would be surveyed prior to settlement and divided into town
ships six miles square, with reserves for the ministry and
schools.

Two hundred eighty-five officers signed the N e w 

burgh Petition
s ig ned).

(no enlisted men or non-commissioned officers

None were Southern,

235 were from New England, and

90 percent belonged to the Society of Cincinnati.

Congress

Kohn calls the affair "one of the most bizarre and little
understood events in American history,"
"At the very moment
of victory, the officers' corps responded to an anonymous
appeal from one of its members and met to consider mutiny
against constituted civilian authority. . . . "
The "anony
mous" appeal was probably written by Captain John Armstrong.
It summarized the various grievances of the army in strong
terms, and concluded:
"IVe have borne all that men can
bear--our property is expended--our private sources are at
an end, and our friends are wearied out and disgusted with
our incessant applications. . . . Any further experiments
on [the army's] patience may have fatal effects."
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received the petition on June 16, 1783 with an attached letter
of endorsement from George Washington:
I am induced to give my sentiments thus freely
on the advantages to be expected from this
plan of colonization, because it would con
nect our government with the frontiers, extend
our settlements progressively, and plant a
brave, a hardy, and respectable race of people
as our advanced post, who would be ready and
willing (in case of hostility) to combat the
savages and check their incursions.18
Despite this pressure from the army. Congress did not
convey bona fide title for military bounty lands until 1796.
By this time some of the veterans were dead, others had sold
their counties to speculators, and the idea of settling the
Northwest with Revolutionary veterans had lost its original
enthusiastic support.

Nearly all of the Revolutionary land

bounties found their way
profiteers.

into the hands of speculators and

The main reason the army is linked with early

settlement of the Ohio Valley is that many of those land
speculators were former Revolutionary officers.

Some of the

Newburgh leaders--Rufus Putnam, Arthur St. Clair, Samuel
Holden Parsons, Timothy Pickering, Benjamin Tupper, and Winthrop
18

The Newburgh Petition appears in several forms.
The
final document sent to Congress is "Rufus Putnam's Plan for a
Western State (1783)," in Hulbert, Ohio in the Confederation,
p. 56.
Washington's endorsement is in ibid., p . 64.
Pickering's notes were doubtless used in the formulation of this
proposal.
See his "Proposition for Settling a New State by
Such Officers and Soldiers as Shall Associate for that Purpose"
in Pickering, Papers of Timothy Pickering, Reel 53, #134.
Also, ibid., #148 ; F re un d, "Military Bounty Lands," p. 21;
Ford, Colonial Precedents, p. 56; Archer B. Hulbert, The Records and Original Proceedings of the Ohio Company (Marietta,
Ohio, 1917), pp. xxiv, xli; Treat, National Land System, p. 21.
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Sargent--formed the nucleus of the Ohio Company, a settlementspeculation firm discussed below.

The Ohio Company and land-

jobber John Cleve Symmes were the only parties able to obtain
lands in exchange for military bounties during the 1780s.
Notwithstanding the Peletiah Webster plan, the Financier's
Plan, and the Army Plan, Congress could not begin to formulate
a land policy until the state land cessions and Indian treaties
led to the creation of the National Domain.
ing 1783-1785.

This occurred d u r 

With the Virginia cession and the Indian

treaties at Forts Stanwix, McIntosh, and Finney, Congress at
last had a public domain in the Old Northwest for which it
could legislate.

But how would that domain be administered?

Treat, National Land System, pp. 237, 238-39, 244-45.
In 1788 the bounties were rendered transferable.
After that,
nearly all of the bounties fell into hands other than those
of their original holders.
When Congress created the n a 
tional military reserve during the 1790s, it remained largely
empty.
Rudolph Freund's "Military Bounty Lands and the Origin
of the Public Domain" is the best treatment of the subject.
While acknowledging that hardly any actual veterans settled
the West using their Revolutionary bounties, Freund insists
that the policy was a success.
The speculators who ended up
with the land, he maintains, were instrumental in the settle
ment of that region and should be given credit for same.
See
Freund, "Military Bounty Lands," pp. 15, 17, 29, 31.
20
The Virginia cession contained an important clause as
far as land policy was concerned.
It declared that all lands
ceded "shall be considered as a common fund for the use and
benefit of such of the United States as have become, or shall
become members of the Confederation . . . and shall be faith
fully and bonafide disposed of for that purpose, and for no
other use or purpose whatsoever."
Jefferson (in the land
Ordinance of 1784) changed the stipulation a little to require
the land revenues be used for the extinguishment of the public
debt and "for no other purpose whatsoever."
The role of the Old Southwest in the public domain was
confused until the Georgia and North Carolina cessions were
obtained.
Although North Carolina ceded in 1787, it was not
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Would the land be sold in large chunks to speculators, or
would sales benefit the small farmer?

In the long run, the

Confederation's financial distress was the main determinant
of the course followed.

Robert Morris, Alexander Hamilton,

and other Nationalists viewed the National Domain as a valu
able source of revenue for funding the national debt.

They

believed that the central government would be strengthened
if it could acquire an independent income from land sales.
They were opposed by Antifederalists and Southerners like
David Howell, William Grayson, and Jefferson, who favored
cheap or free land for actual settlers and feared growing
centralization of the national government.

By 1783, however,

even Jefferson and Howell had come to view the public domain
as a "precious resource" for extinguishing the national debt.
The reasons for this reversal were political as well as eco
nomic.

In the first place, most Southerners eagerly awaited

new western states, which they believed would add to their
strength in Congress.

They were willing to compromise over

land sales in order to expedite settlement and statehood.
At the same time, Antifederalists believed that substantial
land revenues would weaken Morris' Nationalist argument for
the necessity of a tariff, or impost.

The Nationalists'

opponents hoped that lucrative land sales would mean the
until 1802 that Georgia made its cession.
For this reason
much of Confederation land policy, and the
entire western
policy for that matter, pertains only to the area Northwest
of the Ohio River.
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national debt, contrary to Hamilton and Morris' plan, could
be extinguished, not f un de d.

As David Howell wrote in 1784,

But the price of the land is the chief ques
tion, after all.
If the liberties of this
country are preserved, it will, in my humble
opinion, be done by paying, and not by fund
ing, the national debt.
I am, therefore, of
opinion with those who are for making the
most of what we have to carry to market.21
The quest for revenue, then, led the Confederation Con
gress away from colonial precedents of cheap or free land.
Contrary to colonial practices and practices adopted in all
of the thirteen states'

individual land policies, the Con

federation Congress decided to sell public lands as a source
of revenue.

Ironically,

the policy Congress chose to follow

was similar to that of the British Lords of Trade during the
pre-Revolutionary period.

The Confederation Congress, like

Great Britain, needed money badly;
to be the answer to
21

its

problem.

the public lands seemed
But the desire for revenue

Treat, National Land System, pp. 1-7; Tatter, "Land
Policy During the Confederation," p. 184; Kohn, Eagle and
S w o r d . p. 55; Howell to Arnold, February 21, 1784, in H u l 
bert, Ohio in the Confederation, p. 73.
For another Anti
federalist's view, see Richard Henry Lee to Sam Adams, May 20
.1785, in Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry L e e , 11:359: "I
hope we shall shortly finish our plan for disposing of the
western lands to discharge the oppressive debt created by
the war § I think if this source of income be rightly managed,
that these republics may soon be discharged from the state of
oppression and distress that an indebted people must invari
ably feel."
The political motivations of the Nationalist faction in
Congress are discussed in Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 36977:
"As the land was sold. Congress would receive an inde
pendent revenue--that critical element of sovereignty so
clearly grasped by the Nationalists who failed to secure that
object through fiscal centralism."
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was about the only facet of the land question over which
there was any agreement.

Great differences of opinion r e 

mained over the mode of distribution.
be surveyed?

How would the lands

Would there be a minimum purchase requirement?

What about the place of sale, the price per acre, and the
availability of credit?

Would the lands be sold indiscrimi

nately or progressively in contiguous parcels?

Inherent in

all of these questions was the overriding debate between the
New England and Southern systems of land disposal.

Congress

had to decide whether westward expansion was to proceed in a
corporate fashion, under close supervision of the national
government,

or be allowed to run its own course.

This great

question faced Congress as it began, in 1784, to create the
first national land policy.

22

Some gentlemen looked upon it as a matter
of revenue only, and that it was true policy
to get the money without parting with the
inhabitants to populate the country and
thereby preventing the lands in the original
states from depreciating.
Others (I think)
were afraid of interference with the lands
now at market in the individual states.
Part of the Eastern gentlemen wish to have
the land sold in such a manner as to suit
their own people. . . . But others are
apprehensive of the consequences which may
result from the new States taking their
position in the Confederacy.
They, perhaps.

^^Tatter, "Land Policy During the Confederation," p. 183,
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wish this event may be delayed as long as
p os sible.
William Grayson to George.Washington, 1785
The Confederation Congress began work on a national land
policy in the Spring of 17 84.

Financial distress, pressure

from the army officers, fear of British and Spanish encroach
ments, and increasing westward migration all combined to c o n 
vince Congress of the need for a national land policy, as
well as an overall strategy for American expansion westward.
They realized the need for an inexpensive mode of selling
lands in the West; packaging them up into parcels to satisfy
the veterans, pioneers, and land speculators while increasing
federal revenues.

The task of creating a national land sys

tem fell originally to Thomas Jefferson and Hugh Williamson.
Jefferson was quite interested in development of the West,
and had figured importantly in drafting the territorial gov
ernment Ordinance of 17 84.

On March 2, 1784, the day follow

ing acceptance of the Virginia cession. Congress appointed
Jefferson, Williamson, David Howell, Elbridge Gerry, and Jacob
Read to a committee "to devise and report the most eligible
means of disposing of such part of the Western lands as may
be obtained from the Indians by the proposed treaty of peace
and for opening a land office.
7 %

Grayson to Washington, April 15, 1785, Treat, National
Land System, pp. 32-33.
^^Hibbard, Public Land Policies, pp. 32-33; Daniel Boorstin, "Packaging a Continent," in The Americans, The National
Experience (New York, 1965), pp. 241-48:
"Our land system is
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"An Ordinance for Ascertaining the Mode of Locating and
Disposing of Lands in the Western Territory" was first read
before Congress on May 7, 1784.

This report is usually r e 

ferred to as the Jefferson-Williamson Land Ordinance of 1784,
as both Thomas Jefferson and Hugh Williamson were instrumental in its creation.
plan was a 'reformed*
However, there was one

25

In essence, the Jefferson-Williamson

Southern system of land distribution.
important "New England" addition to

the report: prior rectangular survey.

Jefferson and William

son made this reform to prevent overlapping claims, and to
provide for security of title within the context of a Southern
mode of land sales and distribution.

At the same time, the

Land Ordinance of 1784 called for low minimum purchase price

a relic of the young nation's need to make a commodity of its
land, and hastily map and sell it, even before it was explored
or surveyed.
It is one of the first examples of the peculiar
importance of packaging in America." Jefferson's interest in
the West is discussed in Chapter 3 above.
For his attitudes
towards land speculation, see Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, VII:
504:
"I never was nor am now interested in one foot of land
on earth, off the waters of the James River." See also, ibid.,
p. 147.
25
The original report of the committee is in Journals of
the Continental Congress, XXVI:356.
Also in Boyd, Papers of
Je f fe rs on , V I I I : 140-48.
Only recently has Hugh Williamson
received any credit for his role in the Land Ordinance of
1784.
Williamson's role is discussed in Pattison, American
Rectangular Land Survey System, p. 37.
Williamson was a
scientist and a mathematics professor, and his travels in
Europe gave him added perspective in land surveying techniques.
See Williamson to Governor Martin, July 5, 1785, in Burnett,
Letters of the Continental Congress. VTI:563-64.
Williamson
supported the proposed Land Ordinance of 1784:
"However as I
happen to have suggested the plan to the committee it is more
than probable that I may have parental prejudices in its
favor. . . ."
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and the use of warrants

(certificates, caveats, etc.] for

individuals to locate their own claims.
form of indiscriminate

This was a modified

(as opposed to contiguous)

location.

Jefferson and Williamson succeeded in inserting New England's
prior survey mode into the administrative framework of the
Southern colonial land system.

And Jefferson wrote, "The

method of sale heretofore practiced by several

[Southern]

states and now practiced by Congress has never been defeated
and cannot be defeated.
Although rectangular survey had considerable precedent
in the Northeast, the Jefferson-Williamson grid was unique.
Their plan called for the use of "hundreds" and "geographical
miles" whereas the traditional New England grid was usually
divided into six mile square townships using statute miles.
The Ordinance stated that land "shall be divided into H u n 
dreds of ten geographical miles square, with each mile c on
taining 6086 feet and four tenths of a foot.

. . . These

hundreds shall be divided into lots one mile squre each, or
850 acres and four tenths of an acre.

. . ."

The introduction

of hundreds as the basic unit of land distribution, although
soon abandoned in favor of the New England ’township,' was
one part of Jefferson's grand scheme to introduce the decimal
Pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey System, pp.
43, 230; Treat, "Land System During the Confederation," p. 11.
Much of the technical aspect of the rectangular survey system
has been explained to me (patiently) by my friend, Chris
Huck of the University of Montana Department of Forestry.
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system into American usage.

The idea of rectangular units

did remain, and formed the base upon which the national land
system was built.
27

27

Boorstin, "Packaging a Continent," p. 244.
The intro
duction of rectangular survey "explains why the 20th. c en
tury United States startles the air traveler by the rectangu
lar symmetry of its fences and roads. . . . The American
land . . . has thus remained one of the largest monuments to
a priorism in all human history.
And in a country which is
a byword for adaptability and empiricism I" See Pattison,
American Rectangular Land Survey System, pp. 37, 43.
Patti
s o n ’s book (a doctoral dissertation from the University of
Chicago) is the definitive work on the origins of the survey
system.
It interprets technical as well as political aspects
of the problem.
Jefferson was quite interested in the 'hundreds’ unit
of measurement, as well as all decimal units.
The hundred
was originally the subordinate division of the shire or county
in England.
Jefferson attempted, without success, to intro
duce the ’hundred’ into America throughout his life.
See
Ford, Colonial Precedents, p. 65.
Jefferson’s attraction to
decimal units is evidenced by an ordinance he conceived in
1784 in "Notes on the Establishment of a Money Unit and of a
Coinage for the United States." Much of our contemporary
decimally oriented coinage, with its 100 cents, quarter d o l 
lars, and tenths of dollars, etc., is based on Jefferson’s
proposals.
It is only natural that he turned to decimal
arithmetic in devising a land mode.
See Jefferson to Hopkinson. May 3, 1784, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Con
gress , V I I : 512.
Jefferson observed:
"In the scheme for d i s 
posing of the soil an happy opportunity offers of introducing
into general use the geometrical mile, in such a manner as
that it can not possibly fail of forcing its way on the people.
However, this bearing some relation to astronomy and to science
in general, which certainly have nothing to do with legislation,
I doubt whether it can be carried through . . . but I hope it
will be forseen that should we introduce so heterodox a facil
ity as the decimal arithmetic, we should all of us soon forget
how to cypher.
I have hopes that the same care to preserve an
athletic strength of calculation will not [allow us] . . . to
banish all this cunning learning, to adopt the dollar for our
unit. . . . This is surely an age of innovation, America the
focus of it! . . ."
In administration, the 1784 report is
drawn almost verbatim from the Virginia legislature’s 1779
land law.
See also Treat, National Land System, p. 26; Boyd,
Letters of Jefferson, VII : 148.
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Another provision of the Jefferson-Williamson Land Ordi^
nance of 1784 stated that all surveyed regions would be
admitted ultimately into the Confederation as sovereign
states.

The law called for appointment of surveyors by Con

gress and listed technical directions for the mode of survey
ing.

Surveys were not to be progressive, but rather by the

"hundreds most in demand."

Finally, a system of purchase

allowed prospective buyers to purchase a warrant for a h un
dred or lot (one square mile) and then go out and indiscrimi
nately locate their land.

The price of land appears to have

been a source of controversy as the Land Ordinance of 1784
does not specify any figures.

The only evidence of Jeffer

son's sentiments is found in a letter which suggests "the
third of a dollar an acre" as a fair price.

The emphatic

stipulation that revenues from land sales should be applied
to the "NATIONAL DEBT . . . AND TO NO OTHER PURPOSE WHATSOEVER"
seems to indicate a certain discomfort with the idea of selling
the land at all.^^

28

Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 600; Ford, Colo
nial Precedents, p. 70:
"The system of rectangular surveys
was therefore a gradual evolution under conditions peculiar
to Colonial life, modified in regard to boundary lines by
the reforming doctrinaire mind of Jefferson." Freund, "Mili
tary Bounty Lands," p. 29; Pattison, American Rectangular
Land Survey S ystem, pp. 40, 42, 66.
This plan to permit
the direct sale of lots meant, according to Rufus King, giv
ing up "the Plan of Townships." Also, Treat, National Land
S y s t e m . p. 27.
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The Jefferson-Williamson land units, from William D. Patti
son, The American Rectangular Land Survey System.
Congress never adopted the Jefferson-Williamson Land
Ordinance of 1784.

When it took a vote on May 28, only one

state (North Carolina)

supported the plan.

Many in Congress

were waiting until the Indian treaties were finalized before
they would take a stand on land policy.

More important, many

Northeasterners disliked the Southern nature of the JeffersonWilliamson Land Ordinance.

Jefferson's departure for Europe

that year thwarted whatever momentum the report may have had.
The main contribution of the 1784 plan is its establishment
of prior rectangular survey as a tenet of national land policy,
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The Jefferson-Williamson Ordinance furnished a rough base
upon which was built the 178 5 national land system, but with
important differences.

The Land Ordinance of 1784 was much

more Southern than any future Confederation law would be.
Its warrant system threw open all western lands to direct
claim by individual lots, whereas the New England system r e 
quired that lots be assigned only through the agency of p r o 
prietors and speculators,
was invested.

Moreover,

in whom title to an entire township
this 'first come, first serve' mode

of 1784 accorded no preferential treatment to large investors
or those holding military bounties.

Congress would never

adopt such a measure,

especially when revenue was the aim of

national land policy.

The Jefferson-Williamson Land Ordi

nance of 1784 may have been a 'reformed' Southern system,
but it was not 'reformed'

enough to meet the approbation of

the Confederation Congress.

29

Almost a year passed before Congress once again addressed
the question of the public domain.

The immediate catalyst

was the cessions from the Northwest tribes in the treaties of
Forts Stanwix, McIntosh, and Finney.
of squatters,
2Q

Yet the encroachments

the demands of the Revolutionary officers, and

Pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey System, pp.
83-84.
David Howell wrote in February 1784, "We wait with
impatience for the result of the négociations with the Indians,
It is expected that Congress, before they rise, will be en
abled to open their land office."
See also, Burnett, Conti
nental Congress, p. 625; Rohrbough, Land Office Business, pp.
7-8; Lee to Livingston, April 30, 1785, in Ballagh, Letters
of Richard Henry Lee. I I .
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financial distress all served to stress the need for a n a 
tional land system.

It is no coincidence that the financial

crisis was particularly acute during the period in which the
Confederation Congress devised a mode for sales of the p ub
lic domain.

The annual state requisitions were due, and the

scarcity of funds led most to agree the public lands were a
"fine fund for extinguishing the public debt."
this was about all they agreed on.

But as before,

During the ensuing debates,

David Howell wrote, "The Land Ordinance

. . . proves to be the

most complicated and embarassing Subject before Congress
since peace has taken place."

The debates were heated, and

"as much has been said and wrote about it as would fill forty
volumes."

Indeed, William Grayson later commented that "If

the importunities of the public creditors, and the reluctance
to pay them by taxation either direct or implied had not been
so great I am satisfied that no land Ordinance could have
been procured.
On March 16, 1786, Congress read the Jefferson-Williamson
Land Ordinance again, probably as a starting point for discus
sion, and referred the land question to a grand committee
composed of one member from each state.
cluded Hugh Williamson and David Howell

This committee in
(both of whom had

assisted in drafting the Land Ordinance of 1784), but was
Treat, National Land S ystem, p. 27; Pattison, Land
Survey System, pp. 83-84; Burnett, Continental Congress,
p. 625; Rohrbough, Land Office Business, pp. 7-8.
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dominated by Easterners and Nationalists.
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The two most

influential members of the committee were Nationalist Rufus
King of New York and Antifederalist William Grayson of V i r 
ginia.

King led the effort to replace the Jefferson-

Williamson Ordinance with a pure New England plan.

Grayson,

the chairman of the committee, proved to be the great expedi
ter.

He pushed for compromise in the face of great differ

ences of opinion, and secured passage of a land bill even
thought it contained what he considered to be "exceptional
m ea s u r e s ."

32

Perhaps the most influential person in the creation of
the Land Ordinance of 178 5 was not even serving in Congress
at the time.
chusetts.

This was Colonel Timothy Pickering of Ma ssa

Pickering had long been interested in western lands

as a speculator

33

and proponent of the "Army Plan" of 1783.

Journals of the Continental Congress. XXVIII:114.
Members of the committee were Pierse Long (New Hampshire),
Rufus King (Massachusetts), David Howell (Rhode Island),
William Samuel Johnson (Connecticut), Robert R. Livingston
(New Y o r k ) , Archibald Stewart (New Jersey), Joseph Gardener
(Pennsylvania), John Henry (Maryland), William Grayson (Vir
ginia) , Hugh Williamson (North Carolina), John Bull (South
Carolina), and William Houston (Georgia).
32pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey System,
pp. 82, 85.
33
Pickering, Timothy Pickering Papers, introduction;
Jensen, New N a t i o n , p. 336.
Prior to 1785, bad luck in his
land investments tended to lessen Pickering's esteem for the
frontier populace.
He purchased 10,000 acres in the Wyoming
Valley of Pennsylvania and moved there to administrate his
lands and serve as justice of the peace and administrator of
deeds.
The local squatters did not care for Pickering, h o w 
ever, and assaulted him and kept him prisoner for several
weeks.
After losing all his investment, Pickering left the
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On March 1, 178 5 he wrote Elbridge Gerry an urgent letter
requesting information about the land policy debates in
Congress.

In this letter to Gerry, Pickering spoke of their

land speculation interests, and suggested the kind of policy
he wished Congress to adopt:
As you have expressed your wishes to be con
cerned in the purchase of lands on the other
side of the Allegheny Mountains thro* our
agency, we think it very material to your
interests as well as our own that we be in
formed, if possible, what plan Congress will
probably adopt in disposing of those lands
which lie West of the Ohio.
If they mean to
permit the adventurers to make a scramble for
them (as has been the case in this State
[Pennsylvania] 8 Virginia) it will behoove
us to engage seasonably with some enterpris
ing, but confidential character, to explore
the country and make locations.
But I would
rather suppose Congress would fall on a more
regular plan--as that of surveying a district
or districts for a State or States, dividing
the same into counties 8 townships --and then
34
selling the townships at public auction. . .
Pickering,

of course, was advocating a New England system

of prior survey and sale by townships at auction.

This system

would suit more adequately the needs of Eastern land jobbers
like himself, who wanted to speculate in western lands without
necessarily residing in the West.

The New England system was

also productive of the corporate and regulated settlement that
most New Englanders and Eastern Nationalists desired.

Pickering

country and resolved to do his future land dealing in absentia.
^^Pickering to Gerry, March 1, 1785, in Pickering, Timothy
Pickering P ap er s. Reel V, #347; Also in King, Correspondence
of Rufus K i n g . 1:72.
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advocated survey and sales of one state at a time:
In this way the settlement of the Country may
be effected with regularity--with much more
safety than in the desulatory way practised
in the two States [Pennsylvania and Virginia]
before mentioned--and with much greater a d 
vantage to the United States. . . . But if
Adventurers shall be permitted to ramble
over that extensive Country, and take up all
of the most valuable tracts, the best lands
will be in a manner given away, and the
settlers thus dispersed, it will be impossible
to govern; they will soon excite an Indian
war; to the destruction of multitudes of the
settlers and to the injury of the public. . . .
But if there must be a scramble, we have an
equal right with others and therefore the
information desired in the beginning of this
letter may be of essential importance.
Your
answer to this letter will much oblige your
Sincere friends, who wish to advance your in
terests to their o w n . 35
Gerry answered Pickering immediately and told him to
write land committee member Rufus King.

Pickering wrote

King a lengthy letter on March 8, expressing ideas similar
to those above.

He advocated a New England system, gradual

settlement, sale by auction with a minimum purchase and price,
natural resource reserves for the federal government, and
land reserves for the Army, education, and religion.

He

proposed some changes in the technical aspects of surveying
and asked that surveyors be required to record information
on the quality of lands so as to aid "purchasers in the more
distant states."

King answered Pickering on April 13 and

thanked him for his "ingenious communications."
the first draft of the Land Ordinance of 1785:

^^Ibid.

He enclosed
"You will see
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thereby that your views have had weight with the committee
who reported the ordinance, and I have only to add that I
shall hold myself particularly obliged to you for these
communications on the subject.

..."

Pickering replied

on April 36 that the land ordinance met with his "approba
tion- -if for no other reason because the principles of it
coincide with the ideas I had

previously conceived and

communicated to you."^^
As the Pickering-King correspondence indicates, the
first draft of the Land Ordinance of 1785 was nearly a pure
New England system of land administration.

The grand com

m i t t e e ’s report, "An Ordinance for Ascertaining the Mode of
Disposing of Lands in the Western Territory"

(April 14, 1785)

was, in fact, identical to the colonial New England system
except it did not include requirements for settlement and
improvements.

The law called for prior survey of seven mile

square townships, the minimum area of purchase.

After survey,

the land was to be auctioned off in the respective states at
a minimum price of $1.00 per acre, with no credit.

Other p r o 

visions included the appointment of surveyors and stipulation

Gerry to Pickering, in King, Correspondence of Rufus
K i n g . 1:43; Pickering to King, March 8, 1785 in Pickering,
Timothy Pickering P ap e rs . Reel V, #351-A.
With Jefferson’s
system, investors would have to pay "adventurers who under
took to explore the County § make locations for them" and
charged "monstrous deductions;" sometimes 1/2 the original
price of the land.
See King to Pickering, April 15, 1785,
in Correspondence of Rufus K i n g . 1:46.
See also, Pickering
to King, April 30, 1785, in ibid., p. 91.

142
of surveying techniques, mineral reserves for Congress, and
land reserves for Congress, the Army, schools and churches.
As Monroe wrote Jefferson,

the new land Ordinance "deviates

I believe essentially from the one at Annapolis" (the Land
Ordinance ©f 1784).

Congress retained the Jefferson-

Williamson rectangular grid but deleted its hundreds, g eo
graphical miles, and decimal divisions.

The committee

stripped the Jefferson-Williamson survey proposal of its
original function as a control over the Southern land system.
It abandoned the modified Southern system of indiscriminate
location and replaced it with prior survey, and progressive
seating.

"The present plan," Grayson wrote Washington in

April of 178 5, "excludes all the formalities of warrants,
entries, returns, and caveats."

37

After the grand committee read its report on April 14,
Congress debated the proposed land law for over a month.
One reason for the length of the discussion was lagging
attendance--Grayson wrote there were "never above ten States
on the floor and of these nine were necessary to concur in
one sentiment."

Congress had to ’shut d o w n ’ several times

during the debate because it could not reach a quorum of
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXVIII:251-57.
The report appeared in Gr ayson’s handwriting.
Treat, "Land
System During the Confederation," p. 11.
One-seventh of
the surveyed lands was to be held in reserve for the military
bounties.
Hibbard, Public Land Poli cy , pp. 38-39.
Note that
townships were seven miles square instead of the usual six.
This was soon amended.
Monroe to Jefferson, April 12, 1785,
in Hamilton, Writings of James M o n r o e , 11:71; Pattison, Land
Survey System, pp. 86, 88, 92.
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nine states.

But the main reason for delay was "warm and

unexpected" disagreements that arose over the proposed land
law.

Serious debates arose over the township system, method

of sales, and the minimum price.

"We have been this fort

night about a land ordinance," King wrote Elbridge Gerry on
April 26, 1785.

"Virginia makes many difficulties--the

eastern States are for actual Surveys and sale by Townships,
the Southern States for indiscriminate Locations, e t c .
will pass,

if anything does, is wholly uncertain."

What

38

The division of the debate reflected the age-old differ
ences between the New England and Southern land systems.
Many Virginians and other Southerners were willing to accept
prior rectangular survey (ala Jefferson-Williamson), but
were opposed to predetermined location, "Township planting,"
compact settlements, and gradual migration.

They tried to

make it possible for settlers to purchase small amounts of
land wherever they desired.
3A

David Howell, seconded by

For the debates over the Land Ordinance of 1785, see
Journals of the Continental Congress. XXVIII:234-47, 251-56,
264, 268n, 284-85, 290-91, 292-96, 298-303, 309-10, 316-17,
323, 326-29, 335-40, 342-43, 370-73, 378-81.
A chronology
of the debates is in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Con
gress . VIII:ix.
Congress read the Jefferson report on March
4 and March 16, and the Grayson committee report a first
time on April 14; April 29 saw Congress at a standstill with
no quorum.
On May 5 and 6, Congress read the Ordinance a
second and third time; there was a lapse in representation
until May 18 when debate was resumed.
The Land Ordinance of
1785 was passed on May 20, 1785.
The best records of the
debate are found in the letters of committee chairman William
Grayson in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress.
See also Treat, National Land S y s te m, p. 34; Burnett, Conti
nental Co ngress, pp. 624-25.
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Williamson, moved the entire territory be opened to sale by
one mile square sections.

But this amendment, along with

Grayson's proposal to reduce the size of sections by onehalf, failed to muster enough support.

Several amendments

to lower the price to fifty cents or two-thirds of a dollar
also failed to win the votes of nine states.
argument that the necessary $23,040.00

Virginia's

(the minimum amount

with which any land could be purchased), would preclude
sales to actual settlers failed to convince the Northeasterners who sought large sales to land investors.

On May 1

Grayson wrote Madison and accused the "Eastern people" of
"being amazingly attached to their own customs, and unrea
sonably anxious to have everything regulated according to
their oim. pleasure."

39

Journals of the Continental Congress, XXVIII,
see
footnote #38.
Treat, National Land System, p. 35; Treat,
"Land System During the Confederation," p. 11; Pattison,
Land Survey S y st e m, p. 93; Treat, National Land System, p.
37;
Grayson to Washington, May 8, 178 5 in Burnett, Letters
of the Continental Co ngress, VIII:119:
"The price is f i x ’d
at a dollar the acre liquidated certificates, that is the
land is not to be sold under that; The reason for establish
ing this sum was that a part of the house were for a half a
dollar and another part for two dollars and others for
intermediate sums between the two extremes, so that ulti
mately this was agreed upon as a central ground.
If it is
too high (which I am afraid is the case) , it may be here
after corrected by a resolution."
King to Gerry, April 26,
1785, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII;
104.
Grayson to Madison, May 1, 1785 in ibid., VIII :109.
Grayson to Madison, May 28, 1785, in ibid., VIII :129 : "The
Eastern people who before the revolution never had an idea
of any quantity of Earth above a hundred acres, were for
selling in large tracts of 30,000 acres while the Southern
people who formerly could scarce bring their imaginations
down so low as to comprehend the meaning of a hundred acres
of ground were for selling the whole territory in lots of a
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The Easterners, according to Rufus King, had good cause
in defending the New England system and the proposed Ordi
nance.

Sale by townships, he argued, would not injure the

poorer classes and encourage land-jobbing, for this was not
a problem in the ’’Eastern States,” where the lands ’’were
generally settled in that manner.”

Poor settlers could

simply ’’band together” and buy a township.

The Eastern N a 

tionalists argued that the Southern system ’’would have a ten
dency to destroy all those inducements to emigration which
are derived from friendship, religion, and relative connec
tions,” and that ’’the same consequences would result from
sales in small quantities under the present plan.”

Auction

sales in the East would prevent those settlers near the lands
from gaining an unfair advantage, and monopoly would ’’cure
itself,” because speculators would be forced to sell to actual
settlers before too long.

But ”if they should make money by

ingrossing, the great design of the land office is answered,
which is revenue- -. ”

Abandonment of ’’fractional” surveys

and the warrant system would save the Confederation consider
able time and money, while precluding the possibility of over
lapping claims and disputes.

Finally, ”if the plan should be

found by experience to be wrong, it can be easily altered by
reducing the quantities and multiplying the surveys.
mile square.
In this situation we remained for eight days
with great obstinancy on both sides. . . .”
'^^The New England argument in defense of the proposed
Ordinance is paraphrased from the debate by William Grayson
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Aside from the immediate reasons for Eastern support of
corporate expansion via the New England system, one can find
several important underlying factors.

Of economic importance

is the fact that many Eastern states had their own lands for
sale, and were reluctant to diminish their value by throwing
open vast parcels of cheap government land.

At the same

time, those Easterners who wanted to speculate in Ohio lands,
like Pickering and the Army speculators, wanted only gradual
expansion.

If there were no controls, then highly priced

"mid" western lands would be worthless; the pioneers would
simply squat on lands farther West.

Another economic motive

was the belief that cheap western lands would draw off the
Eastern labor pool, raise wages, and lower prices.
were political motivations too.

But there

Besides their push for an

independent national income through land sales, the Eastern
Nationalists had good reason to act as they did.

They feared

the political consequences of new states entering the Confed
eracy, and sought to delay that possibility through a restric
tive land policy.

All of these considerations combined to

move the Easterners and Nationalists toward a more conservative
western policy.

If westward migration was inevitable, then it

should be gradual, orderly and closely supervised.

George

in Treat, National Land S ys te m, p. 31; and Grayson to Washing
ton, April 15, 1785, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental
Congress. VIII:95.
The above quotations are from Grayson,
not the New Englanders, as there are no other firsthand a c 
counts of the debate available.
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Washington, a Virginia Nationalist who subscribed to the
Northeastern view, argued.
Compact and progressive seating will give
strength to the Union, admit law and good
government, and federal aids at an early
period.
Sparse settlements in several
new States, or a large territory for one
will have the direct contrary effects. . .
To suffer a wide-extended Country to be
overrun with . . . scattered settlers, is
in my opinion, inconsistent with that
wisdom and policy, which our true interest
dictates, or which an enlightened people
ought to adopt.41
So after several weeks of debate Congress found itself
in an extremely awkward position.

It needed money, yet there

was no agreement on a mode for selling the public lands.

As

both sides clung to their opposing views, it became obvious
that a compromise was in order.

Although they favored the

Southern system, the Virginia delegates initiated a compro
mise because they believed it would benefit them in the long
run.

Any land sales at all

(even sales under a New England

system) would lead to eventual settlement of the West.
as Herbert James Henderson

has shown, the Virginians'

political" strategy of the

1780s was based largely upon

And,
"geo

anticipated political and economic benefits that would result

For the Easterners' motivations, see Henderson, Party
Politics. p. 370; Grayson to Washington, May 8, 1785, in
Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress. VIII:117;
Washington to Williamson, March 15, 1785, in Sparks, Writ
ings of Washington. IX:105; Washington to Duane, September 7,
1783, in ibid., VI II:477.
Also, Pickering to King, June 4,
1785, in King, Correspondence of Rufus King, 1:106-107.
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from admission of new western states.

Thus, the Virginians

were willing to compromise over land policy, so long as some
new western states

(i.e., Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee)

would enter the Confederation in the not too distant future.
Grayson initiated the bargain in a motion that "would
accomodate both the Eastern and the Southern States."

Since

no one could agree whether to sell by townships or sections,
Grayson proposed to sell half the land one way and half the
other.

One-half of the alternating townships would be sold

intact;

the other half would be sold in sections of 640

acres--but only consecutively, and no second township was to
be offered in sections until every section in the preceding
one had been sold.

This great stumbling block hurdled, the

rest of the Ordinance began to fall into place.
deleted the land reserve for c h u r c h e s , a n d
of townships from seven to six miles square.

Congress

reduced the size
The proposed

Ordinance was read for a second and third time on May 5 and 6,
but further objections and a lapse in representation post
poned acceptance.

Debate resumed on May 18, and the Land

^^For the Southerners' motivations,
Party P ol itics, p. 377.

see Henderson,

^^The religious clause was particularly obnoxious to
Madison.
See Madison to Monroe, in Burnett, Letters of the
Continental Congress . VIII; 624:
"How a regulation so unjust
in itself, so foreign to the Authority of Congress, so hurt
ful to the sale of public land, and smelling so strongly of
an antiquated Bigotry, could have received the countenance
of a Committee is truly a matter of astonishment."
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Ordinance of 1785 finally passed on May 20--after five weeks
of debates and haggling.

Rufus King wrote Elbridge Gerry

about the Ordinance just before its passage, and expressed
his approbation:
from it.

” I am pleased great benefits will result

You will find it bears strong features of an

eastern system.

When I tell you the History of this ordi

nance you shall acknowledge that I have some merit in the
.
.
,,44
business."
The final version of the Land Ordinance of 1785 is here
recapitulated:

Thirteen surveyors

(one from each state)

were to survey the Ohio country lands ceded by the Indians
(the first "seven ranges").

The lands were to be divided

into six mile square townships and one mile square sections
or lots.

The land was to be sold by townships and sections,

alternately, at auctions in each of the thirteen states.
The minimum price was $1.00 per acre, payable in specie or
certificates.

Congress granted Virginia a military reserve

north of the Ohio, and one-seventh of all of the land was
reserved for Revolutionary land bounty holders.

One-third of

all gold, silver, copper, and lead as well as four sections

Grayson to Pickering, April 25, 1785, in Pickering,
Timothy Pickering P a p er s. Reel 18, #234; Treat, Land Policy
During the Confederation." p. 11; Hibbard, Public Land Poli
cies , p. 39; Lee to Washington, May 7, 1785, in Ballagh,
Letters of Richard Henry L e e . II: "I have now the honor to
enclose you the Ordinance above alluded to, which meets the
assent of nine States § every member of these Nine States
except one Man, who keeps the Ordinance from passing by joint
causes, as he alleges, of indisposition 5 dislike. . . ."
The "one Man" was Rufus King.
Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry,
May 8, 1785, in King, Correspondence of Rufus K i n g , I.
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of each township was reserved for Congress, while one sec
tion went for schools and education.

The act reserved six

townships for Canadian and Nova Scotian Revolutionary refugees,
and for Christianized Indians.

Congress prescribed the form

of deeds and the method of obtaining bounty lands.
mainder

The r e 

of the Ordinance dealt with technical aspects of sur

veying and dividing the

public lands.

James Monroe provided

perhaps the best summary of. the Land Ordinance of 178 5 in a
letter to Madison that summer:
[The territory] is to be survey'd in townships
containing abt. 26,000 acres each, each town
ship marked on the plat into plots of one
mile square; and 1/2 the country sold only in
townships and the other in lots.
13 surveyors
are to be appointed for the purpose to act
under control of the Geographer, beginning
with the first range of townships upon the
Ohio and, running North to the Lakes, from
[a point due north of] termination of the
line which forms the Southern boundary of the
State of Pena., and so on westward with each
range.
As soon as [7] ranges shall be survey'd,
the return will be made to the Bd. of Treasury,
who are instructed to draw them in the name of
each State in the proportion of the requisition
on each, and transmit its portion to the loan
officers in each for sale at public provided
it is, nor any part, sold for less than one
dollar specie or certificates the A c r e . 45
Thus, out of conflicting interests came compromise and
the drafting of the first American land policy.

The national

land system was not the creation of one man or section, but
The best summary of the final version of the Land Ordi
nance of 1785 is in Treat, National Land System, pp. 36-37.
See also Harris, Land Tenure S y s t e m , p. 390; Monroe to Madison,
in Pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey System, p. 85.
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rather several.

If credit be given to individuals, then it

must go to Jefferson, Williamson, Grayson, Pickering, and
King.

In weighing the attributes of the New England and

Southern land systems,

the Confederation Congress opted for

a modified New England form.
well as disadvantages.

This system had advantages as

The implementation of rectangular

survey brought order to the huge task of allotting western
lands.

It provided for security of title and simplicity of

conveyance.

But on the other hand, the new land law seemed

unrelated to the realities of westward expansion taking place
at that very moment.

Because it was a revenue measure, the

Land Ordinance of 1785 made no provision for squatting or
preemption.
jobbers;
tions.

The law aimed at sales to speculators and land-

there were no credit or low minimum purchase stipula
It was highly unlikely that any ordinary settler

would have the $640.00 cash with which to purchase a section,
nor would he want to buy from land investors who would be
charging considerably more than the $1.00 per acre they had
to pay.

The requirement for sales of contiguous sections was

completely foreign to those settlers who always sought the
best lands along the river bottoms and streams.

The Eastern

Nationalists were sincere in their loyalty to "township plant
ing," for it had worked well during the colonial period of
their section's history.

But the Southerners better grasped

the nature of American westward expansion.

In insisting on

sales of small tracts, the Southerners were prophetic of the
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eventual course of national land policy.

It remained to be

seen how well the Land Ordinance of 178 5 would fare in the
realities of the trans-Appalachian West in the 1780s.

In my opinion, it will never answer the End
proposed, for before this formal and hitherto
unheard of plan can be carried into Execution,
the lands will be possessed by persons, who
have already and are daily crossing the Ohio,
in great numbers, so as to put the United
States to more expense to dispossess them,
than the soil will afterwards sell for.
Richard Dobbs Spaight to
Governor Caswell, 1785
For my part I must acknowledge my faith of
paying the Domestic Debt by regular sails
of the Western Land was never very great.
There is land eno' and that which is excel
lent. . . . But to me the Idea of running
this out, and by the neat proceeds of its
sails discharging any considerable part of
the Debt is almost as chimerical as to count

Treat, National Land S ys t em , pp. 36-37, 39, 179; J e f 
ferson to Monroe, June 17, 1785, in Boyd, Papers of Jefferson,
pp. 8, 229.
Jefferson originally disapproved of the Ordinance
which superseded his own recommendations.
"I am very differ
ently affected towards the new plan of opening our land
office. . . .” "To sell them at vendue [in auction] is to
give them to the bidder of the day, be they many or few.
It
is ripping up the hen which lays the golden eggs.
If sold in
lots at a fixed price, as first proposed, the best lots will
be sold first.
As these become occupied it gives a value to
the interjacent ones, and raises them, tho* of inferior quality,
to the price of the first." However, after studying the final
document, Jefferson seems to have changed his mind.
In a
letter to Monroe that summer he declared, "I am much pleased
with your ordinance, and think it improved from the first in
the most material circumstances."
See Pattison, American Rec
tangular Land Survey S y s t e m , p. 103.
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upon the number of cod-fish and Whales in
the ocean for that purpose.
George Thatcher to._
Pierse Long, 1788^'
Congress anticipated large revenues from sales under the
Land Ordinance of 1785, and immediately made arrangements for
surveying the Ohio Valley lands.

The Confederation appointed

thirteen surveyors to serve under United States Geographer
Thomas Hutchins.

They began their work in September of 178 5,

but Indian hostilities, hard winters, and the tedious mode of
rectangular survey prolonged the process for several years.
As early as 1786 Charles Petit wrote that Congress was grow
ing impatient, and that "Some are for adhering to the ordi
nance of last year in the mode of laying out and selling the
land.

Others think it impractical and wish it to be radi

cally changed."

Although further efforts by Southerners to

institute indiscriminate survey failed, several other amend
ments were made to the Land Ordinance of 1785.
expedite sales.

In order to

Congress relaxed the survey stipulations,

granted three months credit, and cancelled the thirteen
separate state auctions, replacing them with one auction in
New York City.

As soon as the first four ranges were sur

veyed, the government opened up the region for sale to the
highest bidders.

But the results greatly disappointed the

over-optimistic Congress.

The auction yielded little more

Richard Dobbs Spaight to Governor Caswell (North Caro
l ina), June 5, 178 5, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental
Congress. VIII:ix; George Thatcher to Pierse Long, April 23,
1788, in ibid., VIII:725.
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than one hundred thousand dollars^-far from sufficient for
even one year's payment on the public debt.

48

This failure led Congress, over the next few years, to
ignore the sales provisions of the Ordinance of 1785 alto
gether.

In its quest for land revenues, the Confederation

Congress turned to huge sales of cheap land to investors and
speculators.

From 1787-1788 the Ohio Company, James Flint,

and Royal Parker, John Cleve Symmes, and William Duer and the
secret Scioto Associates purchased over 6,000,000 acres of
government land at pennies an acre.

These sales also resulted

in failure, however, as most of the companies either defaulted
on their payments or went bankrupt.

In the meantime, squatters

and trespassers continued to pour onto the public domain.

As

it became clear that these actual settlers could not and would
not pay large sums of money for land. Congress began to

48

The "seven ranges" are directly West of the Ohio River.
For the survey and surveyors of the seven ranges, see Treat,
National Land Sy stem, p. 41; and Pattison, American Rectangular
Land Survey Sy stem, p. 97.
Pattison provides an excellent
account of these early white explorers of the Ohio country
wilderness.
The interest in Ohio Valley lands by investors
tended to influence the choice of surveyors from each state.
Most of the surveyors chosen were well established gentlemen,
who were quite interested in land speculation.
They were
knowledgeable, cultured, and looking to increase their for
tunes.
It is no wonder that they were referred to as the
"Gentlemen Surveyors" by contemporaries.
No less than five
members of the surveying group were members of the Ohio Com
pany.
See William D. Pattison, "The Survey of the Seven
Ranges," Ohio Historical Quarterly LXVIII (April 1959); Treat,
National Land S vs te m. p. 43; Charles Petit to Jeremiah Wads
worth in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII:
361; Treat, National Land S y s t e m , pp. 44-48; Harris, Land
Tenure Sy stem, pp. 392-93; Rohrbough, Land Office Business,
pp. 10-11; Pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey System,
p. 155.
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acknowledge the failure of a revenue-oriented land policy.
The failure of the Land Ordinance of 1785 rendered Con
gress receptive to offers from speculators and land-jobbers.
During the raid-1780s several land investraent corapanies
approached Congress, all eager to speculate in Ohio country
lands.

A list of their shareholders reads like the social

and political register of New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachu
setts, and New York.

The Ohio Corapany was certainly the raost

prominent and firmly established of these groups.
Associates'

The Ohio

origins went back to the Society of Cincinnati,

the "Array Plan," and the Newburgh Petition of 1783.

Although

the corapany represented a minority of Northern army officers,
it was the only group of veterans organized to collect on the
Revolutionary military bounties.

Their loyal services during

the war, and their announced intent to settle the West, gave
the Ohio Company a certain legitimacy not enjoyed by the
other land speculation companies.

The Newburgh Petition lay

in abeyance from 1783-1787, but its proponents continued to
correspond and confer.

Benjamin Tupper, Rufus Putnam, Winthrop

Sargent, and Samuel Holden Parsons formed the nucleus of this

Treat, National Land S ys t em , p. 47; Kohn, Eagle and
S w or d, p. 100; Jensen, New N a t i o n , p. 355.
The land companies
of the late 1780s had few if any ties to the pre-Revolutionary
and Revolutionary Corapanies discussed in Chapter 3 above.
These firms of the 1760s and 1770s-1783 period include the
Susquehannah Company; Ohio Company (another o n e ) ; Transylvania
Company; Mississippi Company; Illinois Company; IllinoisWabash Company; Vandalia Company; and the Muscle Schoals
Company.
The best treatment of this early speculation is
Abernethy, Western La nds. See also Rohrbough,
Land Office
Business, p. 12,
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group, and each retained an enthusiastic interest in western
lands.

Tupper, Sargent, and Putnam, all surveyors, surveyed

lands in Massachusetts, Maine, and the Ohio country (Seven
Ranges), and agreed that the Ohio lands would best suit
their purposes.

The group continued to speculate in military

land bounties and public securities, and in January of 1786
called a meeting at the Bunch of Grapes Tavern in Boston
where the Ohio Company of Associates was formed.

They drew

up articles of association, elected officers, opened up
$1,000,000 worth of stock for sale at $1,000 a share, and
selected Samuel Holden Parsons to negotiate a land purchase
from Congress.

Parsons was convinced "that public securities,

if Congress a little alter their system, is [our] best estate."
If he could only secure some government post in the West, "I
will make the fortune of your family and my own till time
shall be no more."^^
Kohn, Eagle and S w o r d , p. 100; Hibbard, Public Land
P olicies, p. 41; Hulbert, Records of the Ohio Co mpany, pp.
xxxvii, xli; Pattison, "Survey of the Seven Ranges," pp. 13738; Shaw Livermore, Early American Land Companies, pp. 134,
135, 309.
Most of the members of the Ohio Company were also
members of the Cincinnati, the Masons, and the American Union
Lodge.
The group originally assumed it would have to pay
$1.00 per acre, as per the Ordinance of '85, but instructed
Parsons to try and secure a more "advantageous" deal.
See
Jensen, New Na t i o n , p. 355.
The war service of the Ohio Com
pany members, gave them more leverage in negotiating than
other interests.
This is evidenced in the tone of their
appeal, which appears in the Journals of the Continental C on
gress . XXXIII:428-29: "If these terms are admitted we shall
be ready to conclude the contract.
If not we shall have to
regret, for a Numerous Class of our Associates, that the
Certificates they received as Specie, at the risque of their
lives and fortunes, in support of the Common Cause, must for
a considerable time longer wait the tedious and precarious
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The Ohio Company submitted its proposal to Congress in
the Spring of 17 87.

Under ordinary circumstances Congress

probably would have refused the offer, as it entailed a com
plete disregard of the Land Ordinance of 1785.
were no ordinary times.
controversy,

But these

Shay's Rebellion, the Jay-Gardoqui

the Constitutional Convention, financial d is

tress, lagging attendance, and the failure of the Ordinance
of 1785 all combined to render the Confederation Congress
confused and insecure.

Under these circumstances, the offer

of a million dollars for western lands seemed attractive.
Yet there was still much opposition.
unable to make much headway,

As General Parsons was

the Ohio Associates sent a

shrewd Revolutionary chaplain. Rev. Manasseh Cutler of Ipswich,
Massachusetts,

in his stead.

Cutler immediately launched an

intense lobbying campaign, and offered Congress $250,000.00
down on 1,000,000 acres of land at about two-thirds of a
dollar per acre.

But Cutler found "a number in Congress d e 

cidedly opposed to my terms of negotiation, and some to any
contract."

There were many, he explained in a letter to a

friend, who feared that land-jobbers would gain from so large
a grant, at the expense of actual settlers.
balked. Cutler tried a bluff.

When Congress

On July 17, 1787, he told the

issue of public events . . . and that the United States may
lose an opportunity of securing in the most effectual manner,
as well as improving the value of western lands, whilst they
establish a powerful barrier, against the irruptions of the
Indians, or any attempts of the British power, to interrupt
the security of the adjoining States."
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delegates he would bypass Congress and buy state lands in
stead.

This threat upset many in Congress who favored the

sale, but the Ohio Company offer was not tempting enough
to change

its opponents* minds.

Thus negotiations were at

a standstill in mid-July when William Duer, the infamous
Secretary of the Board of Treasury, entered the scene.
William Duer was an American entrepreneur extraordi
naire.

He was the son of an English aristocrat, a former

naval and army officer, close friend of Alexander Hamilton,
member of the Continental Congress, an ardent Nationalist,
and a member of the Cincinnati.

Duer's business dealings

were varied, but included war profiteering, and speculation
in stocks, specie certificates, and military land bounties.
In 1786 Congress appointed Duer Secretary to the Board of
Treasury, the very center of the public business of the Con
federation government.

Although he was very secretive, there

is enough evidence of Duer's dealings with Cutler and the
Ohio Associates to make the "Scioto" land deal one of the
better documented abuses of government power during the early

Treat, National Land S y st e m, pp. 48-49.
For Parsons*
role in the negotiations, see Hall, Letters of Samuel Holden
Pa rsons, pp. 495-514.
Cutler replaced Parsons before the
July 14, 1787 proposal was made.
It is important to remember
when considering the terms of purchase that even though we
speak in terms of two-thirds of a dollar, etc. the inflated
value of Continental securities, with which most of the land
was being purchased, bring the actual price of lands down to
around ten cents an acre.
Joseph Stancliffe Davis, "William
Duer, Entrepreneur, 17 47-99," in Essays in the Earlier H i s 
tories of American Corporation (Cambridge, 1917), p. 132.
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days of the Republic.

The Scioto project has been called a

"kind of illegitimate half-brother to the new Ohio Company."
Duer offered secretly to assist the Ohio Associates in m a k 
ing Congress a proposition that was too tempting to refuse.
Instead of 1,000,000, Cutler would offer to buy 5,000,000
acres of land from Congress.

One and one-half million would

belong to the Ohio Company, while the remaining three and
one-half million acres would belong secretly to the Scioto
Group, a company made up of Duer and some of the "principal
characters of America."

But Duer warned Cutler that it was

"necessary or at least prudent" to keep the "separate p ur
chases out of sight."

In other words, Duer wanted to use

the Ohio Company as a legitimate front to purchase land for
one of his speculation schemes.

In return for Cutler's

coupling the Scioto and Ohio Company enterprises, Duer agreed
to loan the Ohio Associates $143,000 and use his influence
as Secretary to the Board of Treasury to secure a favorable
contract.

The deal was struck on July 20 after an "elegant"

oyster dinner in Brooklyn.
a "profound secret."

Cutler promised to keep the deal

The next day he, Winthrop Sargent, and

their powerful new ally, Duer, began an intense lobbying campaign to "bring over my opposers in Congress."

52

Archer B. Hulbert, "The Methods and Operations of the
Scioto Group of Speculators," The Mississippi Valley H i s 
torical R e v i e w , I § 11:506-16, 56-7 3 ; James Woodress, A
Yankee's Odyssev: The Life of Joel Barlow (Philadelphia,
1958), p. 91; Davis, "William Duer, Entrepreneur," pp. 11112, 123, 130-31, 132, 124, 133; Livermore, Land Companies,
p. 138.
A study of the Scioto affair is difficult as many
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Cutler found Congress much more receptive to a plan
that offered over $5,000,000 in revenue.

With "the assis

tance of Colonel Duer," he and Winthrop Sargent lobbied
for passage of a plan which was "warmly debated" on July 23.
One tactic of the Ohio Company was its announced support
of Pennsylvanian Arthur St. Clair, the Nationalist president
of Congress, for territorial governor of the Ohio country.
Finally, a committee consisting of Rufus King, Nathan Dane,
Egbert Benson, Edward Carrington, and James Madison gave
the Board of Treasury the power to reach a final agreement
with Cutler.

This was exactly what Duer wanted.

After the

body for which he was secretary took over the negotiations,
the affair went quite smoothly.
signed in October of 1787.

Two separate contracts were

The first was between the Ohio

Associates and Congress for one and one-half million acres.
Two payments of 5500,000 were to be made; the first due
immediately and the second after the surveying was com
plete.

At this time full title to its one and one-half

million acres would be granted the Ohio Company.

The

second contract for three and one-half million acres was
signed by Cutler, Winthrop Sargent,

"and associates;" it

of the transactions were secretive.
One has to depend on
indirect evidence, letters written by uninitiated corres
pondents, or letters written in distress.
According to
Davis, Duer was "a cautious man whose right hand often was
not suffered to know what his left hand did."
Hulbert adds
that Duer often used secret codes, initials, nome du plume,
shorthand, etc. to conceal his communications.
In view of
his government positions, Duer's business transactions were
certainly a conflict of interests.
Indeed, he was grimly
prophetic when he expressed to John Jay, in 1777, the fear
"that we shall not increase in virtue, as we may in years."
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was supplemented by a secret contract signed with Duer a
few days later.

Six equal payments were due on this land,

but not until the Ohio Company's original one and one-half
million acres was bought and paid for.

By signing two

separate contracts,

the liabilities of each company were

greatly minimized.

The Ohio Associates could carry out

their original plan, allowing the Scioto Group additional
time to sell its option and raise the installments.

Most

important, the failure of the Scioto Group would not affect
the Ohio Company's title whatsoever.

The land was to be

paid for in specie, public securities, and military bounties.
Considering the inflation rate on securities, the military
bounties and allowances for bad land, etc., the Ohio and
Scioto Companies received 5,000,000 acres of the Ohio Valley
for about eight to nine cents an acre.

As Cutler wrote in

his diary in the Fall of 1787:
By this ordinance we obtained a grant of
near 5,000,000 acres of land, amounting
to . . . one million and a half acres for
the Ohio Company and the remainder for a
private speculation, in which many of the
principal characters in America are con
cerned.
Without connecting this specula
tion, similar terms and advantages could
not have been obtained for the Ohio Com
pany.
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXXIII:399, 42930.
Since Congress had to approve the final plan, intense
lobbying was necessary.
See Davis, "William Duer, Entre
preneur," pp. 155-34, 137, 139.
Cutler wrote, "My friends
made every exertion in private conversation to bring over my
opposers in Congress.
In order to get at some of them, so
as to work powerfully on their minds, we were obliged to
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No comment need be made about the ethics involved in
such a business deal.

No mention of Duer appears in any of

the letters of the members of Congress, nor in the Journals
of that body.

It seems that the members of the committee

which expedited the sale

(King, Dane, Carrington, Benson,

and Madison) were well aware of the nature of the transac
tion, yet went ahead with it a n y w a y . T h e

reasons for

engage three or four persons before we could get at them.
In
some instances we engaged one person, who engaged a second,
and he a third, and so on to a fourth, before we could effect
our purpose.
In these maneuvers I am much beholden to the
assistance of Colonel Duer and Major Sargent. . . . The M a t 
ter was taken up this morning in Congress and warmly debated
until 3 o ’clock, when another ordinance was obtained.
This
was not to the minds of my friends, who were now consider
ably increased in Congress, but they conceived it better than
the former; and they obtained ah additional clause empowering
the Board of Treasury to take Order upon the Ordinance, and
complete a contract on the general principles contained in it,
which still left room for negotiations."
For the terms of the
contract, see Davis, "William Duer, Entrepreneur," or Hulbert,
"Scioto Group of Speculators," p. 505.
Also, Treat, National
Land Sy st e m, pp. 50-51; Hulbert, Records of the Ohio Company,
p. Ixx; Hibbard, Public Land P ol ic y, p. 48.
Some historians
have intimated that Duer "bribed" Congressmen with offers
of shares in the speculation, etc., but there is no evidence
to substantiate this charge.
As for Cutler and Sargent's
legal relationship with the Scioto Group, there is also d is
agreement.
Some say they were equal partners, and that Cutler
and Sargent hoped to make some money off the Scioto deal.
But Hulbert contends that they were involved in the deal in
"name only." Whatever, when the Scioto venture went bankrupt
the Ohio Company lost $80,000.
The Ohio Company’s main b usi
ness with Scioto appears to have been only in the West--for
instance, when the Galliapolis emigres arrived.
If they were
legally bound to Duer, no one pressed the issue--or Cutler
and Sargent would have also gone bankrupt in the 1790s.
^^Every member of the committee was a Nationalist.
See
Hulbert, "The Scioto Group of Speculators," p. 73; Hulbert,
Records of the Ohio Co mpany, p. Ixxii, Ixxiii.
Hulbert says,
"To doubt the committee knew this is to misread everything
that is written between the lines of the documents that are
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approval of the Ohio Company sale are varied.
in an extremely tenuous position in 1787.

Congress was

Domestic turmoil,

instability, and a feeling of imminent disbandment all r e n 
dered Congress more remiss than it might have been in a less
tumultuous period.

The Confederation always needed money,

and Cutler and D u e r ’s scheme was quite tempting.

Edmund

Cody Burnett astutely summed up the situation:
Congress had long been dreaming dreams of the
money to be obtained from these lands; now
it was suddenly awakened to find the dreams
come true.
Real money and lots of it was
actually dangling before their eyes; besides
there was a fair promise that more, much
more, was coming from like sources. . . .
Those who predicted in 1783 that the National Domain would
one day become a great source of revenue thought their p r e 
dictions had at last come true.

The Ohio Company’s $5,000,000.00

offered security to an insecure Congress.

left to us
of the transaction.” But Congress felt that by
’’linking the democracy and willingness of performance of the
Ohio Company of Associates with the financial strength of
D u e r ’s group of promoters, a very honorable and successful
negotiation could be concluded. . . .”
^^Hibbard, Public Land Policy, p. 47; Hulbert, Records
of the Ohio Company, p. Ixx.
See Antifederalist Richard
Henry Lee to Washington, July 15, 1787, in Ballagh, Letters
of Richard Henry L e e , 11:425:
’’Our next object is to c on
sider a proposition made for the purchase of 5 or 6 millions
of Acres, in order to lessen the domestic debt.
An object
of great consequences this, since the extinguishment of this
part of the public debt would not only relieve from a very
heavy burden, but by demolishing the Ocean of public Securi
ties, we should stop that mischievous deluge of speculation
that now hurts our morals and extremely intrigues the public
affairs.” Burnett, Letters of the Continental
Congress. VIII
xlii; Treat, National Land S ys te m, pp. 57-58.
Treat argues
the Congress is to be commended for extinguishing half a
million of the public debt.

166
Moreover,

the colonization plans of the Ohio Associates

seemed prudent to Congress.

The company intended "an actual,

a large and immediate settlement of the most robust and in
dustrious people in America"; men "who had no intention
other than the Federal Government."

This plan of orderly

westward expansion was in the New England tradition, and
enjoyed the approval of Easterners and Nationalists controlling
Congress.Edward

Carrington, a Virginia Nationalist, voiced

his approval of the sale in an August, 1787 letter to James
Monroe:
I hold a great bargain for the U.S. as the
Land goes good and bad together, and it will
be a means of introducing into the Country,
in the first instance, a description of Men
who will fix the character and politics
throughout the whole territory, and which
will probably endure to the latest period
of time. . . .
This Nationalist and Northeastern influence on western policy
is also seen in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, passed c on
currently with the Ohio Company purchase-

Manasseh Cutler and

the Ohio Associates played a role in shaping the document.
The Northwest Ordinance created a strong territorial government
to insure the Ohio Company's political sovereignty and property
Hibbard, Public Land Po licy, p. 47; Jensen, New N a 
t i o n , p. 355.
Jensen contends that the rise of the National
ists in the Constitutional Convention was also manifest in
the Confederation Congress.
"The ultimate success of the
Ohio Company was due in part to the fact that once more the
balance of power in Congress was shifting, a shift no better
expressed than in the election of General Arthur St. Clair
as president."
As mentioned, the five committee members that
determined the outcome of the Ohio Company's negotiations were
all Nationalists, three of them Easterners.
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rights from encroachments by frontiersmen and squatters.

57

Several other land speculation entrepreneurs approached
Congress during the late 1780s.

Royal Flint and James Parker

(both members of the Scioto Group) proposed to purchase one
million acres on the Wabash and Mississippi Rivers, and George
Morgan and Associates wanted a million acres on the Missis
sippi.

But neither of these deals materialized.

The only

other big land contract negotiated by the Confederation C on
gress was with John Cleve Symmes, a Nationalist Congressman
from New Jersey and newly appointed judge in the Northwest
Territory.

Symmes was enthusiastic about the fertility of

the Ohio country, and foresaw a fortune for "the lucky specu
lator who should buy lands from Congress for five Schillings
an acre and sell it to immigrants at twenty."

Symmes con

tracted for one million acres between the Great and Little
Miami Rivers, on the Ohio.

The contract was for two-thirds

of a dollar per acre, but use of inflated securities, mi l i 
tary land bounties, and allowances for bad land brought his

c7

Carrington to Monroe, August 7, 1787 in Burnett, Let
ters of the Continental Congress. VIII:631.
See Manasseh
Cutler, Description of Ohio (Boston, 1896):
"It is a happy
coincidence that the Ohio Company are about to commence the
settlement of this country in so judicious a manner.
It
will serve as a wise model for the future settlement of all
the federal lands; at the same time that by beginning so
near the western limit of Pennsylvania, it will be a con
tinuation of the old settlements, leaving no vacant lands
to be seized by such lawless banditti as usually infest the
frontiers of countries as distant from the seat of govern
ment."
For the Northwest Ordinance, see Chapter 7 below.
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actual purchase price down to that of the Ohio Company--about
eight to nine cents an acre.

58

Thus by 1788, the Confederation Congress had, by amend
ing the Land Ordinance of 1785, sold over 6,000,000 acres of
the public domain to three land investment companies at a
promised return of over $5,000,000.00 in specie and securi
ties.

Congress hoped there would be more big purchases, and

announced the availability of lands in the Old Northwest to
any purchaser willing to buy "not less than One Million of
Acres in One body."

An era of large scale private coloniza

tion seemed to be at hand.
ing.

On paper the sales looked promis

In reality they proved to be negligible, for the attempt

of the federal government to sell western lands through land
speculators was a dismal failure.

All three of the large

purchasers of the 1780s failed to meet their payments to Con
gress, and two of them went bankrupt.

Part of their problem

was caused by the rise in the value of public securities after
ratification of the Constitution.

All the speculators planned

to pay for most of their lands with securities they received
for those lands.

With the rise of these securities, however,

the cost of lands went up, further applications ceased, and
S^Treat, National Land System, pp. 52-53; Hibbard, Public
Land P o l i c y , p. 50; Pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey
S y stem, p. 170; Hibbard, Public Land Policy, p. 43; Treat,
National Land S y st em , pp. 53, 64.
One other sale that should
be mentioned here was to the state of Pennsylvania.
That
state bought a 2 00,000 acre triangle of land between Lake Erie,
New York, and Pennsylvania at 75 cents an acre.
This p ur
chase gave Pennsylvania additional frontage on Lake Erie.
See
Treat, National Land S ys t em , p. 63, for a graph summarizing
all of the Confederation land sales to speculation companies.
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the existing contractors were unable to make payments.
first company to go under was the Scioto Group.

The

Duer had

never planned on colonization; he wanted only to act as a
middleman and sell his option on the lands to someone else
at a profit.

But Duer could find no buyers.

His agent in

Europe, Joel Barlow, compounded the problem by selling in
dividual lots to French emigres.

Six hundred of these French

men arrived in the United States in 1790 to found the colony
of Galliapolis--only to discover there was no title for the
lands they had purchased.
price of securities,

This ineptitude, the rise in the

and Duer's inaction all culminated when

Duer and two of his associates were swept down in the New
cq
York financial panic of 1792.
59

Robbins, Our Landed He ritage, p. 11.
For the securities
question, see Treat, National Land System, p. 55, and Davis,
"William Duer, Entrepreneur," p. 143.
The confidence that
accompanied the ratification of the Constitution increased
the value of securities because everyone thought, correctly,
that the new federal government would pay off in specie.
Af
ter 1789 no one wanted to waste their securities on land when
they could get silver and gold for them.
See Thatcher to
Long, April 23, 1788 in Burnett, Letters of the Continental
Congress, V III:7 26:
"Not a great many purchasers have offered
themselves, and few that have could give evidence of their
ability, and of those that could, still a small number have,
and probably ever will, comply with their contracts.
Conti
nental Securities have been for several years very low, perhaps
lower than they will ever be hereafter should the proposed Con
stitution, or any other with the energy to discharge the Inter
est be adopted.
Hence if purchasers found it difficult to dis
charge their contracts while public Securities have been sold
from 6/ to 3/ on the pound, what probability is there of
their being enabled after the adoption of the Constitution
that shall secure their Redemption, and make them equal to
Silver and Gold."
Duer, the Ohio Associates, and Symmes all
asked for retroactive reductions in the price of their p ur
chases with these developments.
As Davis commented in "Wil
liam Duer, Entrepreneur," p. 224:
"One cannot but comment in
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The Ohio Company did partially colonize its tract, and
founded the to^m of Marietta in 1788.

However, the original

plan of the Newburgh petitioners to settle en masse was never
realized.

By the 1790s the company was more or less a specu

lation firm, run by ex-army officers, selling Ohio Valley
lands to newly arrived pioneers.

Less than one-third of the

817 Ohio Company shareholders ever moved out West.
difficulties eventually led to the Company's demise.

Many
The

secret Scioto deal angered many members of the company, and
disputes arose between immigrant and speculator stockholders.
The Ohio Associates were hard-pressed to sell shares, and
several original subscribers defaulted.

Lack of business

"know-how," the rise in the price of securities, the rela
tively poor quality of land, lack of immigration, and the
Indian wars of the 1780s and
energy.

'90s all drained the Company's

When its second payment of $500,000 came due in 17 92,

the Ohio Associates were unable to pay.

Rather than forfeit

passing, upon the ingenuity of the land purchasers who would
urge the appreciation of the public securities as one reason
for making a land grant for which those securities should be
received in payment, and then when the appreciation had
taken place would urge a reduction in price of lands corres
ponding to or exceeding the extent of that appreciation." (!)
For Duer's bankruptcy, see Hulbert, Records of the Ohio Com
pany , p. Ixxxv; and Davis, "William D u e r , Entrepreneur,"
pp. 144, 213, 249; Woodress, Life of Joel Barlow, p. 93;
Treat, National Land Sy stem, p. 59.
To relieve the French
immigrants duped by the Scioto Associates, the Congress
passed a relief act granting 24,000 acres to the French
settlers at Galliapolis^
See Hulbert, Records of the Ohio
C om pany. p. Ixxxix.
One of Duer's last business deals before
he landed in debtor's prison was a land speculation scheme
with Henry Knox.
Knox, Duer, and others bought Maine lands at
ten cents an acre.
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everything,

they asked the Federal Congress for help, and

Congress passed a Relief Act which lowered the price of the
original purchase.

The company received 7 50,000 acres for

its original $500,000 in securities.

In addition, the

Federalist-controlled Congress granted the Ohio Associates
214,285 acres for military bounty warrants.

Finally, it

awarded them a donation tract of 100,000 acres for services
rendered in settling the area and in fighting Indians.

By

1795 the Ohio Company had begun to liquidate its holdings.
It sold all company property, completed the surveys
its contract), and divided up its assets.

(as per

Although the

final dividends were small, the Ohio Company was spared
bankruptcy by the federal government.
John Cleve Symmes did not fare as well as the Ohio
Associates,

largely because of his own dishonesty.

Symmes

started off well enough, founding the town of Cincinnati in
1787.

But in his zeal to make money, he continually sold

lands that were not within the bounds of his purchase.

Con

gress was initially cooperative, and agreed to grant Symmes
the lands he had sold.

It also passed a relief measure for

Philbrick, Rise of the W e s t , pp. 124-25; Davis, "Wil
liam Duer, Entrepreneur," p. 142; Livermore, Land Companies,
p. 136.
Proxy voting was the rule, with eight or ten men
holding all the proxies.
Hulbert, Records of the Ohio Company,
p. cxii; Treat, National Land Syste m , p. 55; Hibbard, Public
Land Po licies, pp. 8, 49; Livermore, Land Companies, p. 140;
Hulbert, Records of the Ohio Company, p. Ixvi.
For a summary
of the Ohio Company dealings, see Treat, National Land System,
p. 57.
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the judge similar to that afforded the Ohio Company.

But

Symmes continued to sell lands that did not belong to him.
In 1802, Judge Symmes was arrested on three counts of fraud
and soon went bankrupt.

Thus Congress's grandiose plans to sell western lands
to fund the national government did not work.

The original

sales under the Land Ordinance of 1785 were negligible,
drawing little more than $100,000 in revenue, and Congress's
subsequent deals with the land speculators fared little
better.
but why?

Confederation land policy was undoubtedly a failure-The answer lies in Congress's basic assumptions.

That body was' quite correct in predicting that westward ex 
pansion would increase, producing widespread demand for
western lands.

But it made a great mistake in assuming the

settlers would feel obligated to pay for those lands!

Where

land was cheap, as in the individual states, pioneers would
settle and make purchases.

(Indeed, much of the settlement

prior to 1820 was within the frontiers of the thirteen states,
not the trans-Appalachian West.)

But where lands were expen

sive, as in the public domain in the Ohio country, most of

Philbrick, Rise of the W e s t , p. 125; Treat, National
Land S ystem, p. 60.
Symmes also received a tract for educa
tional purposes.
Congress granted him the land he had been
selling and took away his original grant.
But Symmes wanted
both.
See ibid., p. 61.
Congress had to finally grant p r e 
emption rights to those who had been frauded by Symmes--but
the preemption went at $2.00 an acre.
See Hibbard, Public
Land Policies, p. 51.
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those who migrated would simply squat and trespass.
frontier settlers would,

The

in Jefferson's words, "settle the

lands in spite of everybody."

There is no better example

of this than in the American tradition of squatting as
manifested in the 1780s and
West.

'90s in the trans-Appalachian

Tens of thousands of pioneers squatted and built

homesteads on lands to which they had no legal title whatso
ever.

The futile efforts of federal troops to evict them

were eventually abandoned.

fi ?

^^For squatting and trespassing in the trans-Appalachian
West, see Barnhart, Valley of Democracy, pp. 127-30; "Peti
tion to Settle Ohio Lands (1784)," in Hulbert, Ohio in the
Confederation, p. 95; "Petition of Kentuckians for Lands
North of the' Ohio River," in ibid., pp. 137-40; "Ensign
Armstrong's Report to Col. Harmar, April 12, 178 5," in ibid.,
p. 103.
While the Land Ordinance of 1785 was under debate,
700 troops were dispatched to erect Fort Harmar in the Ohio
wilderness.
One of their main duties was the eviction of
squatters from federal lands.
In the spring of 1785, General
Harmar ordered Ensign John Armstrong and twenty-six men to
forcibly evict trespassers Armstrong described as "banditti
whose actions are a disgrace to human nature."
Ensign A r m 
strong ousted numerous families and burned their cabins and
sheds.
He arrested one Joseph Ross who was "determined to
hold possession, and if I destroyed his house (said) he
would build six more."
When confronted by an armed group of
seventy-five frontiersmen, Armstrong threatened to "fire
upon them if they did not disperse." • There was no bloodshed,
but on April 11 the group petitioned Congress, stating,
we were Visited by a command of men Sent by the
Commandant at Fort McEntosh; with orders from
Government on purpose to Disposess us and Destroy
our Dwellings.. . . by which order it now Appears
our Conduct in Settling here is Considered by the
Legislature to be prejudicial to the Common good;
of which we had not the Least Conception till now;
we are greatly Distressed in our present Circum
stance; and we humbly pray if you in your Wisdom
think proper to grant us Liberty; to Rest where
we are and grant us the preference to our Actual
Settlements when the Land is to be settled by
order of Government. . . .
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As time passed,

it became obvious that New England

"township planting" was not going to work in the transAppalachian West.

This is not to say, however, that the

Confederation land policy was a total failure.

Some legal

settlement did take place under the policy, and the Ohio Com
pany and Symmes settlements formed the nucleus from which
much of southern Ohio grew.

More important, prior rectangular

survey, a provision of the Land Ordinance of 1785, brought
order and security of title to the national land system and
has remained in that system until the present day.

It was

the purchase and location provisions of the 1785 Ordinance
that were ill-suited to the frontier situation.

With expan

sion and admission of new western states into the Union,
these conservative stipulations were amended or defeated.
By the early 18 00s, the national government had begun to
change its land policy to meet the needs of the Westerners.
Preemption was first granted by the Federal Congress in
1799, and the Land Ordinances of 1803 and 1820 marked an
evolution that culminated in the Homestead Act of 1862.

Prior

Several other missions followed the Armstrong foray of
1785.
Ebeneezer Denny (fall of ’85) and Captain John Hamtramck (summers of 1786 and '87) were also sent to evict
squatters, yet were unable to keep up with the continuing
encroachment.
In 1787, Secretary of War Knox warned Con
gress, prophetically, that "All future attempts to remove
squatters may be abortive" because "their numbers may be
so great as to defy the power of the United States."
Indeed,
by the 17 90s the federal government had all but given up its
efforts to evict squatters and trespassers from the transAppalachian West.
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rectangular survey provided a solid foundation upon which
these liberal land policies could be built, but the Eastern
Nationalists'

fear of the West, and their efforts to con

trol westward expansion through a "New England" corporate
style of settlement proved to be anachronistic.

George Wa s h 

ington, a Nationalist himself, gave a prophetic assessment of
the western situation in 1785:
A penetrating eye, on close observation, will
discover thro' various disguises a disinclina
tion to add new States to the Confederation,
westward of us; which must be the inevitable
consequence of emigration to, and population
of that territory. . . . [But] as to the r e 
straining of the citizens of the Atlantic
States from transplanting themselves to that
soil, when prompted by interest or inclination-you might as well attempt (while our Governin'ts
are free) to prevent the reflux of the tides,
when you had got them within your r i v e r s . ^3

Washington to Grayson, May 8, 1785, in Burnett, Letters
of the Continental C on gress, VIII:118.
For a general assess
ment of Confederation land policy, see Tatter, "Land Policy
During the Confederation," pp. 185-86; Treat, "Land System
Under the Confederation," p. 13; and Treat, National Land
S y s t e m , pp. 370-91.
Treat believes the Confederation did a
good job considering the circumstances.
The frontiersman who
could not afford government land simply ignored the policy,
and "moved on again in advance of the civilization he could
not endure."

CHAPTER VI

THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER DEBATE
However singular the opinion may be, I cannot
divest myself of it, that the navigation of
the Mississippi, at this time, ought to be no
object with us.
On the contrary, until we
have a little time allowed to open and make
easy the ways between the Atlantic States and
the Western territory, the obstructions had
better remain.
There is nothing which binds
one country or one State to another but inter
est.
Without this cement the western inhabi
tants, who more than probably will be composed
in a great degree of foreigners, can have no
predilection for us, and a commercial connexion
is the only tie we can have upon them.
George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, 1785
The object in the occlusion of the Mississippi
on the part of these people so far as it is
extended to the interest of their States . . .
is to break up so far as this will do it, the
settlements on the western waters, prevent any
in the future, and thereby keep the States
southward as they now are--or if settlements
will take place, that they shall be on such
principles as to make it the interest of the
people to separate from the Confederacy, so as
effectively to exclude any new State from it:
To throw the weight of the population eastward
and keep it there, to appreciate the vacant
lands of New York and Massachusetts.
In short,
it is a system of policy which has for its o b 
ject the keeping the weight of government and
population in [the East] and is prepared by a
set of men so flagitious, unprincipled, and
determined in their pursuits as to satisfy me
beyond a doubt they have extended their views
to the dismemberment of the government.
James Monroe to Patrick Henry, 1786^
1 George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, August 22, 1785,
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Spanish
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Following the American Revolution, the Spaniards in the
Old Southwest watched the great migration of American pioneers
over the Appalachian Mountains with growing alarm.

"There is

not time to be lost," wrote Martin Navarro, a Spanish official
in New Orleans:

"Mexico is on the other side of the Missis

sippi in the vicinity of the already formidable establishments
of the Americans."

This fear of American encroachment was

manifested in a Spanish western policy bent on strangling
United States settlements in the Mississippi Valley.
of 1784,

In June

the Spanish government in New Orleans issued a procla

mation closing the Mississippi River to all American citizens.
The King of Spain sent Don Diego de Gardoqui to the United
States to negotiate a treaty that would insure Spanish sover
eignty in the Old Southwest.
The American reaction was far from unanimous.

Southerners

and Westerners angrily condemned the Spanish closure,

insisting

on America's right to navigate the Mississippi by virtue of
the colonial charters and the Treaty of Paris of 1783.

Gardoqui

soon learned, however, that many Americans, especially the
Nationalists in the Northeastern states, were not so enthusias
tic in defending American rights to the Mississippi.

They dis

trusted the squatters and "insolvent emigrants” who were cros
sing the Appalachians,

and feared the growth of the West would

in Sparks, Writings of Was hi n gt on . IX:119; James Monroe to
Patrick Henry, August 12, 1786, in Burnett, Letters of the
Continental Congress , V II I: 424-25.
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result in a loss of the economic and political dominance of
the Northeastern states.

Many of the Eastern Nationalists,

including Gardoqui's American counterpart. Secretary of
Foreign Affairs John Jay, were willing to surrender American
use of the Mississippi for a number of years in return for a
favorable trade treaty and military alliance.

The Jay-Gardoqui

negotiations and the Mississippi River Debate thus led to an
inevitable conflict between the expansionist Southern party
and the Northeastern anti-expansionists in the Confederation
Congress.

As a result, the Congress met a political impasse

that had to be resolved by the Constitutional Convention of
1787.

The Confederation Congress's political crisis could not

be,resolved and the Federal Constitution could not be written
until there was a resolution of the East-South split over
western policy.

By viewing the Jay-Gardoqui controversy and

the Mississippi River Debate one can view a crucial issue in
the evolution of early American politics and in the creation
of the first American western policy.

2

Spain is proud and extremely jealous of our
approximation to her South American territory,
and fearing the example of our ascendency upon
that country, is grasping forever at more
territory, by way of security; and hoping to
derive benefit to her system, from our want of

Philbrick, Rise of the West, p. 164.
For the political
implications of the Jay-Gardoqui affair, see Henderson, Party
P ol it ic s, p. 352.
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system, our discord, and inattention.
Hence
we may expect from Mr. Gardoque, an apparent
firm demand of the exclusive navigation of
the Mississippi, with some tempting commercial
offers to procure our assent to the loss of
this very valuable navigation. . . .
Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, 1785^
When the American colonies declared themselves independent
from Great Britain in 1776, great questions arose concerning
Spanish-American relations in the Old Southwest, and specif
ically American navigation of the Mississippi River.
Britain's theoretical claim to navigation rights
basis of the Treaty of Paris, 1763)

was

Great

(on the

never really con

firmed during the 1760s and '70s, largely because of the non
expansionist British western policy and the formidable Indian
barrier in the trans-montane West.

With independence and re

newed American expansion, however, the question of navigation
of the Mississippi was once again brought into dispute.

The

Spanish were a power to be reckoned with in the Old Southwest.
Spain controlled the mouth of the Mississippi and claimed much
of the southwestern trans-Appalachian frontier.

The Franco-

American alliance of 1778 brought Spain into the Revolutionary
War against Great Britain,

embroiled the United States in

European diplomacy, and made the Mississippi River question
even more cloudy.
the United States.

Spain was an extremely reluctant ally of
As a great colonial power Spain could

^Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, February 14, 1785,
in Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry L e e , V I I : 332.
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hardly be expected to support enthusiastically an American
colonial independence movement.

Spain was an ally of France,

not the United States; the Spaniards declared war in order to
recapture the island of Gibralter from Great Britain.

Spain

looked with distrust upon American independence, and was p a r 
ticularly concerned about possible American settlements in
the Mississippi Valley.

Spain stood as a formidable barrier

to American settlement in the southwestern frontier and Ameri
can navigation of the Mississippi River.^
When Spain first declared war against Great Britain, many
Americans were willing to recognize its claims to the Old
Southwest and exclusive navigation of the Mississippi River.
From 1778-1780,

commercial and trading interests in the North

eastern states favored recognizing Spanish claims in return
for substantial military and economic aid.

These New England

interests were ably represented by American diplomat John Jay,
who shared their distrust of Westerners, and feared an expand
ing West would lessen the economic and political weight of
the Northeast.^

Had the Spanish catered to these Northeasterner

Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United
States (New York, 1936), p. 34; Philbrick, Rise of the W e s t ,
pp. 64-65; Frank Monaghan, John Jay: Defender of Liberty
(New York, 1935), p. 255.
^The anti-western sentiment among Northeasterners is dis
cussed in Paul Chrysler Phillips, "American Opinions Regarding
the West, 1778-1783," Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley
Historical A ss ociation, VII (1913-14):291.
See also,
Staughton Lynd, "The Compromise of 1787," Political Science
Quarterly 81 (June 1 9 6 6 ) :233; Abernethy, Western L ands, pp.
203-204.
According to Abernethy, Robert Morris told the
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they might well have enjoyed substantial American support for
their claims in the Old Southwest.

But when John Jay went to

Spain to seek loans and assurances of military aid, he r e 
ceived what Samuel Flagg Bemis has called ’’one of the most
protracted painful snubbings ever accorded a distinguished
envoy of the American government."^

This diplomatic affront

was followed closely by the American victory at Yorktown in
1781, which greatly decreased the United States dependence
on the Franco-Spanish alliance.
lost probable American guarantees

Thus within a year Spain
to

its

claims to the

Southwest and exclusive navigation of the Mississippi River.
Jay later wrote that in order to obtain Spanish aid, he had
originally considered surrendering American claims to East
and West Florida and asking only for a free port on the
Mississippi :
But when Spain afterwards declared war for
objects which did not include ours, and in
a manner not very civil to our independence,
I became persuaded that we ought not to cede
to her any of our rights, and of course that
we should retain and insist upon our right
to the navigation of the Mississippi.'
At the Treaty of Paris negotiations the Spanish further

French envoy Gerard in 1778, ’the strength of the Confederacy
lay in the North and that the North should be kept in the
ascendency by curtailing the territory in the Southwest’
(Abernethy's paraphrase).
^Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 35.

7
Johnston, Correspondence of John Jay, 1:327.
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antagonized the United States by instructing their delegate
to try to convince the British to negotiate for a buffer
state between the United States and the Spanish territory.
This effort came too late, however, as the American diplomats
at Paris were tired of the complications inherent in the
Franco-Spanish alliance.

The Americans ignored their allies

and independently negotiated the Treaty of Paris of 1783.
In this agreement,

the United States received a highly favor

able, but questionable western settlement.
granted the new American republic were huge.

The boundaries
The Americans

received a southern boundary of 31°, the Mississippi as a
western boundary,
of that river.

and the right to navigate the entire length

Spain was appalled.

The 31° southern boundary

and the Mississippi River western boundary included much of
the Spanish Yazoo strip in West Florida, land which the
Spanish traditionally held and had recaptured from the British
during the Revolutionary War.

The British granted navigation

of the entire length of the Mississippi on the basis of a
privilege awarded Britain by Spain following the Seven Years
War

(1763), but S p a i n ’s declaration of war against Britain had

nullified that act.

Thus Great Britain gave the United States

treaty concessions which it had no right to give and, to make
matters worse,
ain

a separate treaty between Spain and Great Brit

(1783) made no mention of these contradictions.

The

stage was set for the inevitable Spanish-American conflict
over the Old Southwest and navigation of the Mississippi during
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the

Confederation

era.
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W h i t t a k e r , S p a n i s h - A m e r i c a n F r o n t i e r , pp. 10, 63; J e n 
sen, N e w N a t i o n , p
170; R o b e r t H. F e r r e l l , A m e r i c a n D i p l o m a c y
(New York, 1959), p. 58; P h i l b r i c k , Rise o f the W e s t , pp. 7479, 171
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they settled and began to farm the Ohio Valley, Kentucky, and
Tennessee, their immediate concern was transporting agricul
tural surplus to eastern markets.

Because of the difficulty

of transporting freight over the mountains, the most practical
route was down the Ohio and Mississippi to New Orleans, and
then onward via ocean transport.

It took less time to ship

goods from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia in this way than to go
overland!

Most of the produce was shipped on flatboats, sim

ple craft which could hold nearly fifty tons.

Farmers banded

together to build and stock these boats, organized a crew,
and began a long, arduous journey down the river.
eral months

(forty or fifty days in the Spring)

After sev

the flatboats

reached New Orleans where the goods were sold and the boats
9
broken up and sold for lumber.
The Spanish watched these developments with ever-growing
alarm.

They believed American settlement south of the Ohio

and navigation of the Mississippi were a direct challenge to
Q

Horsman, Formative Y e a r s , pp. 156, 158-59; Philbrick,
Rise of the West, p. 336 ; Ferrell, American Diplomacy, p. 59;
Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, p. 95.
According to
Whittaker, the volume of American commerce traveling down
the Mississippi prior to 1784 was small.
He states that no
flatboats entered New Orleans from 1785-1787 when the Missis
sippi was closed, and that volume picked up steadily there
after.
The main problem with Whittaker's figures is that
they are taken from Spanish records and do not include
smuggled goods, which made up the bulk of the commerce. James
Wilkinson and John Sevier, for example, are known to have
made several unofficial visits to New Orleans with boatloads
of goods.
More important, the Spanish were concerned with
potential use of the river should a precedent be established.
Mississippi River commerce of the Early National Period would
certainly demonstrate that their concern was well founded.
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Spanish claims in the Old Southwest.

Bernardo de Campo, a

Spanish charge de affaires, wrote from London in 1783 that
swarms of Americans were crossing the mountains into the
Mississippi Valley and would soon threaten Spain's southwestern
possessions.

The Spanish governor of Louisiana warned:

If . . . this vast and restless population
come to occupy the banks of the Mississippi
and Missouri, or secure their navigation,
doubtless nothing will prevent them from
crossing and penetrating into our provinces
on the other side. . . .
The Spanish felt they had to take a stand--or else accept the
likely possibility of an American takeover of the Southwest.
But the Spanish were fortunate enough to have retained some
American allies on the Southwestern question.

Many of those

who supported the Spanish in 1778 remained convinced that
American expansion westward should proceed slowly, if at all.
Gouverneur Morris believed "emigrations from the middle states
to the Western country are already so great as to be injurious."
"Policy would warrant delay," Rufus King wrote Jonathan Jackson,
"but these western adventurers will not suffer it.
this time hold a bold language,
ible accessions."

They at

and are yearly making incred

Encouraged by these sentiments, the Spanish

government formulated a policy to strangle American settlements
in the trans-Appalachian West.

On July 22, 1784 they issued a

proclamation closing the Mississippi River south of the 32°
Spanish alarm over American expansion is discussed
fully in Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 63-67.
The
quoted passage is from Turner, Frontier in American History,
p. 183.
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parallel to all American citizens.

The conflict between the

United States and Spain had come to the fore.

The ambiguous

provisions of the Treaty of Paris would now have to be re
negotiated by the two conflicting powers.

I have long
entertained doubts concerning
the line of conduct which Congress ought to
pursue relative to the Territory of the U. S.
Northwest of the Ohio, and am every day more
confirmed in the opinion that no paper e n 
gagements, or stipulations, can be formed
which will insure a desirable connection
between the Atlantic States and those which
will be erected to the Northwestward of the
Appalachian or Allegheny Mountains, provided
the Mississippi is immediately opened. . . .
Should there be an uninterrupted use of the
Mississippi at this time by the citizens of
the U. S . , I should consider every emigrant
to that country from the Atlantic States as
forever lost to the Confederacy. . . .
Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, 1786
I look upon this as a contest for empire.
Our country [Virginia] is equally affected
with Kentucky.
The Southern States are
deeply interested in this subject.
If the
Mississippi be shut up, emigration will be
stopped entirely.
There will be no new
states formed on the western waters. . . .
This contest of the Mississippi involves
this great national contest; that is, whether
one part of the continent shall govern the
other.
The Northern States have the majority,
and will endeavour to keep it.
William Grayson to the Virginia
Ratifying Convention, 1788^
lljensen. New N a t i o n , p. 114; Rufus King to Jonathan Jack
son, September 3, 1786, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental
Congress, VIII: 458; Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp.
13, 68.
l^Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, June 4, 1786,

in King,
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Spain sent Don Diego de Gardoqui to America as its
"Encargado de Négociés" to resolve the seemingly irreconcil
able claims of Spain and the United States.

Gardoqui was a

clever and able diplomat who had worked closely with the
Americans during the Revolutionary War.^^

The American

negotiator was Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay.

Jay

had served in Paris in 1783, and was a major Confederation
diplomat until appointed Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court in 1788.

Although Jay demanded American nav i

gation of the Mississippi in Paris in 1783, he and many of
his fellow Eastern Nationalists still entertained doubts
about the prudence of an expansionist western policy.

As a

result. Jay was more sympathetic to the Spanish position than
other American diplomats might have been.

The Northeasterners'

attitudes towards expansion would soon clash with the views of
the South and the West on that subject, making for a warm
sectional debate in the Confederation Congress over the JayGardoqui negotiations.
The Jay-Gardoqui negotiations span the mid-1780s.
many diplomatic affairs,
confusing.
pleasant,

Like

they were long, tedious, and very

John Jay termed the negotiations "dilatory, u n 
and unpromising."

Much of the problem was the

seemingly irreconcilable nature of the Spanish and American
Correspondence of Rufus K i n g , 1:175; William Grayson in
Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, p. 75.
^^Gardoqui's duties included coordinating secret ship
ments of war materiel from Spain to the American rebels.
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positions at the outset of negotiations.

The Confederation

Congress demanded the Spanish accept the Treaty of Paris of
1783.

They instructed Jay to insist unequivocally on "the

right of the United States to their territorial bounds
and the free Navigation of the Mississippi,
to the Ocean.

. .

[31°]

from the Source

To back up their demands, the Ameri

cans pointed to the Treaty of Paris, the sea to sea charters
of the thirteen colonies, and the "natural right" of a nation
owning land on a river to navigate the entire length of that
river.

The Spanish countered with a claim to all land south

west of the Tennessee, Ohio, and Flint Rivers, and exclusive
navigation of the Mississippi River.

They supported their

claims by pointing to their separate treaty with Great Britain
in 1783,

the right of military conquest of territory belonging

to a common enemy, their ownership of the entire west bank of
the Mississippi,

and the fact that all British privileges to

the Mississippi,

having been canceled by Spain's declaration

of war, could not therefore legally be transferred to the
Americans by treaty.

If the United States would accept the

Spanish position, the Spaniards offered a military alliance
and a commercial treaty.

15

14john Jay, in Johnston, Correspondence of John J a y ,
111:243.
For Jay's instructions, see Journals of the Con
tinental Congress, XXIX:658.
l^whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 68, 73;
Ferrell, American Diplomacy, p. 56; Philbrick, Rise of the
W e s t , pp. 171-72; Monaghan, John J a y , p. 256; Bemis, Diplo
matic History of the United S t a t e s , pp. 74-75, 78.
For
Gardoqui's instructions, see Whittaker, Spanish-American
Frontier. pp. 70-71.
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When negotiations commenced in 1785, the United States
were at a distinct disadvantage.
the side of the Spaniards,

International law was on

and the Americans had no military

muscle to back up their claims.

On the other hand, thousands

of restless western settlers were daily crossing the moun
tains, pressuring the Spanish, and in the late eighteenth
century

S p ai n’s position as a world power was undoubtedly

on the decline.

The Spanish needed American friendship in

their disputes with Great Britain.

Thus both sides had

assets and liabilities in these intricate diplomatic maneuverings.

The winning side would be that most adept at the

art of diplomatic persuasion.

Initially, both men clung to

their government's positions, and the talks dragged on.
Richard Henry Lee wrote George Washington in October of
1785, "The négociation with Mr. Gardoqui proceeds so slowly
and as yet so ineffectually that I may fancy the free naviga
tion of the Mississippi is a point
hastily concluded upon."
cajolery to win Jay over.

. . . that will not be

Gardoqui used flattery, gifts, and
He was particularly charming to

Mrs. Jay, in hopes she would influence her hu sband’s decisions.
But Jay was bound by the Congressional instructions which for
bade him to surrender the American right to navigate the Mis
sissippi.

He finally weakened, however, when he was made a

most tempting offer.

Gardoqui proposed a defensive alliance

and a "most favored nation" status for the United States in
trade

(including trading privileges with Africa and the
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Phillipines)

in return for a postponement of the southern

boundary dispute and American relinquishment of the use of
the Mississippi for a minimum of twenty-five years.

The

prospect of a lucrative trade deal for the commercial North
east was too much for John Jay to resist.

The Mississippi

River provision was not all that bad, he reasoned, for it
would "save the right and only suspend the use during the
term of the treaty."

Moreover, Jay honestly believed this

was the best settlement the United States were going to get.
In May of 1786, he informed Congress the negotiations had
reached an impasse, and requested that a committee be ap
pointed "with power to instruct and direct me on every point
and subject relative to the proposed treaty with Spain.
Edmund Cody Burnett has compared the effect of Jay's
announcement to that which might have occurred had a bomb
been tossed into the halls of the Confederation Congress.
That body immediately polarized as Southern Congressmen
squared off against Northeasterners.

Once again, the western

question served to accent the sectional dichotomy in Congress,
and split the Nationalist faction into Northern and Southern

Philbrick, Rise of the W e s t , p. 171; Lee to Washing
ton, October 11, 1785, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental
Congress. V I I I : 233; Lee and Washington both favored surrender
of the navigation of the Mississippi for a number of years.
Jensen, New N a t i o n , p. 172; Billington, Westward Expansion,
p. 225; John Jay in Johnston, Correspondence of John J a y ,
111:241; Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII:
xxviii.
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camps.

17

"It was immediately perceived," Monroe wrote Madi

son, "that the object was to relieve

[Jay] from his instruc

tions respecting the Mississippi and get a committee to cover
the measure."

Monroe believed "Jay has m a n a g ’d this negotia

tion dishonestly," and had been "negotiating expressly for
the purpose of defeating the object of his instructions and
by a long train of intrigue and management seducing the representatives of the States to concur in it."

18

While the

Southerners unanimously opposed Jay's proposal, the Easterners,
especially Nationalists, voiced their approval.

Most Eastern

Nationalists were not averse to temporarily surrendering the
navigation of the Mississippi, especially if it would increase
the wealth of their section.

Battle lines were drawn for the

Mississippi River Debate, which raged in the Confederation
Congress during the summer of 1786.
John Jay outlined his position in an address to Congress
on August 3, 1786.

The negotiations with Gardoqui, he said,

were deadlocked, with no agreement possible.

Spain would

never consent to American navigation of the Mississippi River.
The Spanish were, however, willing to offer a defensive alliance
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp.
18

389, 394, 398.

Burnett, Continental Congress, pp. 654-55; Burnett,
Letters of the Continental Congress. YIII:xxviii; Monaghan,
John J a y , p. 258; Monroe to Henry, August 12, 1786, in
Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress. VIII:424.
Monroe was so incensed that he disavowed his efforts to
reach some sort of accommodation with the Easterners over
territorial government and called for a return to the
Ordinance of 1784.
See chapter 7 below.
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and a "most favored nation" trade status in return for United
States surrender of navigation of the Mississippi for twentyfive years.

" W h y , therefore," Jay asked, "should we not

(and for a valuable consideration too) consent to forbear
to use what we know is not in our power to use?":
[I] oppose every idea of our relinquishing
our right to navigate . . . Mr. Gardoqui
strongly insists on our relinquishing it. .
. . the King will never yield on that point,
nor consent to any compromise about it. . . .
It is much to be wished that these matters
had lain dormant for years yet to come; but
such wishes are in vain; these disputes are
agitating; they press themselves upon us and
must terminate in accomodation or War, or
disgrace.
The last is the worst that can
happen; the second we are unprepared for;
and therefore our attentions and endeavors
should be bent to the first.19
Timothy Bloodworth of North Carolina reported that by
mid-August "the subject was

. . . agitated with that warmth

which might have reasonably been expected on a matter of such
importance."

The sectional cleavage was so great that many

honestly feared a possible dissolution of the Confederacy.
As the debate progressed,
more clearly defined.

20

the arguments of the South became

The Southerners believed the "use of

the Mississippi is given by nature to our western country,
and no power on earth can take it away from them." James Madison
called J a y ’s diplomacy "short-sighted" and "dishonorable;"
ISjournals of the Continental Congress, XXXI:479-80;
Monaghan, John J a y , ~p~! 259.
Z^Henderson, Party Politics, p. 294: Monroe wrote (August
12), "the Eastern people talk of dismemberment. . . ," and
Theodore Sedgwick urged Northeasterners to "contemplate a sub
stitute for union."
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"a voluntary barter in time of profound peace of the rights
of one part of the empire to the interests of another part."
The Southerners opposed any measure that would discourage
immediate settlement of the

West. They looked

forward to

new western states, and foresaw political allies in the
trans-Appalachian region.

They feared that in the proposed

treaty, "The Eastern States

are to receive the

and the Southern States are

to pay the purchase by giving

the Missecippey."

benefits . . .
up

21

Charles Pinckney of South Carolina keynoted the Southern
argument in a speech probably delivered August 16, 1786.
He called the Jay Treaty unnecessary:

22

"Spain in her treaty

proposes no advantages which we do not now enjoy, and can
never be in her interest to curtail

. . . she proposes nothing

more than she will always be willing to grant you without a
treaty."

Pinckney argued further that closure of the Missis

sippi would greatly lower the value of western lands--lands
from which Congress needed revenue to finance the government:
"The sale and disposal of lands ceded in the Western terri
tory has ever been considered by Congress as a sufficient
Z^Timothy Bloodworth to the North Carolina Assembly,
December, 1786, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Con
gress . V I II:521; Jensen, New N a t i o n , p. 172.
The best ac
counts of the debates are found in Secretary Johnson's notes,
and James Monroe's letters in Burnett, Letters of the Conti
nental Congress. VII.
See also the recorded speeches of
Charles Pinckney and William Samuel Johnson cited in foot
notes #22, 23, 24.
22"Charles Pinckney's Reply to Jay, August 16, 1786, Re
garding A Treaty with Spain," American Historical Review 10
(1905): 820-27.
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fund . . . for discharge of the domestic debt . . .

it is

known that the value of the lands must altogether depend upon
the right to navigate the Mississippi."

More important, the

surrender of the Mississippi would drive the Westerners from
the Confederacy:

"By using the first opportunity . . .

to

sacrifice their interests to those of the Atlantic States,
can they be blamed for immediately throwing themselves into
[Spain's] arms for that protection and support you have
denied them?"

Pinckney alluded to the need to strengthen the

Confederation when he implied this treaty might prevent es
tablishment of a badly needed central government.

He argued

that the South and the West would oppose "vesting that body
with farther powers, which has so recently abused those they
already possess."

In conclusion, Pinckney stated.

Upon the whole, as the present treaty proposes
no real advantage that we do not at present
enjoy, and it will always be in the interest
and policy of Spain to allow . . . and as the
suspension demanded may involve us in uneasi
ness with each other at a time when harmony
is so essential to our true interests . . .
let me hope that upon this occasion the gen
eral welfare of the United States will be
suffered to prevail, and that the house will
on no account consent to alter Mr. Jay's in
structions, or permit him to treat upon any
terms other than those he has already p ro
posed.23
Pinckney had spoken for the South and the West.

Now attention

shifted to the Northeastern rebuttal.
Two Eastern Nationalists, William Samuel Johnson of
Z^ibid.
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Connecticut and Rufus King of New York, delivered the chief
rebuttals to Pinckney.

Johnson contended that both sections

would gain from the proposed treaty, because "Trade beneficial
to one part of the Union is beneficial to all, for we are one
Body."

As for the Mississippi, he questioned the American

"right" of navigation:
to Use and can Use.

"That is mine which I have a right

Can you say this of the Mississippi? . . .

It is not yours to give.

When you agree not to use it you

have sacrificed nothing . . . you give up only a Right to go
to War for 20 years.
King concurred,

This is a benefit, not a loss."

Rufus

adding the United States could secure naviga

tion of the Mississippi later on, when they were stronger and
in a more advantageous bargaining position.

He noted that

Britain and France were on Spain's side, and the Americans
could not possibly go to war now.

Moreover, the livelihood

of the Northeast depended on commerce, and King insisted that
without the proposed treaty the Eastern merchants would suffer.
Nationalists Theodore Sedgwick and Arthur St. Clair concluded
the Northeastern argument, with St. Clair observing, "This
will check settlement of the Western country . . . .
try is too thin of inhabitants

Our coun

. . . emigration therefore in

our present situation is hurtful.
St.

Clair's sentiments were typical of many Easterners

^^For the Eastern rebuttal, see Burnett, Letters of the
Continental Congress, VIII:429, 438-40, 447-49.
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who supported at least a temporary forbearance of the naviga
tion of the Mississippi River.

The attitudes of these

Easterners formed a consistent philosophy regarding the western
territories.

This philosophy was not always espoused openly,

for to make it known, "would be impolitic for many reasons . . ."
Many of their views could not "with safety be now admitted.
Yet by examining the political and economic motives of the
Easterners one can better understand their stance in the
Mississippi River Debate.
Political considerations figured importantly in the Eastern
appraisal of the West.

Most Easterners, especially the Nation

alists, doubted the "loyalty" of the squatters and banditti
of the West.

Rufus King believed their "pursuits and inter

ests . . . will be so different and probably so opposite [ours],
2^
that an entire separation must eventually ensue."
And even if
the Westerners joined the Confederacy, Eastern Nationalists
entertained many apprehensions about their potential political
and sectional loyalties.

Most of these Northeasterners agreed

with the South that new western states would support the South
in Confederation politics.

27

By closing the Mississippi, the

Northeast hoped to slow western settlement and admission of
? c:
Rufus King to Jonathan Jackson, September 3, 1786, in
Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII:458.
^^Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, June 4, 1786, in King,
Correspondence of Rufus K i n g , 1:175
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 408-409; Staughton Lynd,
"Compromise of 1787," pp. 22 5-4 7.
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new western states, thus prolonging the Eastern dominance in
national politics.

As Grayson of Virginia observed, "The

Northern States have a majority and will endeavor to keep
it."28
At the same time, the Mississippi question was of great
economic importance to the East.

The benefits which would

result from the proposed Spanish trade deal were especially
attractive during the post-war depression of the early 1780s.
But what of other economic motivations?

Many conservatives

believed that westward migration "must in its consequences
depopulate and ruin the Old States."

Northeasterners b e 

lieved immediate settlement of the West would drain the
Eastern labor supply, thereby raising wages and diminishing
consumers.

By slowing settlement they hoped to insure eco

nomic stability:

"If from our relinquishment at present

[Spain] can retain for a number of years the exclusive naviga
tion of the river, it is well--", Edward Rutledge assured Jay.
"It will stop migration,

it will concenter force, because the

settlers can have no vent for the products of that country
but down the Mississippi,

and therefore I think they will not

fond themselves of inhabiting her banks."

King agreed.

If

the Westerners were "cut off for a time from any connections
except with the Old States,

across the mountains,

I should not

despair that a Government might be instituted so connecting
28

Whittaker,

Spanish-American Frontier, p.

75.
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them with the Atlantic States, as would be highly beneficial
to them both, and bring considerable trade."

Northeastern

land speculators were in an untenable position.

Most of

them had invested in state lands or "mid" western lands.

Thus

they favored gradual settlement onto speculator-owned lands.
They opposed opening the Mississippi because it would lower
the value of their lands.

Like most Northeasterners, they

feared the economic consequences of immediate unrestricted
American nagivation of the Mississippi River.

29

These political and economic attitudes combined with
other factors, most importantly the desire to avoid an Indian
war, to instill in most Eastern Nationalists an intense fear
of westward migration.
7Q

These attitudes were well ingrained

Ibid., pp. 74-75; Jensen, New N at ion, pp. 9, 171;
Richard Henry Lee to George Washington, in Ballagh, Letters
of Richard Henrv L e e . 11:426-27.
Lee, a Virginia Antifeder
alist who became a staunch Federalist in the 1790s, supported
the Eastern Nationalist western policy of the Confederation.
Edward Rutledge to John Jay, in Johnston, Correspondence of
Johy J a y . 111:217; Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, June, 1786,
in King, Rufus K i n g . 1:178.
A Virginia nationalist like
Washington opposed navigation with a different twist.
He
envisioned a network of canals connecting Virginia with the
trans-Appalachian West.
See Sparks, Writings of Washington,
IX:115; Bemis,
Diplomatic History of the United St at es,
p. 79; Bancroft, Formation of the Constitution, p. 125.
For
land speculation see Chapter 5, above.
Also, Madison to
Jefferson, March 19, 1787, in Hunt, Writings of James Madison.
11:328:
"It will be difficult, however, to get proper steps
taken by Congress so many States having land of their own at
market.
It is supposed that this consideration had some
share in the zeal for shutting the Mississippi . . . ." The
irony of Eastern fears of economic repercussions from expan
sion is, of course, that in the 19th century New England's
prosperity was based upon western raw materials, foodstuffs,
and consumers.
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in the American Secretary of Foreign Affairs, John Jay.

Jay

had never ventured south or west of Philadelphia, and feared
the "western country will one day give us trouble."
doubted "whether after two or three generations
ers] will be fit to govern themselves.

..."

He

[the Western
His feelings

about westward expansion are summarized in a letter to Thomas
Jefferson :
Would it not be wiser gradually to extend our
settlements as want of room should make it
necessary, than to pitch our tents through
the wilderness in a great variety of places,
far distant from each other, and from those
advantages of education, civilization, law
and government which compact settlements and
neighborhoods afford?
Shall we not fill the
wilderness with white savages?
and will they
not become more formidable to us than the
tawny ones which now inhabit it?^"
Many historians contend that John Jay acquiesced to
Gardoqui because it was the wisest and most rational policy
to follow at that time.

31

Jay believed the Americans could

not afford a confrontation with the Spanish so soon after the
Revolution.

Gardoqui's offer seemed reasonable, especially

since it included a favorable trade agreement and only a tem
porary surrender of navigation of the Mississippi.

Yet it

appears as though Jay could have secured more favorable terms
in 1786.

History contradicts Jay's assertion that, without

^^John Jay, in Johnston, Correspondence of John Jay,
111:245; Jensen, New N a t i o n , p. 170; Monaghan, John J a y , p. 259,
*7 1

p.

See Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States,
79; Monaghan, John Jay, p~^ 259.
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his proposed treaty, "the Mississippi would continue shut.

. . .

The Spanish posts would be strengthened, and that Nation would
there bid us defiance."

32

The relaxation of Spanish policy and

the ultimate success of diplomat Thomas Pinckney at San Lorenzo
in 1795 indicate the United States had more bargaining power in
1786 than John Jay seemed to realize.

To be sure. Jay could

not predict the future, but did he negotiate as aggressively
as possible?

Or did he betray the same weaknesses criticized

so severely during the Jay Treaty controversy of 1794?

It can

certainly be argued that Jay's timid diplomacy combined with
his doubts concerning westward expansion to play a large role
in his decision to forbear the American right to navigate the
Mississippi River for twenty-five years.
Thus a number of reasons motivated John

Jay andmany

Eastern Nationalists to argue in favor of surrendering the
Mississippi to Spain in August of 1786.

After William Samuel

Johnson and Rufus King finished their speeches,
the Southerners'

turn to speak.

the Virginia delegation
rington)

it was again

A resolution introduced by

(probably written by Monroe and Car

on August 18, summed up the Southern argument:

"This

treaty will not open to us a single port

nor admit us into

those now open upon better terms than we

now enjoy." If Spain

"fails in her present object

. . . she will either come for

ward and grant the terms we require, or at least seek an
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXXI:483-84
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accomodation.

..."

The surrender of the Mississippi was

"inadmissable" and Jay should be recalled, "as his sentiments
are now known in Congress and differ so widely from the
opinions of the several states, especially on the points
relative to the Mississippi and the boundaries."

Finally,

the Virginians proposed the negotiations be transferred to
Thomas Jefferson in Madrid, and the United States continue to
demand the right to navigate the entire length of the Missis
sippi River.
A month of heated debate had not changed anyone’s mind.
The same sectional split which initiated the struggle was
manifested in the final vote.

The Virginia resolution was

defeated 7-5, and on August 29, 1786, Massachusetts moved to
repeal Jay's original instructions demanding American naviga
tion of the Mississippi River.

This motion passed,

7-5, with

all the states from New Hampshire to Pennsylvania in favor,
and those from Maryland to Georgia opposed.

Thus, John Jay

Ibid., XXXI:574-95.
For the move to transfer negotia
tions to Jefferson, see Henderson, Party Politics. p. 398.
Southerners hoped to have Jefferson use his French connec
tions as a liaison to the Spanish court.
Jefferson was in
favor of American expansion and endorsed navigation of the
Mississippi.
See Jefferson to Monroe, August 11, 1786, in
Ford, Writings of Je ff erso n. IV:262-63:
He opposed surrender
ing navigation because, "Such a supposition would argue not
only an ignorance of the people to whom this is most interest
ing, but an ignorance of the nature of man, or an inattention
to it . . . our best interests will be promoted by making all
the just claims of our fellow citizens, wherever situated,
our own . . . 6 making common cause even where our separate
interests would seem opposed to theirs.
No other conduct can
attach us together; and on this attachment depends our happi
ness."
See also Jefferson to Madison, June 20, 1787, ibid.,
11:481.
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and the Northeasterners seemingly won the hard-fought battle
over the Mississippi River question.

It is my voice that we instruct our dele
gates, that with firmness they expostulate
with Spain on this point and obtain an in
stant opening of this river to our trade.
It is my voice, and there are two hundred
thousand people west of the mountains (more
inhabitants than there are in some of our
states) who, were they present, would shout
the same language.
Hugh Henry Brackenridge (representative of
western Pennsylvania in the Pennsylvania
state legislature) September 22, 1787^^
Although the Northeastern states won the major skirmish
of the Mississippi River Debate,
whole.

they lost the battle as a

One of their main problems was the provision of the

Articles of Confederation pertaining to treaties:

No diplo

matic agreement could be made without the approval of nine
states of the Confederation.

To be sure, the East could muster

seven votes to change J a y ’s instructions, but they could not
possibly secure the nine votes necessary to ratify a treaty
negotiated under those instructions.

This hard political fact

Journals of the Continental Congress, XXXI:592; Burnett,
Continental Congress, p. 658.
After changing J a y ’s instruc
tions, the East further antagonized the South by "locking up"
the decision through a procedural ruling.
See Henderson,
Party Po li tics, p. 393.
35

James H. Mast, "Hugh Henry Brackenridge and the Missis
sippi Question, 1786-1787," Western Pennsylvania Magazine of
History LIV (October 1971): 380-81.
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combined with other important developments during late 1786
and 1787 to dampen Eastern enthusiasm for closing off the
Mississippi.
One important factor was the considerable public outcry,
especially in the West, over Congress's August 29 reversal
of Jay's instructions.
all over the country.

Denunciations of Jay poured in from
"To sell us and make us vassals to

the merciless Spaniards is a grievance not to be borne!",
protested one Westerner,

and the vast majority concurred.

Several state legislatures received petitions protesting the
"ruthless and disconsolate policy" of the Spanish and demand
ing Congress resist the Spanish closure.

Thousands of western

Pennsylvanians petitioned their state legislature, demanding
it "give such instructions to the . . . Delegates in Congress,
as may be favorable to the interests of this country."
Henry Brackenridge,

Hugh

the delegate from western Pennsylvania,

delivered an impassioned speech to the Pennsylvania state
legislature demanding American navigation of the entire length
of the Mississippi:
We will now use this language and say to
Spain, you are unjust, and may as well d e 
prive us of the great elements of light and
air, as of this river.
Shall I not taste
because another has drunk?
Shall I not
breathe because another has breathed before
me?
Shall I not see because a ray of light
has touched your eye?37
^^Henderson, Party Polit ics , p. 396.
37por western protest to the reversal of Jay's instructions,
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This western discontent is just one aspect of the chaos
the Mississippi River Debate brought to Confederation politics.
Indeed, the Jay-Gardoqui affair created a Northeast-South
deadlock in the Confederation Congress that finally had to be
settled in the Constitutional Convention of 1787.

One his

torian maintains the Mississippi question was a major catalyst
for that Convention.

38

The Jay affair convinced Virginia N a 

tionalists like Madison, Carrington, and Arthur Lee that their
plans for westward expansion had met an impasse in the Confed
eration Congress.

They immediately moved to turn the Annapolis

trade convention (September of 1786)
tutional reform.

into a forum for Consti

At the same time, Shay's rebellion motivated

Eastern Nationalists to support the Federal Convention.

Both

Northeastern and Southern Nationalists feared the disunion and
chaos symbolized by the Mississippi and Shay affairs.

Yet

their fundamental disagreement over westward expansion, new
western states, and navigation of the Mississippi precluded
any compromise, even in the Federal Convention.

Not until

Northeastern and Southern Nationalists reconciled their differ
ences over western policy could there be a solution to the

see Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 76-77; Horsman,
Formative Y e a r s , p. 15; and Abernethy, Western Lands. The
quoted passages are from Jensen, New Na tion , p. 173; and Mast,
"Hugh Henry Brackenridge and the Mississippi Question,"
pp. 378, 380-81.
The petitioners in Pennsylvania were p a r 
ticularly incensed over Arthur St. Clair's stand on the ques
tion.
^^Henderson,

Party Politi cs, pp. 398-99.
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Confederation's political dilemma.
The solution came in the summer of 1787, when the Con
federation Congress and the Constitutional Convention debated
simultaneously the Northwest Ordinance, slavery in the terri
tories, and admission of new western states.

Their solution,

the "Compromise of 1787,"^*^ is discussed at length in chap
ter seven, below.

The importance of the Mississippi River

Debate in the Compromise of 1787 is that it brought the funda
mental disagreement over the West to the fore, and served as
a catalyst for compromise.
That a compromise was in the making can be seen in the
status of the Mississippi River question during late 1786
and 1787.

The Northeasterners,

anticipating the Constitu

tional Convention, decided not to antagonize the South by
pressing for their original demands.

Although Jay's instruc

tions remained those of August 29, and Jay continued to
negotiate with Don Diego de Gardoqui, by the Spring of 1787
it was obvious the talks had broken down.

"The Spanish

project sleeps," James Madison wrote Thomas Jefferson.

"A

late accidental conversation with Gardoqui proved to me that
the négociation is arrested . . .

it appears that the intended

sacrifice of the Mississippi will not be made.

..."

In the

Federal Convention, the Eastern Nationalists acquiesced to a

39%bid., pp.

352, 378,

389, 398-99.

^^Staughton Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 225-50.
section 3 of Chapter 7 below.

See
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stipulation requiring all treaties be approved by two-thirds
of the Senate.

The Southerners inserted this provision,

according to Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, "for the ex 
press purpose of preventing a majority of the Senate . . .
from giving up the Mississippi."

Jay himself finally capitu

lated in September of 1788, when he recommended that "negotia
tions pass over in their present state to the new government."
One of the final acts of the Confederation Congress was to
repeal J a y ’s August 29 instructions with a resolve that "the
free navigation of the River Mississippi is a clear and essen
tial right of the United States, and ought to be considered
and supported as such."^^
The Spaniards were angered and frustrated by their narrow
defeat, and grew even more determined to prevent American
growth in the Old Southwest.
policy, however:

They definitely changed their

"They begin to be convinced," wrote James

White of North Carolina,

"the western country, are rather to

be restrained by benevolence than violence."

Faced with dead

locked negotiations and continuous pressure from the western
settlers,

the Spaniards in 1788 reopened the Mississippi to

Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 404-407; Lynd, "Com
promise of 1787," p. 235; Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier,
p. 77; Jensen, New N a t i o n , p. 73; Ferrell, American Diplomacy,
p. 60; Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress. VIII:417;
Madison to Jefferson, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental
Congress. V I II :560, 799; Philbrick, Rise of the W e s t , p. 173;
Burnett, Continental Congr ess, p. 680; Williamson to Madison,
June 2, 1788, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress.
VI II :746; Mast, "Hugh Henry Brackenridge and the Mississippi
Question," p. 383.
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Americans,

stopped encouraging Indian raids, and offered to let

Americans settle in Spanish territory with freedom of religion
and no taxation or military service.

In return, the Spaniards

asked the immigrants to pledge allegiance to, and become citi
zens of, Spain.

Through a liberal immigration policy and an

open Mississippi, the Spaniards hoped to win the western A me ri 
cans*

loyalty, create an anti-American buffer state in the Old

Southwest, and thus halt further encroachments from the United
States of America.

Several western Americans encouraged the

Spanish in their new policy.

Congressmen John Brown and James

White of Kentucky and Tennessee,
Robertson,

as well as John Sevier, James

and General James Wilkinson all listened attentively

to Spanish overtures, and probably offered support.

But their

actions seem to have been motivated more by desire for trading
privileges
ment.

(in New Orleans)

than loyalty to the Spanish govern

Most Westerners were surely unwilling to exchange Ame ri

can rule for that of an autocratic Spanish regime.

The so-

called "Spanish conspiracy" of the late 1780s and 1790s died
for lack of popular support.
European diplomacy ultimately combined with American
expansion and Spanish setbacks in the Old Southwest to bring
For the "Spanish conspiracy" of the late 1780s and
1790s, see Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 78-122;
Thomas Perkins Abernethy treats this subject in From Frontier
to Plantation in Te nn es se e. See also Philbrick, Rise of the
W e s t , pp. 175-76, 180; James White to Samuel Johnston, April,
1788, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII:
724; Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, p. 80; Horsman,
Formative Y e a r s , pp. 15-16; Bemis, Diplomatic History of the
United Stat es , pp. 81, 106.
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about a victory for the United States in the Mississippi
affair.

Historians Samuel Flagg Bemis and Arthur P. Whi t 

taker are at odds over just what caused the Spanish aboutface.^^

While Bemis points to Spain's European entanglements

and problems with Great Britain, Whittaker insists that the
pressure of American western settlement forced the Spanish
to make concessions.
hypothesis.
in Europe.

There is evidence to support either

As always, Spain and Great Britain were at odds
When,

in 1790, Spain and Britain clashed in the

Nootka Sound incident, war between the two seemed imminent.
Strangely,

the Spanish were very concerned lest the Americans

ally with Great Britain to defeat them.

Evidently the Span

ish were not fully aware of the deteriorating relations
between the United States and Great Britain which resulted
from Jay's disastrous treaty in 1794.

When the United States

sent Thomas Pinckney to negotiate with Spain in 1795, he
arrived at exactly the right psychological moment.

The

Spanish minister Godoy was so afraid of Great Britain he was
willing to pay any price for American friendship.

At the same

time, the Spanish in the Old Southwest were daily feeling the
pressure from advancing American settlement.

They must have

realized that the westward movement of the United States
could not be contained much longer without war.

The result

of these two simultaneous developments was a treaty beyond
For the Bemis-Whittaker debate, see their respective
works cited above.
The debate is treated in Ferrell, Amer
ican Diplomacy, pp. 73-77.
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the Americans'
Lorenzo

greatest expectations.

The Treaty of San

(also known as Pinckney's Treaty of 1795) recognized

the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1783.

The United

States received a southern boundary of 31®, a western bound
ary on the Mississippi River, and the right to navigate the
entire length of that river with a port of deposit at New
Orleans.

The Old Southwest remained uneasy for several

years, but the die was cast.

In 1803, twenty years after

the Treaty of Paris had started the conflict, the United States
purchased the Louisiana Territory and gained sole possession
of the Mississippi R i v e r . D e s p i t e

the ill-advised diplomatic

efforts of John Jay and the reluctant expansionists from the
Northeastern United States, one more obstacle had been con
quered in the American trek westward.
The Mississippi River Debate is thus an important subject
in the study of Confederation politics and the creation of the
first American western policy.

In viewing the Jay controversy,

one can see the sectional basis of Congressional politics, and
the importance of the West in the opposing viewpoints of the
Southern and Eastern parties in the Confederation Congress.
As differences over western policy split the South and the
Northeast, so too did they divide the Nationalist party of
those two regions.

Not until Southern and Eastern Nationalists

^^Biilington, Westward Expansion, pp. 223, 230, 235;
Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States , pp. 104-105,
107; Philbrick, Rise of the W e s t , pp. 193-94; Ferrell, Ameri
can D ip lom acy, p. 73; Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier.
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reached an agreement over a western policy--over questions
such as American navigation of the Mississippi River--would
the Nationalist front ever unite to form a strong centralized
national g o v e r n m e n t . A n d this would not happen until July
of 1787, when the Confederation Congress drafted a territorial
government law for the western territories--the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787.
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp.

352, 378, 389, 398-99.

C H A P T E R VII

CREATION OF THE AMERICAN COLONIAL SYSTEM:
THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787
Some of our fellow-citizens may think we
are not yet able to conduct our affairs and
consult our interests, but if our society
is rude, much wisdom is not necessary to
supply our wants, and a fool can sometimes
put on his clothes better than a wise man
can do it for him. . . .
Western Virginia statehood advocates'
petition, December 9, 1783
In Congress, since my coming, we have
passed an Ordinance for establishing a
temporary government beyond the Ohio for
the more perfect security of peace and
property among the rude people who will
probably be the first settlers there--The
form of government, as you will see by the
enclosed paper, is much more tonic than our
democratic forms on the Atlantic are.
Richard Henry Lee to Colonel Henry Lee, ,
July 30, 1787^
George Bancroft once described the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787 as an American state paper second in importance only
2
to the Federal Constitution.
The Northwest Ordinance formed
the heart of the United States colonial system throughout the
Frontpiece vignettes are from Turner, "Western StateMaking," 1:252-53; Richard Henry Lee to Colonel Henry Lee (?),
July 30, 1787 in Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry L e e , 11:430,
2
Bancroft, Formation of the Constitution.
213

214

late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and served as the
governmental basis for the American continental empire.

For

nearly a century and a half after its passage, the Ordinance
of 1787 received unanimous praise from American leaders and
historians.

It was hailed as a magnificent creation, respon

sible for spreading democratic institutions over the North
American continent.

Within the past fifty years, however, an

historiographical debate has arisen over the Northwest Ordi
nance which is as stimulating as it is diverse.
The assault on the Northwest Ordinance came from what
can be described as a 'second generation' of Progressive his
torians.

In the late 1930s Theodore Pease argued in the

Mississippi Valley Historical Review that the Ordinance of
1787 was not a democratic document at all, but rather auto
cratic and authoritarian.
thesis

Merrill Jensen documented this

in his writings about the Confederation period, as

have John D. Barnhart, Francis Philbrick, and Julian P. Boyd.
These men point to Thomas Jefferson and David Howell's gov
ernmental Ordinance of 1784 as the truly democratic document
of territorial government.

The 1784 Ordinance, they say, was

repudiated in 1787 and replaced by the Northwest Ordinance,
which "furnished immediately a government that was altogether
3
unrepresentative and undemocratic."

Pease, "Ordinance of 1787," pp. 167-180; Jensen, New
Nation ; Barnhart, Valley of Democracy; Francis S. Philbrick,
The Laws of Illinois Territory. 1808-1818 (Springfield, 1950),
introduction to Volume XXV; Philbrick, Rise of the W e s t ;
Boyd, Papers of Jeff erson, p. 7.
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More recently the detractors of the Ordinance of 1787
have been put on the defensive by two historians from the
University of Wisconsin who have written about the Ordinance
in a more favorable light.

Robert Berkhofer, Jr. and Jack

Eblen contend the change from Jefferson’s 1784 plan to that
of 1787 was a natural evolution brought about by the exi
gencies of the frontier situation.

They argue that if the

new system was colonial, it was only temporarily so; the
territories all gained sovereignty in the course of time.
Eblen insists,

"politically controversial or deceitful m o 

tives" cannot be attributed to the framers of the Northwest
Ordinance :
Their contribution to the Ordinance of 1787
did not emanate foremost from a desire
either to further or frustrate whatever demo
cratic tendencies there were on the frontier,
but from their perception of what would con 
stitute the most viable system of colonial
government for the Empire in the West.4
Both sides in this historiographical debate agree that a
change
and the

occurred from 1784 to 1787, but here the agreement
conflicting value judgments begin.

ends

Jensen and company

say the change was abrupt, undemocratic, and therefore bad.
Eblen and Berkhofer say it was a natural evolution, practical.
Jack E. Eblen, The First and Second United States Empires.
Governors, and Territorial Government. 1784-1912 (Pittsburgh,
1968), chapter 1; Eblen, "Origins of the United States Colonial
System: The Ordinance of 1787," Wisconsin Magazine of History
LX (Summer 1968); Berkhofer, "Origins of the U. S. Territorial
System," pp. 231-62; Berkhofer, "Northwest Ordinance," pp. 4555.
I, for one, would like to have been a 'mouse in the cor
ner' when these theses were presented at a Merrill Jensen
seminar at the University of Wisconsin.

216
and therefore good.
tion.

There is evidence to support either p os i 

While the change in Ordinances led to an undemocratic

and arbitrary territorial government, it certainly was the
product of a natural evolution in that direction.

The revi

sionists are probably correct in their assertion that the
change was
point

'best'

for all concerned, but that is beside the

(as Eblen has shown, most Westerners ignored the Ordi

nance of 1787 anyivay, thus nullifying whatever impact it might
have had).

The purpose here is not to impose value judgments,

but rather provide some notion of the political environment
that produced the Northwest Ordinance of 1787--to view the
Northwest Ordinance in the political context of the 1780s.
The basic division over the Ordinance of 1787, as in all
Congressional debates over western policy, was between the
Northeast
the South.

(or the "East" as it was called in the 1780s) and
The Southerners were optimistic about expansion,

and favored a democratic territorial government that would
lead to new western states.

The Easterners, especially the

Nationalists, were not so optimistic.

They believed in a

strong, nationally-controlled territorial government.

They

wanted to limit the number of western states, and establish
a strong federal presence in the trans-Appalachian frontier.
Sometimes the Eastern Nationalists had to compromise with the
Southerners, but as the South came to adopt a more 'national'
political perspective in the middle and late 1780s, the
Northeasterners encountered less opposition to their plans
for the West.

Prior to 1787, the Eastern Nationalists created
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an Indian and land policy,
an orderly,

and conducted diplomacy aimed at

federally-supervised westward advance.

The North

west Ordinance of 1787, with several compromises, was the
culmination of the Eastern Nationalist western policy.
The Northwest Ordinance was a direct manifestation of
the political environment of the day.

Indeed, attitudes towards

the West mirror the political ideology of Americans during the
waning days of the Confederation.

A plan for an autocratic

colonial government in the West was the natural product of a
nation that yearned for a more powerful and centralized n a 
tional government.^
conservative,

As national political attitudes grew more

so too did attitudes towards the West.

Yet there

are seeming contradictions in the history of the Ordinance of
1787.

Why, for instance, did a Southern-controlled Congress

unanimously pass what was essentially an Eastern Nationalist
governmental Ordinance for the western territories?

During

the 1780s it was always the Southern block that opposed the
Eastern plans for the frontier,

and the Jay-Gardoqui contro

versy of 1786 had split the Congress so thoroughly that com
promise seemed impossible.

Why then did a Southern Congress

pass the Northwest Ordinance of 1787--a document which, among
other things, permanently outlawed the institution of slavery
in the territory north of the Ohio River?

The answer to this

Berkhofer, "Origins of the U. S. Territorial System,"
p. 260;
Arbitrary government during the initial stages of
settlement, according to Berkhofer, "reflected the political
currents of the day favoring centralization of government."
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puzzle lies in the political context of the time--in the
Southern drift towards Nationalism and in the intricate and
confusing relationship between the Confederation Congress and
the Constitutional Convention meeting concurrently during the
Spring and Summer of 1787.

By viewing the political events

that led to the "Compromise of 1787,"^ one can see that the
debate over the West not only reflected the Nationalist
ascendency in Confederation politics, but was a catalyst for
the triumph of Nationalism in the Federal Constitution of 1787,

Shall [the territorial governments] be upon
colonial principles, under a governor,
council, and judges of the United States re
movable at a certain period of time and they
admitted to a vote in Congress with the
rights of other states, or shall they be
left to themselves until that event?
7
James Monroe, 1786
Following the American Revolution most agreed that some
sort of government was necessary to establish order in the
West and administer the affairs of that country.

The focus

of this essay will be the evolution of a governmental ordi
nance for the West in the Confederation Congress.

However,

Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 225-250; Henderson, Party
Politics, pp. 408-20.
L y n d ’s thesis that the Northwest Ordi
nance was the result of a compromise between North and South
in the Confederation Congress and the Constitutional Convention
figures importantly in Henderson's interpretation, and will
be treated at length in section 3 of this essay.
7
Jensen, New Nation, p. 35 8.
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Congress was not the only body attempting to provide govern
ment for the trans-Appalachian frontier.

The history of the

1780s is full of instances of Westerners forming states,
writing constitutions,

and creating their own governments.

Congress notwithstanding.

Many western settlers took Thomas

Jefferson literally when he wrote that Americans everywhere
possessed "a right which nature has given all men, of . . .
going in quest of new habitations and there establishing new
societies under such laws and regulations as to them shall
seem most likely to promote public happniess."

Of the numerous

proposed western states, Vandalia, Transylvania, Westylvania,
and Franklin are best known.

The Ohio country actually had a

"squatter governor" in 1787, and as early as 1785 Kentuckians
wefe clamouring for independence, statehood, and their own
government.

Yet none of these statehood movements could suc

ceed without approval of the Confederation Congress.

With the

creation of the National Domain in 1784, most Americans turned
to Congress to see what provisions would be made for governO
ment in the West.
O
Turner, "Western State-Making," provides a good survey
of the various western statehood movements.
Ibid., p. 267.
For the state of Franklin, see Thomas Perkins Abernethy, From
Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee (Birmingham, Alabama,
1932); Randolph C. Downes, " Ohio’s Squatter Governor: William
Hogland of Hoglandstown," Ohio Archeological and Historical
Quarterly XLII (April 1934): 273-82.
See Caleb Wallace (Ken
tucky) to James Madison, July 12, 1785, in Hunt, Writings of
James M a d i s o n , 11:149,
"We conceive the people of this Dis
trict do not at present enjoy a greater portion of Liberty
than an American colony might have done a few years ago had
she been allowed a Representative in the British parliament."
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independence, many agreed that the territories in the transAppalachian West should eventually be granted statehood and
sovereignty.

The Dickinson draft of the Articles of Confed

eration and Jefferson’s draft of the Virginia state constitu
tion both called for "free and independent states" in the
West, and the Virginia cession of the Ohio country to Congress
stipulated that the region be divided into numerous small
states to join the Union eventually with equal rights.

Al

though Congress squabbled for seven years over the Virginia
cession,

it did agree on a resolution stating.
That the unappropriated lands that may be
ceded or relinquished to the United States
by any particular State . . . shall be dis
posed of for the common benefit of the
United States and be settled and formed in
to distinct republican States which shall
become members of the federal union, and
have the same rights of sovereignty, free
dom, and independence as other states.^

Yet not all Americans agreed that new states should be
created in the West.
majority of votes.

The above resolution barely received a
And even those who favored new western

states disagreed as to how they should be governed and incor
porated into the Confederation.
gress create in the West?
should they have?

How many states should Con

What sort of territorial government

Were the settlers to run their own affairs,

or would Congress exercise temporary jurisdiction?

How long

would they have to wait for admission into the Confederacy?

^Bestor, "Settlement of the West," pp. 13-44; Berkhofer,
"Northwest Ordinance, pp. 45-55.
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Congress debated all of these questions in the early 1780s,
and various governmental proposals emerged.

Thomas Paine,

Peletiah Webster, Theodoric Bland, Alexander Hamilton, and
Timothy Pickering devised some of the more notable plans.
With temporary approval of the Virginia cession in the Spring
of 1784, the Confederation Congress gained jurisdiction over
a huge public domain in the trans-montane West.
had to act.

Now Congress

In a letter to an Indian affairs committee,

George Washington warned that the West was being overrun by
"lawless Banditti" who would soon cause an Indian war.

Order

must be established immediately in that region, warned Wash
ington.

Thus, on

March 1, 1784

(the same day the Virginia

cession was accepted), Congress appointed Thomas Jefferson to
head a committee to draw an Ordinance of government for the
western territories.^^
The Ordinance of 1784,^^ drafted by Thomas Jefferson and
David Howell and approved by Congress on April 23, 1784, was
a radical document.

It proposed to divide the trans-Appalachian

West into fourteen new states, all eligible for eventual admis
sion into the Confederation.

The period of federal supervision

would last only until the Westerners formed their own territorial
For early territorial government proposals, see section 1
of Chapter 5, above.
Also, Berkhofer, "Origins of the U. S.
Territorial System."
Most of the early governmental plans are
in Hulbert, Ohio in the Confederation. George Washington to
James Duane (Indian Affairs chairman)', September 7, 1783, in
Sparks, Writings of George Washington, VIII:477-484.
l^For the Ordinance of 1784, see section 2 of Chapter 3
a bove .
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government, and there was no minimum population requirement
for organization of those governments.

The Ordinance called

for local control during the entire territorial process and
allowed admission into the Union when the respective states'
populations reached that of the smallest of the original
thirteen states

(Delaware--60,000 in 1790).

Congress defeated

Jefferson's provision abolishing slavery in the territories
(by one vote), yet the Ordinance of 1784 provided for white
male suffrage long before any of the seaboard states legislated
such a reform.

A study of the Ordinance of 1784 leaves the

impression that Jefferson and Howell were not so worried about
the "lawless Banditti" of the frontier as some of their contem
poraries .
Although the Ordinance of 1784 passed on April 23, it re 
mained a dead letter until replaced by the Northwest Ordinance
three years later.
effect?

Why was not the Ordinance of 1784 put into

The most obvious reason is that Congress did not

exercise firm control over the West from 1783-1787.

Indian

hostilities, the tardiness of land surveys and sales, and Con
gressional financial straits all prevented implementation of
Jefferson and Howell's Ordinance.

More important, there was

still serious disagreement over just how great a role the
national government should play in the western territories.

Ibid.
The best discussions of the Ordinance of 1784
are the "Editorial Note," in Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, VII;
Berkhofer, "Origins of the U. S. Territorial System;" and
Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, chapter 1.
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Many Eastern congressmen voted for the *84 plan mainly because
it met the requirements of the Virginia cession.

These men

wanted to decrease the number of new states and put some muscle
into the law by adding federal controls.

In April, Elbridge

Gerry of Massachusetts had succeeded in amending the Ordinance
of 1784,

to wit:
Measures not inconsistent with the principles
of the Confederation, and necessary for the
preservation of peace and good order among
the settlers in any of the said new states,
until they shall assume a temporary govern
ment as aforesaid, may from time to time be
taken by the United States in Congress as 
sembled.

This amendment did not greatly affect the democratic tone of
the Ordinance, however.

Since there was no minimum requirement

for the formation of "temporary government," the period of n a 
tional control would not be very long.

But a movement to in

crease the amount of federal control over the West had definitely
b eg un .^ ^
Ironically, many Americans in 1785 felt a curious sense of
identification with Great Britain's colonial problems.
faced a double-edged sword:

If, on the one hand, federal super

vision of the West was too weak,
prevail; or worse,
or Spain.

Congress

lawlessness and anarchy would

the Westerners might start a war with Britain

Yet if Congressional rule was too strict, the W e s t 

erners might revolt and declare themselves independent, just as
*J *7

Peterson, Jefferson and the New Natio n, p. 278; Eblen,
First and Second Û1 Si Empires, p. 26; Boyd, Papers of Je^fferson, VI; Berkhofer, "Origins of the U. S. Territorial System,"
p. 253.
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the seaboard states had done nine years earlier.

Most Ameri

cans in the 1780s agreed that transplanting republican insti
tutions in the West was going to be a tricky business.

But

they differed greatly over how the transplantation was to take
place.
The basic division over the West fit into the sectional
context of Confederation politics.

The Southern delegates

were much more optimistic about the prospects of westward e x 
pansion than their Northeastern colleagues.

Most Southerners

supported the Ordinance of 1784 and Jefferson’s Land Ordinance
of 1784.

They opposed the first draft of the Land Ordinance

of 17 85 and John J a y ’s attempt to surrender American use of
the Mississippi River for twenty-five years.

The Southern

faction wanted to admit numerous new western states into the
Confederacy as soon as possible, but their motives were based
more on political considerations than noble agrarian premises.
During the 1780s the West was being populated mostly by South
ern pioneers in Tennessee, Kentucky, and southern Ohio.

Thus

Southern leaders fully expected the new western states to sup
port the South in the sectional politics of the Confederation
_
15
Congress.
Easterners,

almost to the man, agreed with this view of

^^Eblen, First and Second U, S. Empires, pp. 28, 47;
Theodore Pease, "The Ordinance of 1787," p. 176.
1^
Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 408-20; Lynd, "Compro
mise of 1787," pp. 229-30.
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the potential political loyalties of the new western states,
Rufus King of Massachusetts believed that, in the Ordinance
of 1784, "Congress had impoliticly laid [the West] out into
ten States.

...

It is possible then that if this plan be

persisted in by C o n g^ , 10 new votes may be added.
the Southern faction in Congress.

. ."to

Although some Northeasterners

entertained hopes that at least one of the western states would
adopt "Eastern politics," most were pessimistic.

They wanted

to reduce potential states and postpone their admission into
the Confederation as long as possible.
only rationale.

Politics was not their

Many Easterners saw the West as a potential

economic threat--an escape for those who would otherwise man
the factories and shops of the East.

Westward expansion, they

reasoned, would lead to higher wages,

lower land prices, and

competition in the form of a viable Mississippi River commerce.
Mr.

George Clymer, a Nationalist from Pennsylvania,
thought the encouragement of the Western
Country was suicide on the old States.
If
the States have such different interests
that they cannot be left to regulate their
manufactures without encountering the inter
ests of other States, it is a proof that they
are not fit to compose one nation.16
Many Easterners could not understand why anyone would want

to leave the seaboard states to settle in the wild frontier.
Henderson, Party Po li ti cs, pp. 408-409; Rufus King in
Adrienne Koch, e d . , Notes on the Debates in the Federal Conven
tion of 1787 Reported by James Madison (Athens, Ohio, 1966),
p. 457; Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires , pp. 26.28;
Peterson, Jefferson and the New N a t i o n , p. 284; George Clymer
in Madison, Notes on the D eb ates, p. 545.
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They were puzzled by the "half-savage" pioneers, and deeply
disturbed about their propensity for starting Indian wars.
Constrictionists like Samuel Meredith of Pennsylvania b e 
lieved, "it would prove a happiness to all settled parts of
the Country if the Ohio were the boundary for a Number of
years."
view.

Most Northeasterners, however, took a more pragmatic
If westward expansion was indeed inevitable, then it

would have to be closely supervised and regulated by the n a 
tional government.

Those who advocated an

the central government,

increased role for

the Nationalists, pointed to the West

as a prime example of the need for an expanded federal role.
Consequently,

the Eastern Nationalists in Congress began a

movement to tighten national controls over the West.

Their

first priority was to reduce the number of projected western
states, and make their admission into the Union more difficult.
As Congress began to revise Jefferson's Ordinance of 1784, the
Easterners found they had an effective, if unwitting, ally in
young James Monroe of Virginia.

It was in August of 1785 that

Monroe set out on horseback for a five month fact-finding tour
of the Northwest territory.

17

It is in effect to be a Colonial Govt,
similar to that w^ prevail'd in these States
previous to the Revolution with this remark
able and important difference, that when
l^Samuel Meredith to Thomas Fitzsimmons, 1787 in Burnett,
Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII:513; Jay A. Barrett,
Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, p. 33.
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such district shall contain the number of the
least numerous of the "13 original States for
the time being" they shall be admitted into
the Confederacy.
James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson
May 11, 1786
I have the honor to inclose to you an
Ordinance that we have just passed in Con
gress for establishing a temporary Govern
ment beyond the Ohio, as a measure prepatory
to the sale of Lands.
It seemed necessary
for the security of property among the uni
formed and perhaps licentious people as the
greater part of those who go there are, that
a strong-toned government should exist, and
the rights of property be clearly defined.
Richard Henry Lee to George Washington
July 15, 178718

James Monroe was twenty-eight years old when he went West
in the summer of 1785.
the Ohio country,

During his tour, Monroe saw much of

interviewed settlers and military commandants,

and he even sat in on some Indian treaty negotiations.

While

out West, Monroe formed some opinions about that region, some
of them astute and some rather strange.

He returned in Decem

ber and wrote Thomas Jefferson, "My several routes westw^, with
the knowledge of the Country I have there obtain'd, have im
pressed me fully with a conviction of the impolicy of our measures respecting it."

19

18

James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, May 11, 1786, in
Hamilton, Writings of James M o n r o e , 1:126-27; Richard Henry
Lee to George Washington, July 15, 1787, in Burnett, Letters
of the Continental Congress, VIII:620.
^^Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787. p. 33;
Burnett, Continental Congress, p. 651; Monroe to Jefferson,
January, 1786 in Hamilton, Writings of James Monroe, 1:117-18.
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Monroe's observations were twofold.

First of all, he

felt the federal presence in the West should be increased
during the initial stages of territorial government.

He was

"clearly of the opinion that to many of the most important
objects of a federal government their interests,

if not

o p po s’d, will be but little connected with ours."

He there

fore advocated a strong national presence, making the West
"subservient to our purposes."

Secondly, Monroe thought the

number of states should be decreased;
A great part of the territory is miserably
poor, especially near the lakes Michigan §
Erie § that upon the Mississippi § the Illi
nois consists of extensive plains w" have
not had from appearances § will not have a
single bush on them for ages.
The districts
therefore within wh these fall will perhaps
never contain.a sufficient number of Inhabi
tants to entitle them to membership in the
Confederacy, and in the mean time, the p e o 
ple who may settle within them will be gov'd
by the resolutions of Congress in w they
will not be represented. . . .
Why Monroe thought a "great part" of the Ohio and Mississippi
valley was a 'barren plain' unable to support a substantial
agricultural population is puzzling.
states had some credence.

Yet his call for fewer

As a Southerner, Monroe wanted

western states incorporated into the Union as soon as possible.
Jefferson's proposed states
long

were so small that it would take

time for them to equal the population of the smallest of

the thirteen original states

(Delaware in 1786).

To be sure,

the Jefferson-Howell grid would provide many more western
votes, but not for a long time, and "perhaps never.

..."

a
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Monroe was evidently willing to sacrifice long-term advantage
for more immediate benefits.

Thus he recommended Virginia

change its cession and Congress redivide the Northwest terri
tory, provided "that the s^ territory be divided into not
less than two nor more than five States."
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By 1786 most Congressmen believed that the Confederation
government should play a more powerful role in the western
territorial governments.

This development paralleled growing

Nationalist attempts to increase the overall powers of the
central government.

At the same time most Congressmen, North

eastern and Southern, believed that the number of projected
states in the West should be reduced.
ever, were diametrically opposed.

Their motivations, how

The South wanted to reduce

the number of new states in order to expedite their admission.
The Northeast wanted to decrease the number in order to lessen
their future political muscle.

Since the question of just how

and when new western states would be admitted into the
70

Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, p. 33;
Burnett, Continental Congress, p. 651; Peterson, Jefferson and
the New N a t i o n , p. 284; Monroe to Jefferson, January 19, 1786,
in Hamilton, Writings of James M o n r o e . 1:117-18.
This letter
is of vital importance in understanding the evolution of the
Northwest Ordinance.
See also Monroe to Jefferson, May 11,
1786, in Hamilton, Writings of James M on ro e. 1:126-27.
The
state land cessions, particularly Virginia's, figured impor
tantly in all discussions of future states in the West.
The
Virginians stipulated that numerous states (ISO miles square)
be erected in the West.
Otherwise their deed of cession was
null and void.
That is why Monroe tried to persuade Virginia
to change the cession--for unless they did there could be no
public domain, much less a governmental ordinance.
Although
Congress accepted the Virginia cession in March of 1784, it was
not until 1786 that Virginia changed the cession to conform to
the new Congressional standards.
Thus the cession controversy
actually dragged on for 10 years.
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Confederacy had not yet arisen, a rather artificial unity
existed on the issue of territorial government.

Nearly all

the members of Congress agreed that changes were necessary,
and this unity led to the passage of an April resolution, by
Nathan Dane of Massachusetts, calling for appointment of a
new committee to rewrite the Ordinance of 1784.

21

The new committee on territorial government, consisting
of James Monroe

(chairman), William Samuel Johnson, John Kean,

Charles Pinckney, and Rufus King,
1786.
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issued its report on May 9,

Much of this May 9 report survived one and a half

years of debate to constitute the governmental articles and
part of the articles of compact of the Northwest Ordinance of
1787.

The Monroe report provided a constitution for western

territorial government.

The governmental structure was quite

similar to the British colonial governments of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries.

The May 9 report applied only to

the ceded lands of the Old Northwest, and made them into one
governmental unit until three to five states were formed.

23

To summarize, the road to statehood passed through two stages
of governmental evolution.

The first stage was unrepresentative.

^^Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 17 8 7 , p. 37.
7 7

Monroe's May 9 report is in Journals of the Continental
C ongress. XXX:251-55.
Two Eastern Nationalists, Johnson and
King, served on the Monroe committee.
^^Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, p. 39:
"It was
partially to gain the initiative and forestall attempts to
reduce the number of states to two that Monroe had introduced
his proposal in 1786 for a three to five way division of the
territory."
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The territory was to be governed by a congressionally appointed
governor,
judges.

assisted by a secretary, council, and court of three
In this first stage,

the territorial governor had

absolute executive and legislative authority.

The second,

"representative" stage began when the population of the terri
tory reached 500.
assembly

In this stage the residents could elect an

(with one representative for every fifty people)

and send one non-voting representative to Congress.
and officials had to own property to vote and serve.

Voters
This

stage was similar to the British system in that the territorial
governor had an unqualified veto on all legislation and convene,
prorogue,

and dissolve the assembly at will.

The new state

could not be admitted into the Confederacy until its population
reached that of the smallest of the original thirteen states.

2S

Congress did not act on the Monroe report during the Spring
of 1786,

During this interlude some interesting correspondence

occurred between Monroe and Thomas Jefferson, who was serving as
American minister to France.

Monroe sent Jefferson a copy of

the proposed Ordinance, assuring him "The most important princi
ples of the Act of Annapolis

[the Ordinance of 1784] are you

observe p re s e r v ’d in this report."

In an emotional reply of

July 9, Jefferson disagreed with his friend and defended the
Burnett, Continental Congress, p. 652.
The 500 popula
tion minimum for the second stage and the representative ratio
(1:50) were not in the May 9 report but were added as amend
ments that summer.
^^Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, pp. 29-32; Berk
hofer, "Origins of the U. S. Territorial System," p. 256;
Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," p. 234.
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1784 plan.

His objections to the May 9 report centered around

the proposed decrease in the number of western states,

Jeffer

son and others adhered to Montesquieu’s basic tenet that re
publican institutions could flourish only in areas small enough
to preserve the homogeneity of interests and lifestyles of the
inhabitants.

Jefferson feared that powerful, centralized, i.e..

non-republican governments would be necessary to administrate
the affairs of large territories.
soning,

the Westerners "will

moderate size, but it is the
as a regular society."
permanently,

Thus, to Jefferson's rea

not only be happier in states

of

only way in which they can exist

If Congress encouraged, temporarily or

authoritarian regimes in the West, "They will end

by separating from our Confederacy and becoming its enemies."
In conclusion, he stated,
Upon the [1784] plan we treat them as fellow
citizens.
They will have a just share in
their own government, they will love us, and
pride themselves in an union with us.
Upon
the latter [the May 9 report] we treat them
as subjects, we govern them, and not they
themselves; they will abhor us as masters
and break off from us in defiance.26
Monroe to Jefferson, May 11, 1786, in Hamilton, Writings
of James M o n r o e , 1:126-27; Jefferson to Monroe, July 9, 1786,
in Boyd, Papers of Je fferson. IX:112-13; Berkhofer, "Origins of
the U. S. Territorial System," pp. 244, 257-60.
Berkhofer con
tends that too much emphasis has been placed on this letter.
Furthermore, "all the letters usually cited to prove Jefferson’s
opposition to extension of Congressional authority during the
early stages of government, when read in the context of his
ideological geography, refer more to the proposed alteration in
the size of the new states than to the nature of their govern
ment."
I believe the size of states directly affects their
government, temporarily or permanently, "in the context of his
[Jefferson’s] ideological geography."
Boyd, Papers of Jeffer
s o n . XVII:163.
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Jefferson’s letter had not yet arrived when James Monroe
himself began to have some reservations about the progress of
the territorial question.

Indeed, by July of 1786 Monroe was

convinced that his May 9 report had, if anything, opened Pan
d o r a ’s Box.

M o n r o e ’s apprehensions were kindled by the Jay-

Gardoqui negotiations over the Mississippi River in the Spring
and Summer of 1786 which precipitated a Northeast-South split
in Congress over western policy.

27

Whereas both sections had

earlier agreed that the number of potential western states
should be reduced,

it was now apparent that their motivations

had been quite different.

William Grayson of Virginia attempted,

in July of 1786, to amend the May 9 report so as to allow for a
minimum of five states in the Old Northwest, but the weight in
Congress had shifted to the Northeast.

New committee appointments

gave the Easterners a majority on the territorial government com
mittee, and rumor had it the new members planned to make the
statehood provision even more prohibitive.

Monroe felt he had

been betrayed, and wrote Jefferson that the Easterners,
manifested a desire to rescind every thing
they have heretofore done in it, particularly
to increase the number of Inhabitants which
shod entitle such States to admission into
the Confederacy § to make it depend on their
having one 13tn. part of the free inhabitants
of the U.S.
This with some other instruc
tions they wish to impose on them evinces
plainly the policy of these men to keep them
out of the Confederacy a l t o g e t h e r . 28

^^Lynd, ’’Compromise of 1787,” p. 235.
7R

Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, p. 39;
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Monroe even went so far as to suggest that the May 9 re 
port be discarded and the territorial question be left "upon
the ground of April 23^ 1784"

[the Ordinance of 1784].

By

mid-summer of 1786 the Northeast-South breach seemed irrepa
rable.

The animosity between Virginia and Massachusetts was

particularly intense.

Monroe advised Jefferson,

The Massach. delegates . . . are without ex
ception the most illiberal I have ever seen
from that State.
Two of these men whose
names are Dane and King are elected for the
next year. . . . The former is I believe
honest but the principles of the latter I
doubt.
This conflict directly affected the territorial government
Ordinance, which "hath not been decided on 8 hath only been
postpon'd in consequence of the inordinate schemes of some
men alluded to as to the whole policy of the aff^s of that
country."

Thus, when Monroe left Congress in late summer of

1786 he had good reason to regret having ever been involved
in the territorial question.

29

The new Northeastern committee on territorial government,
consisting of William Samuel Johnson (chairman), Melancton
Smith, Charles Pinckney, John Henry, and Nathan Dane issued a
new report on September 19, 1786.

30

Using Monroe's May 9

Bancroft, Formation of the Constitution, pp. 280-81; Monroe
to Jefferson, July 16, 1786 in Hamilton, Writings of James
M o nr oe . 1:140-42.
29

Monroe to Jefferson, July 16, 1786 in Hamilton, Writ 
ings of James M o nr oe , 1:141-42.
3f)

J o u r n a l s o f the C o n t i n e n t a l Congress, XXXI : 6 9 9 - 7 0 3 ;
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report as a basis, the new committee made some innovations
that greatly broadened the nature of the Ordinance.

Eastern

Nationalist Nathan D a n e ’s legal skills are evident in the
verbiage of the document.
conveyance of estates

He wrote provisions for equal

(land inheritance), obligation of con

tracts, property rights, and what amounted to a territorial
bill of rights guaranteeing religious freedom, jury trial,
and habeas corpus.

But the committee also moved to slow down

the statehood evolution.

It raised M o n r o e ’s 500 minimum p o p u 

lation requirement for the second stage to 5,000, and changed
the representative ratio from 1:50 to 1:5000.

Most important,

the Northeasterners increased the population requirement for
statehood to one-thirteenth of the population of the original
states, provided ’’the consent of so many states in Congress is
first obtained as may at that time be competent to such admis
sion.”

The first part of the new statehood provision would

have kept Michigan out of the Union until after 18 80, and
Wisconsin until 1900.

And the second part of the new provision

was so ambiguous that it would have enabled Congress to keep
new western states out of the Union altogether.
The innovations of the Northeastern committee were so
repugnant to the South that compromise was impossible during

Johnson, Henry, Smith, and Dane were from the Northeast.
Johnson and Dane were Nationalists.
^^Ibid.
Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787.
pp. 42, 57; Lynd, ’’Compromise of 1787,” p. 234; Henderson,
Party Politics, p. 409; Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires,
p p . 34-35.
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the Fall of 1786.

Southerners were concerned about the

western question, and Jefferson wrote Madison,
This measure, with the disposition to shut up
the Mississippi give me serious apprehensions
of the severance of the Eastern and the Western
parts of our confederacy.
It might have been
made the interests of the Western states to
remain united with us, by managing their inter
ests honestly and for their own good.
But the
moment we sacrifice their interests to our own,
they will see it better to govern themselves.
Seven months passed before Congress again resumed debate over
the territorial Ordinance--but an eventful seven months at
that.

During the Winter of 1786-1787 the Jay-Gardoqui negotia

tions over closure of the Mississippi River continued with no
settlement and the Massachusetts state militia suppressed
S h a y ’s Rebellion.

Most important,

the Nationalists succeeded

in their campaign to replace the Articles of Confederation,
and scheduled the Constitutional Convention to meet in May of
1787.

Yet there was still no government for the western terri

tories.

In early Spring several memorials from the inhabitants

of the Illinois country combined with renewed Southern interest
to prod Congress into action once again.

T O

On April 26, 1787 Congress re-read the September 19 report
and reassigned it to a new committee also dominated by the
T T

Northeast.

It submitted a new report on May 9, 1787,

one year after Monroe's original report.
32

exactly

The governmental

Jefferson to Madison, December 16, 1786, in Boyd, Papers
of Jefferson. X:603; Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires,
p. 36; Henderson, Party P ol itics, p. 410.
33
J o u rn a ls o f th e C o n t i n e n t a l Congress, X X X I I : 281.
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provisions remained intact (indeed, they had not changed
noticeably since Monroe's first draft), but the Easterners
filled some loopholes and assigned specific terms of office
to territorial officials.

Now the governor and judges were

to share the legislative function during the first stage,
and adopt the laws of one of the thirteen original states.
The report made the territories responsible for a share of
the federal debt and forbade higher taxes on nonresident
landowners.

But in debate which probably took place May 10,

the Southerners succeeded in deleting the "one-thirteenth"
population requirement from the statehood clause.
Congress scheduled the Ordinance for a third reading and
a vote on May 11, but did not act on it again until July.

One

reason for the inaction was that Congress had no quorum from
May 11 to July 4.

The Constitutional Convention was meeting

in Philadelphia and many Congressmen served in both bodies.

35

Still, the basic reason for the failure to pass the territorial
Ordinance was deadlock.

Since the South defeated the "one-

thirteenth" clause on May 10, the Ordinance had no statehood
provision.

Easterners and Southerners still could not agree

on a method for admitting new states into the Union.

Not

until Congress reconvened in July was the Northwest Ordinance
again taken up, and then it passed in just three days.

But

Ibid.; Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1 787.
43; Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, pp. 36-37.
35
B u r n e t t , C o n t i n e n t a l Congress, p. 681.
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what happened between May and July?

Why were the Congressmen

able finally to complete the Ordinance over which they had
haggled for three years?
Until recently, most historians have linked the passage
of the Northwest Ordinance with the appearance in Congress of
Rev. Manasseh Cutler, an agent for the Ohio Company of New
England.

The Ohio Company was comprised of a group of Eastern

Revolutionary War officers who pooled thousands of military
land bounties and petitioned Congress for 1 and 1/2 million
acres in the Ohio Valley.

They hoped to colonize the Ohio

country and sell their lands for a substantial profit.

The

fact that nearly all Ohio Company members were Eastern N a 
tionalists who favored a 'corporate,'
mode of expansion

federally supervised

(in the colonial New England tradition) has

led many historians to hypothesize that the Ohio Company was
responsible for the arbitrary nature of the governmental p r o 
visions of the Northwest O r d i n a n c e . R e c e n t

scholarship,

however, has taken much of the wind out of this "Ohio Company
thesis."

It appears the governmental provisions of the North

west Ordinance were not altered substantially after Monroe's
May 9, 1786 report.

To be sure, the Ohio Company members

found an autocratic territorial government much to their liking,
But they cannot be credited with the drafting of such a govern
ment, because much of the legislation was on record prior to

^^For this view, see Pease, "Ordinance of 1787," p. 167;
and Jensen, New N at io n, p. 358.
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Cutler’s arrival in New York in 1787.^^
While Manasseh Cutler was not solely responsible for the
Northwest Ordinance, he did have a role in its passage.

There

is substantial evidence that Cutler met with Nathan Dane and
others in July of 1787 to discuss government in the terri
tories.

The Ohio Company speculators were naturally interested

in the territorial question, and Cutler wrote on July 10 that
he had received a copy of the proposed Ordinance "with leave
to make remarks and propose amendments."

This amended copy of

the Ordinance is in the Cutler family records, and it appears
that Rev. Cutler was responsible for provisions of the articles
of compact of the Northwest Ordinance relating to Indians,
religion,

and education.

Thus Cutler played a minor role in

the drafting of the Ordinance of 1787.

However,

the real im

portance of Manasseh Cutler and the Ohio Company was in the
passage of the Ordinance.

Cutler’s offer,

in behalf of the

Ohio Associates, of hundreds of thousands of dollars was
quite tempting to the bankrupt Confederation Congress, yet
the Ohio Company made a territorial government a condition
of purchase.
no money.

Without a governmental Ordinance there could be

So the Ohio Company’s offer served as a spur to

the reluctant Congress, pressuring them to reach a compromise.
There were other more important motivations, however, and just
how Congress reached a compromise will be discussed at length

37

Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, p. 37.
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in the final section of this essay.
For whatever reason,

the Confederation Congress burst

into activity in early July.

A score of Southerners left

the Constitutional Convention for New York on July 2 and,
on July 4, established the first congressional quorum in
over two months.

They wasted no time.

A reconstituted.

Southern-controlled committee composed of Edward Carrington
(Chairman), Richard Henry Lee, Melancton Smith, John Kean,
and Nathan Dane finished drafting the Ordinance of 1787.
Dane wrote.
We tried one day to patch up M[onroe]*s p.
system of W. Government.--started new ideas
and committed the whole to Carrington,
Dane, R. H. Lee, Smith, and Kean.
We met
several times and at last agreed on some
principles--at least Lee, Smith and myself.
We found ourselves rather pressed.
The
Ohio Company appeared to purchase a tract
of federal lands--about six or seven m i l 
lions of acres--and we wanted to abolish
the old system and get a better one for
the government of the country, and we
finally found it necessary to adopt the
best system we could g e t . 39
7 0

Ibid.; Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787,
pp. 69-70, 72; Henderson, Party Politics, p. 411; Burnett,
Continental Congress, p. 682.
Cutler also amended the Ordi
nance by including an anti-slavery proviso in the articles
of compact.
This idea, however, was not original with him
and I believe that by July 10 numerous Congressmen were talk
ing about abolishing slavery in the Northwest.
The signifi
cance is that Cutler knew about the slavery proviso before
he left for Philadelphia the evening of July 10.
As will be
discussed in the third section. Cutler's greatest role in the
passage of the Northwest Ordinance was his service as a m e s 
senger to the Constitutional Convention that led to the Com
promise of 1787.
39
Dane to King, July 16, 1787, in King, Correspondence
of Rufus King, 1:289-90.
The reconstituted committee con
sisted of two Nationalists (Carrington and Dane), two
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On July 13 the Confederation Congress passed the North
west Ordinance of 1787.^^

The governmental provisions, bill

of rights, and legal verbiage were essentially unchanged,
although Nathan Dane added property qualifications for all
elected officials.
articles of compact.

The most important additions lay in the
The Northeast and South had finally

agreed on a statehood provision.

The Old Northwest^^ was to

be divided into no less than three and no more than five
states, to be admitted into the Union "whenever any of the
said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants."
Moreover, "such admission shall be allowed at an earlier
period, and when there may be a less number of free inhabitants
in the State than sixty thousand," if Congress approved.

This

sudden agreement on a statehood plank, after three years of
haggling,

is quite surprising, but not so surprising as the

Antifederalists (Lee and Smith), and Kean, an Independent.
Lee, who later joined the Federalists, was a strong supporter
of the Eastern Nationalist western policy.
^^Journals of the Continental Congress. XXXII :333-343,
The only negative vote was cast by Abraham Yates, a parochial
Antifederalist from New York.
Y a t e s ’ rationale is unknown,
although Dane wrote that "In this case, as in so many others,
he appeared not to understand the subject at all." Yates was
so adamantly opposed that I have tried to learn his reasoning,
but could not find anything.
^^Eblen, First and Second U. S. E mpires, p. 38.
Although
M o nr oe ’s original report applied only to the Northwest, the
idea was dropped and does not appear in either the September
19 or May 9, 1787 revisions.
The concept of a Northwest
Ordinance was not again incorporated until July of 1787.
This
has led Lynd to believe that the boundary was drawn because of
the slavery proviso in the document.
See section 3, below.
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sixth article of compact, which stated.
There shall be neither involuntary servitude
in the said territory, otherwise than in the
punishment of crimes whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted:
Provided always.
That any persons escaping into the same,
from whom labor or service is lawfully
claimed in any one of the original States,
such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed
and conveyed to the person claiming his
or her labor or service as aforesaid.
Fugitive slave law notwithstanding, this slavery provision
was quite radical and unexpected.

Congress had not discussed

slavery in the territories since the 1784-1785 session, and
even committee chairman Nathan Dane confessed,
I had no idea the States would agree to the
sixth article, prohibiting slavery, as only
Massachusetts of the Eastern States was
present, and therefore omitted it in the
draft, but finding the House favorably d is
posed on this subject, after we had c om
pleted the other parts, I moved the article,
which was agreed to without o p p o s i t i o n . 42
In only one week in July of 1787 the Confederation Con
gress was able to complete a task that had dragged on since
1784.

To be sure, most of the Northwest Ordinance was already

written.

Monroe had provided the governmental provisions and

Journals of the Continental Congress. XXXII:343; Eblen,
First and Second U. S. Empires, pp. 32, 36-37, 38, 40; Barrett,
Evolution of the Ordinance of 1 787. pp. 47, 60, 77; Pease,
"Ordinance of 1787," p. 179; Dane to King, July 16, 1787 in
King, Correspondence of Rufus K in g . 1:290.
Actually, there
was considerable anti-slavery sentiment among the Eastern
Nationalists throughout the 1784-1787 period.
The Easterner
needed a vehicle to express that sentiment, however, and the
Northwest Ordinance provided that vehicle.
See Pickering to
King, March 8, 1785, in King, Correspondence of Rufus K ing.
1:284, and Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, p. 29.
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Nathan Dane the bill of rights and several of the articles
of compact.

Yet the Northeast-South split over the number

of states and the statehood provision had seemed irreparable.
What caused the sudden burst of energy and spirit of compro
mise in July of 1787?

Most historians have either glossed

over the subject, or relied heavily on the "Ohio Company
thesis."

They credit Congressional lust for money as the

main stimulus.

But the "Ohio Company thesis" leaves many

questions unanswered.

For instance, how was the severe

Northeast-South breach over western policy, accentuated by
the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations, ever resolved?

How did the

Easterners and Southerners ever reach an agreement on the
number of possible western states and admission procedure?
Moreover, why did a score of Southern politicians leave the
Constitutional Convention and travel 90 miles to New York
City for the purpose of passing a colonial governmental
Ordinance drawn in its final stage by a New Englander under
the stimulus of an Eastern land company?

And most important,

why did an overwhelmingly Southern Congress unanimously pass
an Ordinance which, in its final form, prohibited slavery
north of the Ohio River?!

To answer these difficult ques

tions one must, again, turn to the political developments
of the time.

By viewing the Northwest Ordinance in the c on

text of the debates of the Constitutional Convention one can
conceive the relationship between the Ordinance of 1787 and
the Federal Constitution.

And by studying the debates of
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the Confederation Congress and the Constitutional Conven
tion one can understand the crucial role that the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 played in what Staughton Lynd has termed
the "Compromise of 1787."^^

This brings to my recollection what I was
told by Mr. Madison and what I do not remem
ber ever to have seen in print.
Many indi
viduals were members of both bodies [the
Constitutional Convention and the Confedera
tion Congress], and thus were enabled to
know what was passing in each--both sitting
with closed doors and in secret sessions.
The distracting question of slavery was agi
tating and retarding the labor of both, and
led to conferences and inter-communications
of the members, which resulted in a compro
mise by which the northern or anti-slavery
portion of the country agreed to incorporate,
into the Ordinance and Constitution, the
provisions to restore fugitive slaves; and
this mutual and concurrent action was the
cause of the similarity of the provision
contained in both, and had its influence,
in creating the great unanimity by which the
Ordinance passed, and also in making the
Constitution the more acceptable to the
slaveholders.
Edward Coles

(former secretary t o . .
James Madison), 18 56

When Edward Coles wrote the above passage he emphasized
the fugitive slave question, probably because the Fugitive
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 408-20; Lynd, "Com
promise of 1787," pp. 225-250.
^^Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," p. 228.
This quotation
was originally in Edward Coles, History of the Ordinance of
1787 (Philadelphia, 1856), pp. 28-29. A similar theory is
in Peter Force, Life, Journals, and Correspondence of Rev.
Manasseh Cutler, L.L.D. (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1888), II, Appen
dix D, p. 419.
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Slave Act was one of the burning issues of the 1850s.
fundamental importance of Coles'

The

statement, however, is his

assertion, by way of James Madison,

that "conferences and

intercommunications" took place between the Confederation
Congress and the Constitutional Convention over the nature
of the Northwest Ordinance and the Federal Constitution.
This idea has been fully researched by Professor Staughton
Lynd, who hypothesizes that there was a connection in the
drafting of the Ordinance and the Constitution.^^

In order

to ease the sectional tensions which had stymied both docu
ments, a compromise was reached whereby the South received
the "three-fifths" rule in the Constitution and liberal
statehood provisions in the Northwest Ordinance, as well
as tacit recognition of slavery below the Ohio River in the
latter.

The Northeast received a guarantee of a minimum of

three states in the Ohio territory, and prohibition of

Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 225, 245:
"This essay
takes issue with Professor Max Farrand's belief that the
three-fifths compromise was of secondary importance in the
proceedings of the Convention, and that the question of the
West was separate from the sectional conflict between North
and South. . . . One is therefore led to inquire whether
consultation between Congress and Convention preceded the
drafting of the Northwest Ordinance on July 9-11; whether
the nature of the Ordinance was such as to ease the sectional
tensions then troubling the convention; and whether the essen
tial features of the Ordinance were reported to members of
the Convention in time to influence its voting on July 12-14.
Since the answer to all of these questions is probably yes,
I think one can justifiably present the hypothesis that there
occurred in 1787 a sectional compromise involving Congress
and Convention, Ordinance and Constitution, essentially simi
lar to those of 1820 and 1850."
See also Henderson, Party
Politics, pp. 408-420.
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slavery (and therefore the ’’three-fifths” clause) north of
the Ohio River.

Lynd observes that on July 10 the Constitu

tional Convention was in a severe sectional deadlock over
the issues of slavery and proportional representation, just
as the Confederation Congress was in a deadlock over the
statehood provisions of the Northwest Ordinance.

But on

July 12 the Constitutional Convention passed the ’’threefifths compromise,” and the following day the Confederation
Congress unanimously passed the Northwest Ordinance, outlaw
ing slavery in the Ohio country.

Is this a coincidence?

William Grayson wrote James Monroe that the slavery article
in the Northwest Ordinance was agreed to by the South for
the purpose of preventing tobacco and indigo production in
Ohio, ”as well as for sev'l other political reasons.”

What

were the ’’political reasons” to which Grayson alludes?

To

find out, we must turn to the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention and the Confederation Congress and explore the
intricate relationship between these two bodies in the Summer
of 1787.46
The Northeast-South factionalism over the West in the
Confederation Congress was also present in the Constitutional
46bynd, ’’Compromise of 1787,” pp. 225-238, 249.
Grayson
to Monroe, August 8, 1787, in Burnett, Letters of the Conti
nental Congress, VIII:651-32.
Henderson. Party Politics,
pi 413 : ’’Only by perceiving the Northwest Ordinance in the
context of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention
can one properly understand its passage, and only by viewing
the debates of the Convention as an extension of Congressional
factionalism can one understand why the convention had such a
vital influence on the Ordinance.”
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Convention.

Recent scholarship indicates that the Virginians

and the Southerners wielded much more power at the Convention
than previously believed.
James Madison,

It was Virginian Nationalists like

Edward Carrington, and Arthur Lee who took

the initiative in 1787, and most effectively advocated the
Nationalist program in Philadelphia.

But unlike Eastern N a 

tionalism Virginia's Nationalism had a sectional bias that
was inextricably linked to slavery and the West.

Virginia's

Nationalism took the form of the "Virginia Plan" of May 29,
which called for proportional representation in both houses
of Congress and a slave census for purposes of taxation and
representation.

The Virginians advocated proportional repre

sentation, the heart of the Nationalist program, not only
because of their republican political tenets, but because
of their vast Kentucky holdings and visions of a number of
Southern-dominated states in the western frontier.

The

Southerners foresaw a day when they would dominate the p oli
tics of the new nation.

But Southern ascendency depended

upon proportional representation (with a slave census), and
speedy incorporation of Western states into the Union.

Thus

the issue of proportional representation was closely bound
to the issue of the West.

Without new Western states, this

Southern "geo-political" strategy was nullified.
Constitutional Convention,

And the

like the Congress, was split over

the West.^^
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 414-418
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In June and July of 1787 the Constitutional Convention
hotly debated the questions of slavery census, proportional
representation,

and the West.

Although historians have

traditionally viewed the Convention division as one of "small
states" vs.

"large states," the events of June and July evi

dence another pattern:

Northeast vs. South.

As James

Madison wrote,
the States were divided into different i n 
terests not by their difference in size, but
by other circumstances; the most material of
which resulted partly from climate, but
principally from the effects of their having
or not having s l a v e s . 48
Gouverneur Morris, Elbridge Gerry and Rufus King led the
Eastern faction in the fight.
proportional representation,

Nationalist Morris opposed
especially in the West, because

he felt it would insure eventual Southern and Western domi
nance:
He thought the rule of representation ought
to be so fixed as to secure to the Atlantic
States a prevalence in National Councils.
The new States will know less of the public
interest than these. . . . Provision ought
therefore to be made to prevent the maritime
States from being hereafter outvoted by them.
He thought this might be easily done by
irrevocably fixing the number of representa
tives the Atlantic States should respectively
have, and the numbers which each new State
will have . . . [the West] would not be able
to furnish men equally enlightened to share
in the administration of our common interests.
The busy haunts of men, not the remote w i l 
derness, was the proper school of political
talents.
If the Western people get power

48 Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 239, 242.
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into their hands, they will ruin the
Atlantic interests. . . .49
The Southerners disagreed.

After hearing Morris' July 5

speech, James Madison retorted, "To reconcile the gentl^ with
himself,

it must be imagined he determined human character by

the points of the compass."

In a reply to Morris, George

Mason of Virginia admitted.
According to the present population of
America, the Northern part of it has a
right to preponderate; and I cannot deny
it.
But unless there shall be inserted
in the Constitution some principle which
will do justice to the Southern States
hereafter, when they shall have threefourths of the people in America within
their limits, I can neither vote for the
system here nor support it in my state.
_ The Western States as they arise must be
treated as equals, or they will speedily
re volt.50
Several days later Elbridge Gerry again took up the Eastern
attack regarding new western states.

He was for "admitting

them on liberal terms, but not for putting ourselves into
their hands."

Gerry feared the Westerners would "oppress

commerce and drain our wealth into the Western country.

To

guard agSt these consequences," he thought it necessary, "to
limit the number of new States to be admitted into the Union,
in such a manner, that

they should never be able tooutnumber

theAtlantic states."

Gerry's motion to this effect,

seconded

40

Ibid., p. 242; Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 416-17;
Koch, ed., Madison, Notes on the Debates, p. 271.
^^Koch, e d . , Madison, Notes on the Debates, p. 271;
Bancroft, Formation of the Constitution, pp. 262-63.
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by Rufus King of Massachusetts, was defeated.

Yet there

were still no grounds for compromise.
The Constitutional Convention debated over the West
in late June and early July of 1787.

On July 2 the Conven

tion held a short recess to search for a compromise.

At

this same time the North Carolineans and Georgians left the
Convention and traveled to New York City to join the Virgin
ians in Congress.

It seems likely they did so in order to

finish the Northwest Ordinance--the Southerners wanted some
assurance that new western states would be equitably incor
porated into the Union.

Early July is also the time when

the "conferences and intercommunications" to which Edward
Coles alludes probably took place.

Besides Coles'

statement,

there is circumstantial evidence to support this hypothesis.
Many of the representatives serving in the Confederation
Congress in 1787 were also members of the Constitutional
Convention.

The Convention adjourned for three days on

July 2 because of the deadlock.

When the Confederation Con

gress reached a quorum on July 4, Gorham, King, Johnson,
Blount, Few, Pierce, Hawkins, and Madison were among those
seated, and all of them had just arrived from Philadelphia
with news of the Convention.

In addition, Hamilton, Cutler,

Richard Henry Lee, and Gouveneur Morris arrived from

Koch, e d . , Madison, Notes on the Debates, pp. 288-89;
see also ibid., pp. 245, 266-67 , 552; Bancroft, Formation of
the Constitution, p. 263; Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 41617.
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Philadelphia between July 3 and 5.

If Congress thus knew

the affairs of the Convention, the opposite was also true.
On July 10, after perusing the Northwest Ordinance and m a k 
ing several amendments. Rev. Manasseh Cutler "thought this
the most favorable opportunity to go on to Philadelphia."
Cutler arrived there in the midst of the slave census d e 
bate, one day before the crucial vote of July 12.

Gouverneur

Morris had adjourned the Constitutional Convention July 11
on a note of despair; the division over slave representation
seemed irresolvable.

That night Cutler consulted with the

Virginia and Massachusetts delegates at the Indian Queen
Tavern and probably told them about the slavery provision
in the Northwest Ordinance.

The next morning, July 12,

Gouverneur Morris announced a new plan to "bridge" the sec
tional conflict.

The "three-fifths" compromise passed on

July 12, and the Northwest Ordinance, with its slavery
article, passed in Congress the following day, July 13,

1787.52
If one accepts L yn d ’s hypothesis, what then were the
motives which led Southerners and Easterners to support the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787?

The Southerners, who controlled

Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 416-17; Lynd, "Com
promise of 1787," pp. 227-28; Barrett, Evolution of the
Ordinance of 1787. p. 70. Another person who may have helped
implement the Compromise of 178 7 was Alexander Hamilton of
New York.
On July 12 Hamilton arrived in Philadelphia from
New York for a short, unofficial visit with his friend.
Gouverneur Morris.
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Congress in July of 1787,

thought the Northwest Ordinance

would provide a guarantee of future Southern political power
through rapid admission of new western states and application
of the "three-fifths" rule to the region southwest of the
Ohio.

To be sure, there would be only three to five new

states in the Northwest, but the prospect of immediate allies
(via the new lower population requirements for statehood)
was very tempting to Southern Congressmen.

The Virginia

delegates wrote Governor Randolph,
Indeed, if it is thought Material to the in
terest of the Southern States that their
Scale be Strengthened by an accession from
this quarter, that object will be better
secured by the New, than the old plan
[Ordinance of 1784], because upon the
former there may be an early admission of a
state, but upon the latter such an event
must be long, or forever p o s t p o n e d . 54
In addition to allies in the Northwest, Southerners looked
forward to a block of slaveholding states in the Southwest
territory.

The July 13 version of the Ordinance applied

only to the Ohio country.

SS

Since it outlawed slavery in

S3

Four of the eight states present were Southern, the
temporary president was William Grayson of Virginia, and
three of the five committee members who drafted the Northwest
Ordinance in its final stages were Southerners (Lee, Carring
ton, and Kean).
See Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 225-26.
^^Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 225-26, 229-30, 237;
Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, p. 39; Virginia Dele
gates to Governor Randolph, November 3, 1787, in Burnett,
Letters of the Continental Congress. VIII:672-73.
See also,
Carrington to Jefferson, October 23, 1787, in ibid., p. 660.
^^See footnote #41.
The Southwest Ordinance of 1789 was
identical to its predecessor except the slavery provision was
deleted.

254

just the Northwest, the Ordinance of 1787 was interpreted
by nearly everyone as a tacit endorsement of slavery in the
Southwest territory.

Insomuch as the new Constitution stated

that the "three-fifths" rule would apply to "the several
states which may be included within this union," Southerners
were naturally quite pleased.

Reading this clause in con

junction with the liberalized statehood admission procedures
of the Northwest Ordinance,

the South thought, with good

reason, that it was the victor in both questions of slave
representation and in equal representation for western
states.

Indeed, Grayson later commented that the Northwest

Ordinance "passed in a lucky moment," leaving Massachusetts
"extremely uneasy about it."

And Nathan Dane wrote King in

mid-August that "the Eastern states

. . . gave up as much

as could reasonably be expected.
But both sides gain something in a compromise, and the
Compromise of 1787 was no exception.

The Northeast may have

made concessions regarding statehood requirements, the fugitive
slave clause, "three-fifths" rule, and slavery in the South
west, but it had good reasons for supporting the Northwest
Ordinance.

Most important, the Easterners succeeded in bar

ring the institution of slavery (and the three-fifths rule)

Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 231-32, 244, 246-47;
Dane to King, August 12, 1787, in Burnett, Letters of the
Continental Congress, VIII:636.
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from the Ohio country.

Moreover, there was a possibility

of only three new states emerging from the Northwest, and
the territory now had an autocratic territorial government
to delay the statehood process as long as possible.

Some

Easterners were not entirely pessimistic about their politi
cal prospects in the West.

Dane considered the 60,000 popu

lation requirement "too small, but, having divided the whole
Territory into three States, this number appears to me to be
less important."

Thus Dane assumed that only three new

states would evolve.

Even if they all supported the South,

Northeasterners would retain control of the Senate.

And

some Northeasterners entertained notions of political allies
in the West.

Dane reasoned.

The Eastern State of the three will probably
be the first and more important of the rest,
and will no doubt be settled chiefly by
Eastern people; and there is, I think, full
an equal chance of its adopting Eastern
politics.^7
The announced intention of the Ohio Company of New England
to colonize the Old Northwest lent credence to Dane's suppo
sition.

Many conservatives believed the Ohio Company would

introduce into the Old Northwest "a description of men who
will fix the character and politics throughout the territory,
and which will probably endure to the latest period of time."
The Ohio Company's presence, in combination with a strong

Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 246-47; Dane to King,
August 12, 1787, in King, Correspondence of Rufus K i n g , 1:289
90.
The emphasis is my own.
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handed territorial government, could restrain if not nullify
any Southern political muscle in the Northwest territory.
Indeed, the first five territorial officials in the Ohio
country were all Eastern Nationalists, and three were members
of the Ohio Company.

Could the appointment of territorial

officials have also been part of the Compromise of 1787?
No evidence exists to confirm such an idea.

But it is

clear that Northeast as well as South had justification for
supporting the Northwest Ordinance and the Compromise of

1787.58
The ambiguities of the Compromise of 1787 are apparent.
The South thought five states would be created in the North
west, the Northeast predicted three.

Southerners thought

the region would solidly support the South, but the Easterners
hoped at least one state would adopt "Eastern politics."
The South hoped for immediate admission of new states, while
the Northeast intended to delay the process as long as p o s 
sible.
ent

The Northeast and South each had their own differ

and contradictory

rationales for supporting the Ordi

nance of 1787, but since only time would tell what political
course the Old Northwest would follow, both sections could
support an Ordinance that would lead to settlement and
eventual statehood.

In place of a West vaguely attractive

or dangerous, the Northwest Ordinance made available a West
CO
Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, p. 46; Carring
ton to Jefferson, in Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, VIII:164.
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described by Staughton Lynd as "just sufficiently specific
that each section could read in it the fulfillment of its
political dreams.
The great irony of the whole affair is that the Confed
eration notions of the future American political balance
were exactly backwards.

The South thought its power would

lay in all of the West and in the House of Representatives.
In fact, its strength lay in just the Southwest and in the
Senate.

By struggling for proportional representation and

admission of western states, the South not only created its
future political o p p o n e n t s , b u t

at the same time approved

one of the landmark documents of American Negro freedom!
It is unfair, though, to expect the men of the 1780s to have
been prophets.

If the Southerners were mistaken,

their colleagues from the Northeast.

so too were

No one knew what would

happen in the West, so they compromised and hoped for the
best.
The Compromise of 1787 led to the drafting of the Fed
eral Constitution and passage of the Ordinance of 1787, two
of the most important of all American state papers.

Both

^^Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 230, 247-50; Eblen,
First and Second U. S. Empires, p. 39.
^^To be sure, all of the early national West backed
the Jeffersonians and Jacksonians and was therefore allied
with the South.
But during the sectional crises of the
1840-60 period, the Northwest allied with the Northern Whigs
and eventually the GOP.
Who was that man from the Illinois
territory, anyway?
^^Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," p. 249.
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these documents are truly products of their time, and by
viewing them one can view the political dialog of the late
1780s.

The intricate relationship between the Ordinance

and the Constitution added to the "covenanted" quality the
Virginia cession had given the former.

There was no provi

sion whatsoever for admission of new states in the Federal
Constitution aside from the statement, "New states may be
admitted into the Union."

Without the Northwest Ordinance

there was no basis for expansion and creation of the American
Western Empire.

This is why Bancroft said the Ordinance of

1787 stood second in importance only to the Constitution
itself.

The relationship between the Northwest Ordinance

and the Constitution, and the circumstances under which the
Northwest Ordinance passed, gave that document a quasi
constitutional quality and the character of truly fundamental
legislation.

To summarize, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was not
written by any one person.

It had distinct British colonial

origins, and evolved in a series of stages in the Confedera
tion Congress during the 1780s.

In its final form, the

Ordinance of 1787 bore the stamp of many men, but three stand
out:

Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe of Virginia and

Nathan Dane of Massachusetts.

The drafting of the document

^^Henderson, Party Politics, p. 418
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was begun in the Southern faction and ended up among the
Eastern Nationalists.

At the same time, the colonial system

of the British was transformed into a highly democratic form
by Jefferson, but then came back to an unrepresentative form
of government controlled by an autocratic territorial gover
nor.

The western territories were to pass through three

stages of development that distinctly paralleled the evolu
tion in the British colonial system, but as Monroe observed,
there was one ’’remarkable and important difference.”

After

the territories reached a specified population, ’’they shall
be admitted into the Confederacy.”^^
The debate over whether the Northwest Ordinance was
democratic, or ’should’ have been democratic rages on.

The

neo-Progressives point to the imposition of a governor and
judges, absence of elections, absolute veto of the governor.

Burnett, Continental Congress, p. 685; Eblen, First
and Second U. S. Empires, p. 18; Berkhofer, "Origins of the
U. S. Territorial System,” p. 261; Pease, "Ordinance of
1787,” p. 168; Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires: 42,
44-45: "The American colonies passed through three stages
that roughly but distinctly parallel the three stages of
the Ordinance of 1787.
During the seventeenth century
the colonies passed through a stage of strong executive con
trol that can be equated with the first stage of the Ordi
nance.
The first two-thirds of the eighteenth century was
a period of executive eclipse and the real emergence of a
strong representative government authorized in the Ordi
n a nc e’s second stage . . . after 1763 the colonies moved
into a period of rebellion that led to independence.
The
Ordinance sought to avoid rebellion by providing for quasi
independence through statehood as the third stage.” Eblen
notes that one reason for the arbitrary nature of the Ordi
nance was the considerable French and alien population resid
ing in the territories.
Monroe to Jefferson, May 11, 1786,
in Hamilton, Writings of James Monroe, 1:126-27.
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and high property qualifications for suffrage and officeholding.

They conclude that "Jefferson's Ordinance

. . . was

abolished in 1787 by the land speculators and their supportes
who wanted Congressional control of the West so that their
interests could be protected from the actions of the inhabi
tants."

The revisionists counter that, in a nation's history,

brief periods of colonialism are inconsequential.

The impor

tance of the Northwest Ordinance, they say, is that it even
tually led to statehood and full rights of citizenship.

In

the interim it administered the affairs of the frontier in
an organized and efficient manner.

"Thus the 1787 document

should be considered more an extension and replacement than
a repudiation of the Ordinance of 1784,"^'^
The revisionists Eblen and Berkhofer are probably cor
rect in their assertion that the Northwest Ordinance was a
"viable system of colonial government."
and efficient,

if only on paper.

It was very orderly

The Eastern Nationalists

were very good at this sort of thing.

The creation of the

national bureaucracy and administrative systems under Hamil
ton and the Federalists during the 17 90s is the classic

Jensen, New N ation, p. 354; Pease, "Ordinance of
1787," p. 169; Barnhart. Valiev of Democracy, pp. 133-34:
"If the Ordinance of 1787 is compared with the Virginia
Bill of Rights of 1776, it is obvious that protection to
only a limited number of rights were assured to the settlers
of the Northwest Territory."
Boyd, Papers of Jefferson,
pp. 17, 164; Berkhofer, "Origins of the U. S. Territorial
System," p. 261; Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires,
pp. 44, 47.
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example of their organizational abilities--and the Northwest
Ordinance fits well into this Nationalist bureaucratic tradi
tion.

Yet Jensen, Philbrick, Boyd, and Barnhart are correct

in saying that the Northwest Ordinance provided for an u n 
democratic, authoritarian regime in the West.
"good" or "bad"?

Was this

Some would say it does not really matter,

since most Westerners negated the arbitrary nature of the
Ordinance of 1787 by simply ignoring it.^^

The purpose

here has been to place the Northwest Ordinance in the p o 
litical context of the 1780s.

And the fact that Congress,

in 1787, reinstituted in the W-est a colonial system similar
to that against which the thirteen original states had them
selves revolted in 1776 seems a good indication of just how
the political ideology of the American Revolution had evolved
Initially, Westerners protested loudly over the auto
cratic nature of their territorial government.
Governor
Arthur St. Clair, for example, was constantly at odds with
the settlers of the Northwest territory, who claimed he
was "cloathed with all the powers of a British nabob."
St.
Clair opposed statehood for Ohio until 1802 when he was
dismissed from office by President Thomas Jefferson.
But
this sort of violent opposition diminished as Westerners
learned that the territorial governments were strong only
on paper.
Jack Eblen states that the final result "was a
quick repetition of the slow loss of the pre-Revolutionary
royal governor's powers, even though the territorial gov
ernor's office was stronger in law." The West was too
big to rule with an iron hand, and Westerners were not
ideally obedient subjects.
Most Westerners just ignored
the territorial governments.
Moreover, the genius of the
Northwest Ordinance was that its undemocratic features were
only temporary.
Federal
supervision lasted just long enough
to help the territorial settlers through the difficult early
years.
Then their territories were able to take an equal
place among the United States of America.
See Eblen, First
and Second U. S. Empires, pp. 47-50.
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in thirteen years.
Political ideas and attitudes changed greatly during
the 1780s.

Edward Carrington talked of this evolution in

June of 1787 when he wrote Jefferson about the proceedings
of the Constitutional Convention:
The ideas here suggested are far removed
from those which prevailed when you [were]
amongst us, and as they have arisen with
the most able, from an actual view of events,
it is probable you may not be prepared to
expect them.
They are however the most
moderate of any which obtain in any general
form amongst reflective and intelligent
Men.
Times had changed.

Radical notions of decentralized author

ity and local control were no longer in vogue.

The new

ideology "amongst reflective and intelligent Men" called for
a strong national authority and a centralized federal govern
ment.

Nationalism had prevailed, and a study of Confedera

tion western policy provides an excellent means for viewing
the rise of the centralist impulse.

The change in attitudes

towards the West reflects an overall change in the political
ideology of many Revolutionaries.
But the West was far more than just a mirror of the
rise of Nationalism.

Indeed, the West and the western ques

tion was a direct catalyst for adoption of the Nationalist
program in 1787-88.

Without the western question, the South

may never have supported the Federal Constitution.

7

It was

GGcarrington to Jefferson, June 9, 1787, in Boyd, Papers
of Jefferson, pp. 11, 410.
The thesis that the West was a catalyst for Southern
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largely because of their political aspirations in the West
that Virginia and the South endorsed the heart of the N a 
tionalist program--proportional representation.

And it was

to insure admission of new western states into the Union
that the South compromised and accepted Eastern Nationalist
proposals for three to five states in the Old Northwest.
Southern advocacy of a colonial territorial governmental
Ordinance was quite natural for a section that had adopted
Nationalist notions of centralized authority.
changed.

Times had

If Carrington could seriously say to Jefferson,

’’the negative which the King of England had upon our Laws
was never found to be materially inconvenient," then he
could certainly endorse the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.
And it was the Northwest Ordinance that led to adoption of
the Nationalist program in the Federal Constitution of that
year.
Nationalism is part of the "geo-political" interpretation of
Virginia politics by Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 415-18:
The "Southern delegates in the Convention overwhelmingly took
a "large-state" position on the issue of proportional repre
sentation in both houses. . . . That Virginia led the "nation
alist" force in the Convention--a force composed of four South
ern States out of five and just two Northern states out of six
present (8 in all) was due not only to her supremacy in popula
tion among the thirteen states, but also to her vast Kentucky
holdings and her involvement in the settlement of the Northwest.
That "small" states such as Georgia and North Carolina should
have joined Virginia on the very foundation of the nationalist
plan, proportional representation, also testifies to the ubi q
uitous influence of Southern geo-political strategy for the
West in Convention proceedings. . . . The Virginia-Pennsylvania
bloc epitomized in the two persons of Madison and James Wilson
(who disagreed with Morris regarding the West) can be understood
as a triumphant core region manifestation of the Virginia Congres
sional policy of the past year.
Indeed the Pennsylvania alli
ance was crucial to disarm to destructive sectional dichotomy
which had obtained during the Jay-Gardoqui affair."

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION:

THE RELUCTANT EXPANSIONISTS

The state of society has an influence
not less than climate.
Our back country
people are as much savage as the Chero
kee.
I believe . . . that were it not
for the commercial cities on the sea
coast even the use of a plough would far
to the westward be forgotten.
David Ramsay, 178 5
It was always my fear that our Western
Territory, instead of proving a fund for
paying our national debt, would be a
source of mischief and increasing expense,
but the expense is not the worst part of
it.
It has given such a spring to the
spirit of emigration, too high before,
that though it is pregnant with the most
serious consequences to the Atlantic
States, it can not now be held back.
Arthur St. Clair to,
John Jay, 17 88
The great accomplishment of the Confederation Congress
was the creation of the first American western policy.

From

1783 to 1787 Congress mapped an overall strategy for westward
development.

Congress first established federal control of

the National Domain in 1784, and drafted the revenue-oriented
Land Act of 1785 to provide money for the national government

David Ramsay to Thomas Jefferson, 1787, in Boyd, Papers
of Jefferson. IX:441; St. Clair to Jay, December 13, 1788,
in Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 11:101-105.
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Indian affairs culminated in the Ordinance of 1786, and the
Dane committee reports of 1787, and during that same time
John Jay negotiated with Don Diego de Gardoqui to try and
settle the diplomatic problems in the Southwest.

Finally,

in July of 1787 the Confederation Congress instituted a
strong territorial government in the West under the North
west Ordinance of 1787.

All of the various aspects of the

western policy fit together in a consistent and coordinated
plan, because most of the men who drafted the legislation
subscribed to similar notions about the West, and agreed as
to what would be the wisest policy for that region.

The

creation of the first American western policy was largely
the work of the Eastern Nationalist faction in the Confedera
tion Congress.

Although Southerners had some input, it was

mainly the Eastern Nationalists who legislated for a slow,
orderly westward advance, closely supervised by the federal
government.

By examining the political, economic, and social

bases of Eastern attitudes towards the West, one can better
understand why they acted as they did.
Political motivations have been discussed at length in
these essays and need only to be reviewed at this time.

If

power is the ultimate goal of any political movement, then
political motivations played a major role in Eastern Nation
alist western policy.

Conservatives had always seen the

frontier element as a threat to their political fortunes.
Colonial legislatures often gerrymandered districts so as to
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insure coastal dominance, and after the Revolution Easterners
fought efforts to move state capitols to the West.

In the

Confederation Congress the Eastern Nationalists pursued a
similar strategy because they feared that voters in the
West would not be receptive to their brand of political c o n 
servatism.

They were right, of course.

Westerners were

opposed to the centralist tenets of the Eastern Nationalist
political doctrine.

This became obvious during the struggle

over ratification of the Constitution.

In most of the state

conventions, the "up-country agricultural regions" and
Westerners voted almost solidly against ratification.

The

Westerners were not sympathetic to the Constitution or N a 
tionalism, and were particularly repelled by the Northeast's
conservative brand of Nationalism.

After the Constitution

passed, Westerners quickly moved into the Jeffersonian camp.
Thus Northeasterners had sound political reasons for acting
2
as they did during the Confederation period.
Economic rationales for Northeastern attitudes towards
2

Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the
Frontier in American History," in Ray Billington, e d . , The
Frontier Thesis: Valid Interpretation of American History
(New York, 1966), p. 17; Jensen, New Nation, p. 327.
See
also, John C. Miller, The Federalist Era. 1789-1801 (New
York, 1960), p. 125.
For western opposition to the Consti
tution, see Main, The Anti-Federalists, p. 280;
Turner,
"Frontier in American History," p. 209; Homer Hockett,
"Federalism and the West," in Essays in American History
Dedicated to Frederick Jackson Turner (New York, 1910),
pp. 116.
For the Northern-Western alliance of the 18301860 period, see the Epilogue, below.
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the West have also been treated in the preceding essays.
The Eastern Nationalists were greatly concerned lest w est
ward expansion result in a reversal of their economic
supremacy.

Most predicted expansion would cause a drain

of labor supply and consumers, with a resulting drop in
prices and increase in wages.

The East was still almost

entirely devoted to commerce; manufactures had not yet b e 
come the overriding economic factor.

Not until the large-

scale development of factories and manufacturing in the
nineteenth century did Northeasterners come to see the West
as a valuable source of raw materials and a ready market
for Eastern products.

In the 1780s the West, and the M i s 

sissippi River commerce in particular, seemed threatening
and potentially dangerous.

At the same time Eastern land

speculators were in a delicate position.

Some had invested

in lands in the original thirteen states

(such as in Western

Pennsylvania and up-state New York) and opposed all expansion
for fear it would lower their land prices.

Yet others like

Pickering, and the Ohio associates had invested in the lands
bordering the Ohio River.

They wanted expansion, but very

carefully controlled expansion onto speculator-owned lands.
If the floodgates were opened, their lands would greatly
depreciate (and this is eventually what happened--none made
the fortunes they had anticipated).
an economic threat to the Northeast.

Thus the West seemed
The trans-Appalachian

frontier, populated by fugitive debtors and paper money
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advocates, posed a threat to fiscally conservative New Eng
land, and to the commercial interests and speculators who
formed its economic base.

Social attitudes and class conflict are important
ingredients in the conservative view of the West.

As Francis

Philbrick and others have shown, there existed from colonial
times "misapprehensions concerning border communities, which
were the basis of strong social prejudices against them.
One constant source of irritation was religion.

The Eastern

Nationalists had a strong puritan strain, and in the eigh
teenth and early nineteenth centuries were nearly all Congregationalists, Episcopalians, and Presbyterians.

It is no

marvel that these pious New Englanders frowned on a segment
of the population attracted to the Methodists and Baptists,
or to no religion at all.

At the same time, the Northeast

was solidly opposed to slavery, and embraced humanitarian
notions regarding the American Indian.

The implication of

a South-West alliance as it affected the 'peculiar institu
tion' was certainly a bone in the Northeasterners*

throats.

Moreover, the Westerners' propensity for trespassing on
Indian lands, and the resulting violence and warfare were
Philbrick, Laws of the Illinois Territory. XXXVrcccxxiii
Many historians have written of anti-western sentiments among
the upper classes.
Perhaps the best known are Turner,
Merrill
Jensen, John D. Barnhart, Henry Tatter, Payson J.
Treat, Julian P. Boyd, and Merrill D. Peterson.
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denounced constantly as barbarous and cruel by outraged
Northeasterners.

All of these factors combined with long

standing class prejudices to instill a great contempt among
Easterners for those "lawless Banditti", "squatters, insol
vent emigrants, and demagogues," and "white savages" who
4
populated the trans-Appalachian West.
Class prejudices against Westerners are evident in the
correspondence and public papers of the period.

The upper

classes in both sections were offended by the rude settlers
of the frontier.

These attitudes are particularly evident

among New Englanders,

largely because of their isolation from

the trans-Appalachian West.

The Northeasterners were appalled

at the manners and conduct of the border settlers.

People

who "looked rude in their manners and dress" gave most East
erners "an unfavorable opinion of the country."

They assumed

that anyone anxious to leave the security and comforts of the
seaboard must be the scum of society,
poverty, the
tempt,

"Under the pressure of

[jail], and the consciousness of public con

[they] leave their native places, and betake them

selves to the wilderness," observed Timothy Dwight.

Benjamin

Rush agreed:
The first settler in the woods is gen
erally a man who has outlived his credit
or fortune in the cultivated parts of the
state . . . as he lives in the neighborhood
For religious factors, see Philbrick, Rise of the W e s t ,
p. 319; Marshall Smelser, The Democratic Republic. 1801-1815
(New York, 1968), p. 76; and Manning J. Dauer, The Adams
Federalists (Baltimore, 1953), pp. 26-27.
Anti-slavery is
discussed in Chapters 3 and 7.
For Eastern attitudes towards
the Indian, see Chapter 4, above.
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of Indians, he soon acquires a strong tinc
ture of their manners.
His exertions, while
they continue, are violent, but they are
succeeded by long intervals of rest.
His
pleasures consist chiefly in fishing and
hunting . . . . Above all he revolts against
the operation of laws.
He cannot bear to
surrender up a single natural right for all
the benefits of government.
This comparison of the settlers to Indians, and assertion of
their laziness is found in nearly all Eastern Nationalist and
Federalist comments about the pioneers.

Jay called them "white

savages;" David Ramsay said they were "as much savage as the
Cherokees;" Samuel Holden Parsons referred to them as "our
own white Indians;" and Pickering wrote King, "They are little
less savage than the Indians; and when posessed of the most
fertile spots, for want of Industry, live miserably."^
These sorts of attitudes made Easterners very concerned
about Confederation western policy.

Nathan Dane wrote Timothy

Dwight, "our frontier inhabitants from New Hampshire to
Georgia . . . will give us much trouble in a few years if we
do not treat and govern them with much prudence and good
policy."

But what was that "good policy" to be?

the most prudent course?
constrictionists.

What was

Some Eastern Nationalists were avowed

They were against all expansion.

Men like

Rufus King were "opposed to encouragement of western emigrants,"
and Paine Wingate of Massachusetts doubted "whether, in our day,
Philbrick, Laws of the Illinois Territory. XXV:cccxxxiii,
cccxxxiv; Berkhofer, "American Territorial System;" David
Ramsay to Jefferson, 1787, in Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, X:441;
Pickering to King, June 4, 1785, in King, Correspondence of
Rufus K i n g . 1:106.
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that country will not be a damage to us rather than advan
tage."

Wingate believed it would have "been as well for the

Indians to have kept their own territory."^
were in the minority.

But these men

Most Northeasterners were expansion

ists- -but reluctant expansionists, to be sure.

Their aim

was to control westward expansion through a strong national
government.

This is why Nationalism and the centralist im

pulse are so important to an understanding of Confederation
western policy.

Western policy was one of the major avenues

for increasing the power of the central government during the
1780s.

Through land policy,

Indian affairs, diplomacy and

territorial governments, the Eastern Nationalists of the Con
federation era moved towards a centralized state.

But they

could not achieve their goal without the help of the South.
The South, and particularly Virginia, is of key impor
tance in understanding the adoption of an Eastern Nationalist
western policy.
sures?

Why did the South support the Eastern m e a 

The answer is twofold, and can be found largely in

the realm of politics.

First, the Southerners

(especially

the Virginians) were vitally interested in western develop
ment.

According to Henderson, their entire "geo-political

strategy" of the 1780s was aimed at securing the economic

Philbrick, Laws of the Illinois Territory. XXVrcclvi;
Rufus King to Jonathan Jackson, September 3, 1786, in Burnett,
Letters of the Continental Congress. VIII:458; Paine Wingate
to Samuel Lane, June 2, 1788, in Burnett, Letters of the Con
tinental Congress. VIII:746.
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and political benefits that would come with expansion and
7
new western states.
Southern desire for new states led
them to compromise with Northeasterners over the West.

They

accepted many notions about that region that were essentially
"Eastern Nationalist" because they believed that any expan
sion was better than none.

Since the Northeast had an 8 to 5

majority in Congress, the Southerners’ hopes all lay in the
future.

The second political consideration can be found in

a shift in political philosophy.

Nationalism and the cen

tralist impulse were in the ascendency during the middle and
late 1780s.

The Nationalist faction, which had originally

been a Northeastern phenomenon (Morris, Hamilton, Jay, King,
Pickering, Livingston, etc.), began to gather a large Southern
following.

Indeed, by 1787 Virginia, not New England, was

the leader of the centralist movement, with Washington and
Madison as prominent Nationalist spokesmen.

Attitudes towards

the West changed with the evolution in political philosophy.
This tempering of the Southern position became evident during
the land policy debate of 1785, when the South accepted a
modified "New England" land system.

When the Jay-Gardoqui

controversy threatened an impasse, both sides again searched
for a compromise.

The interrelationship between the North

west Ordinance and the Federal Constitution, as manifested
in the Compromise of 1787, was no accident.

7
Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 370-71.

Western policy
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was inextricably tied to the Nationalist movement.

As the

Southerners, especially Virginians, adopted Nationalism, so
too did they adopt Eastern Nationalist western policy.

The

rise of centralism was accompanied by adoption of centralist
notions concerning the West.
If one gives any credence to the frontier hypothesis of
Frederick Jackson Turner,

the split over Western policy can

be viewed in a much broader context.

The American Revolution

was declared in 1776 and based upon highly radical conceptions
of the individuals* natural right to freedom and sovereignty.
Yet even before the Declaration of Independence was signed,
Americans were arguing among themselves as to just how far
those ideals of natural rights should be carried.

Disagree

ments emerged as liberals who favored maximum individual
sovereignty, a weak central government, and local control, were
pitted against conservatives who valued order and stability
and a strong national government.

The western question was a

perfect focal point for this struggle, if only in the idealis
tic sense.

As Turner has shown, the frontier came to symbolize

the forces of individualism, liberty, and sovereignty in the
minds of many Americans.

The radicals' version of the Revolu

tionary experience coincided with an idealistic view of the
frontier experience, because Revolutionary ideals of freedom
and liberty could be sought in an environment that offered
few governmental restraints on the individual.

Yet as Turner

also noted, and as the conservatives of the 1780s constantly
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pointed out, the frontier encouraged some undesirable aspects
of complete freedom.

A person did not become automatically

rational the minute he crossed the Ohio, and lawlessness and
rashness were just as much a part of the frontier experience
as sovereignty and independence.

Indeed, an American's

attitude toward the West and Westerners was a direct result
of his conception of the Revolutionary experience and the
limits to which ideals of freedom and sovereignty should be
extended.

The radicals and libertarians tended to ignore the

less savory characteristics of Westerners,

and idealized the

importance of their settlement beyond the Appalachians.

Con

servatives were wary of the West, and sought to harness the
troublesome Westerners through a strong national government.
The Nationalist impulse, the desire to control and regulate
the affairs of individuals,
western policy of the 1780s.

found logical expression in the
The Nationalist victory in the

Constitutional Convention in 1787 was complemented by adoption
of the Northwest Ordinance that same year.
The irrelevancy of Nationalist

western policy to the

realities of the frontier soon became obvious.

No proof need

be submitted other than the fact that, with the exception of
prior rectangular survey of lands, every aspect of the Eastern
Nationalist policy was either greatly altered or abandoned
by the federal government of early national America.

Congress

repudiated the sale of public lands for revenue purposes as
early as 1804; a humanitarian Indian policy was out of the
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question by the time of Jackson's presidency; Thomas Pinckney
secured American navigation of the Mississippi in 1795; and,
as Jack Eblen has shown, the Northwest Ordinance was simply
ignored by those settlers who were supposedly under its con
trol.

The Nationalist western policy may have been typical

of the political climate from which it evolved, but as Ameri
cans moved West during the Great Migration of the early
1800s, it became increasingly anachronistic.

By 1840 the

opening of the trans-Mississippi frontier made the Eastern
Nationalist western policy a dead letter.
The uniqueness of Eastern Nationalist plans for western
development is apparent to anyone who visits Marietta, in
southeastern Ohio.

Marietta was the first legal settlement

in the Ohio Valley, completely planned and developed by the
Ohio Company of Massachusetts.

Even today. Marietta's citi

zens boast that they live in the "only planned community in
America."

They exaggerate, of course.

Throughout the Ohio

Valley there are many planned communities like Marietta.
They have spacious, ordered streets, and a town square sur
rounded by public buildings.

The Ohio Company and the North

easterners built many such towns--replicas of the New England
and Eastern villages from whence they migrated.

But as one

moves farther west or south, these towns are few and far
between.

Beyond the Mississippi they simply do not exist.

The Eastern Nationalists had a vision for the American advance
westward.

They looked forward to a slow, corporate settlement.
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and a transplanting of New England society in the great A meri
can West.

They anticipated thousands of communities like

Marietta dotting the Mississippi Valley.

The Eastern Nation

alists believed that if the central government was strong
enough,

they could mold and shape society as they pleased.

As it turned out, they were mistaken.

Eastern domination of

the West did not come until the economic and cultural pene
trations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries combined
with political centralism to cause the fusion of two differ
ing societies.

EPILOGUE
THE FEDERALIST PARTY AND THE WEST
1789-1803^
Now by adding an unmeasured world beyond
that river [the Mississippi] we rush like
a comet into infinite space.
In our wild
career we may jostle some other world out
of its orbit, but we shall, in every event,
quench the light of our own.
Fisher A m e s ’ opinion of thog
Louisiana Purchase, 1803
After a new Federal government was instituted under the
Constitution, most Eastern Nationalists of the Confederation
era formed the nucleus of the Federalist party of early n a 
tional America.^

Thus the Eastern Nationalist attitudes

Most of this essay is drawn from Michael Allen, "The Fed
eralist Party and the West, 1783-1803," A Senior Honors Thesis
submitted to the Department of History of Central Washington
State College, March 8, 1974.
The only other treatment of the
subject is Homer C. Hockett, "Federalism and the West," in
Essays in American History Dedicated to Frederick Jackson Tur
ner (New York, 1910), pp. 113-135.
See ibid., p. 115:
"To the
extent to which [the Federalist party] was the party of aristo
cratic tradition and the representative of the commercial
against the agricultural interest it was a party of inherent
antagonism to the interests and ideals of the West."

2

Seth Ames, e d . , The Life
1854), pp. 323-24.
“

and Works

of Fisher Ames (Boston,

^Henderson, Party Politics, p. 420: ", . . party develop
ment in the 1790s began as a remarkable continuation of the
factionalism in the Continental Congress.
The Southern and
Eastern nucleii of the Republican and Federalist parties as
well as the division in the Middle States were replications of
the structure of Confederation politics."
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towards the West can be seen in the western policy of the
Federalists of the 1790s and early 1800s.
land policy,

In Indian affairs,

territorial government and admission of new

western states, the Federalists tried in vain to slow down
the westward advance.

Some tried to stop it altogether.

A

study of Federalist attitudes towards the West from 1789-1803
involves also a study of the decline of the Federal party.
Nothing so nearly represented the spirit of the new republic
as its restless westward settlers.

And nothing so nearly

represented the spirit of the Federalist party as its efforts
to stop those settlers.

By studying Federalist attitudes

toward the West one may gain a better understanding of the
Federalist-Jeffersonian dichotomy and a clearer perception
of America in 1800.

Only in this way can one understand the

importance of the revolution that was taking place.
The trans-Appalachian frontier played an important role
during the Federalist administrations of George Washington
and John Adams.

Events such as the Whiskey Rebellion, the

struggle with Great Britain over the Northwest posts,
Pinckney's Treaty (securing navigation of the Mississippi
River), and the Kentucky Resolutions serve to accent the
importance of the West during the Federalist era.

Since

nearly four-fifths of Washington's budget was spent on mea
sures directly or indirectly related to the frontier, Feder
alist leaders soon formulated a consistent policy for that
region.

Alexander Hamilton saw the West mainly as a source
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of revenue to fund the national debt and support his fiscal
program, and most Federalists shared similar views.

They

distrusted and feared the migrants to the frontier regions
and, consequently, Americans west of the Appalachians came
to resent their government.

The frontier settlers demanded

a more equitable land policy,

free navigation of the Missis

sippi, British evacuation of the Northwest posts, admission
of western states, and protection from the Indians.

The

Federalist administrations of George Washington and John
Adams often ignored or only partially answered these de
mands .^
As in the Confederation era, the Federalists of the
1790s demonstrated an unusual concern and sympathy for the
plight of the American Indian.

Federalists comprised a

large percentage of the small group of early national poli
ticians who made genuine efforts to acknowledge the property
rights and sovereignty of the Indian.
were twofold.

Their motivations

First, the educational and social backgrounds

of most conservatives made them more receptive to the ideas
of humanitarianism.^

Second, Federalists saw the American

Indian as an effective barrier to westward migration.

Al

though acting on strong moral belief, they saw a liberal
Leonard White, The Federalists: A Study in Administra
tive History (New York, 1948), pp. 161-383; Philbrick, Rise
of the W e s t , p. 354; Treat, National Land System, pp. 70-73;
Syrett, Works of Alexander Hamilton. VI:421, 502; Miller,
Federalist E r a , p. 161,
^See Chapter 4 above.
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Indian policy as an effective means of keeping settlers out
of much of the trans-Appalachian frontier.

President Wash

ington and Secretary of War Knox were early proponents of
an equitable Indian policy.

"The Indians," Henry Knox

stated, "have constantly had their jealousies and hatreds
excited by attempts to obtain their lands.

I hope in God

that all such designs are suspended for a long period."^
A Congressional committee composed of six Federalists de
nounced the Frontier Protection Act of 1792, recommending
that.
Instead of being ambitious to extend our
boundary, it would be wise to check the
roving disposition of the frontier set
tlers and prevent them from too suddenly
extending themselves to the Western
waters.
If kept closer together . . .
they would not so frequently involve us in
Indian wars; but permitted to rove at
pleasure, they will keep the nation em
broiled in perpetual warfare. . . .
The Frontier Protection Act passed the Senate with nineteen
members voting no; thirteen were Federalists.^
Despite the efforts of Hamilton, Knox, Pickering, W a s h 
ington, and others to establish good relations, Indian wars
were the inevitable result of white encroachment on Indian
^Prucha, Indian Policy, p. 41.
7

Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United
States (Annals of Congress), 2nd Congress, January 26, 1792,
p. 338.
Federalist members of the committee were Goodlue,
Wayne, Boudinot, Livermore, Steele, Parker, and Bourne.
In
the vote over protection from Indians, as in all other Con
gressional votes, I have determined the Federalists by using
David Hackett Fischer, Revolution of American Conservatism,
Appendix II.
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lands.

After the Ohio Valley tribes defeated General

Harmar and territorial governor Arthur St. Clair, the Ameri
can government was put in the awkward position of having to
defend trespassers on Indian lands.

Colonel Timothy Picker

ing opposed aiding the frontiersmen and explained in a letter
to Rufus King how he would control the lawless trespassers
of the frontier:
If such savage emigrants encroach on the
Indian Territory or commit any outrages,
nothing short of a military force will be
able to bring them to justice . . . to p r e 
vent [Indian wars] resulting from such
emigrations I could wish the Indians might
be expressly authorized by treaty, to break
up every settlement within their territory.&
In Congress, Federalist Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts
expressed a somewhat more philosophical opinion on the sub
ject:
Were they (the opponents of Indian land
rights) to say to the savages in their own
land, you have no right to any land? . . .
wherever the natives of a country had p o s 
session, there they had a right and not
because they did not dress like us, were
not equally religeous, or did not under
stand the arts of civilized life were they
to be deprived of their posessions. . . .
Their rights or their posessions were as
sacred as civilized life.®
Unfortunately for the Indians, the political pressure of the
Westerners proved greater than Federalist sympathy for the
O

Pickering to King, in King, Correspondence of Rufus
King, 1:106.
9
Annals of Congress,

4t h Congress, A p r il 1796, p. 900.
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Indians’ plight.

Anthony Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers

preceded the eventual removal of most Indian tribes to the
region west of the Mississippi, the humanitarian Federalists
notwithstanding.

Andrew Jackson soon demonstrated the Repub

lican solution to the Indian problem.
Debates over the statehood applications of Kentucky and
Tennessee would seemingly provide an excellent arena in
which to view Federalist western policy.
tucky, however, is clouded.

The issue of Ken

Most Federalists probably agreed

with Fisher Ames' view of the Kentuckians as "the infuriate .
wild men of the mountains."

But Kentucky applied for admis

sion simultaneously with Vermont

(1791), and this dual appli

cation appears to have facilitated a North-South, FederalistRepublican compromise.

Alexander Hamilton wrote.

One of the first subjects of deliberation
with the new congress will be the Indepen
dence of Kentucky, for which the Southern
states will be anxious.
The North will be
glad to send a counterpoise in Vermont.
These mutual interests and inclinations
will facilitate a proper result.
The Federalists apparently thought Vermont would balance the
political influence of Kentucky, leaving the Federalist
domination in Congress unchallenged.^®

Statehood for Tennessee was an entirely different matter,

A m e s , Life and Works of Fisher A m e s . 1:317; Syrett,
Works of Alexander Hamilton. V:186.
Federalist hopes of p o 
litical support from Vermont were soon dispelled as a ruralurban split occurred in that state.
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Since there were no new Eastern states to balance potentially
Republican Tennessee, the Federal party opposed admission
solidly.

They knew that a shift in the balance of power

would occur should this new western state be admitted into
the Union.

Statehood for Tennessee was, Chauncey Goodrich

wrote Oliver Wolcott, "but one twig of the electioneering
cabal of Mr. Jefferson."

Yet most of the Federalists* argu

ments against admission did not sound so partisan.

They

attacked both the census and proposed constitution of Ten
nessee, insisting they did not comply with the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787.

Congressman Theodore Sedgwick thought

Tennessee's new constitution had been drawn up too hastily,
and Rufus King chaired a senate committee that voted to deny
admission until a more accurate census could be taken.

Eleven

of the fifteen senators who voted to postpone admission b e 
longed to the Federalist party.
the Federalists lost.

In the final vote, however,

Northern Republicans

(led by William

Findley and Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania) allied with
southern Republicans and southern Federalists having large
frontier constituencies

(such as Robert Goodloe Harper and

William Smith of South Carolina), and the House of Represen
tatives voted 48 to 30 in favor of admission.
negative votes were cast by Federalists.

All thirty

As the Federalists

had feared, one of Tennessee's first acts as a new state was
to cast its electoral votes for Thomas Jefferson in 1796.^^
llfor Tennessee statehood, see Abernethy, From Frontier
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The Federalists seemed oblivious to political reality,
however, as they wrote and adopted the constrdctionist Land
Act of 1796.

This legislation followed General Anthony

Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers, which opened up a brand
new area north of the Ohio to western settlement.

Battle

lines were drawn quickly over the proposed Ordinance.

The

Federalists were determined to retain the speculator-oriented
provisions of the Land Ordinance of 1785 in this new bill,
while Republican and frontier elements prepared to fight for
a law favoring the yeoman farmer.

Once again the Northeastern

vs. Southern and Western political split was apparent in the
United States Congress.

12

The frontier faction in the House

again allied under Gallatin and Findley.

Republican strength

in the House typified the changing political scene and made
for a more heated debate over the land bill.

Gallatin's lib

eral amendment calling for a residency requirement for p u r 
chasers was defeated, but enjoyed considerable support.
Republican Congressman Baldwin charged that "Speculation and
making money [are] rarely found in more raging extremes and
to Plantation in Tennessee, p. 138; Annals of Congress. 4th
Congress, May 1796, pp. 9Y, 1308, 1312, 1322, 1474; Hockett,
"Federalism and the West," p. 118; Joseph W. Cox, Champion
of Southern Federalism. Robert Goodloe Harper of South Caro
lina (Port Washington, N. Y., 1972), p. 55; Dauer, The Adams
Federalists♦ Congressional voting appendix.
See also,
Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee, p. 143.
Abernethy suggests that Tennessee might have cast its elec
toral votes for Adams in 1796 had the Federalist party not
opposed statehood.
^^Treat, National Land System, pp. 78-80, 89.

285

persons we have supposed worthy of our confidence

[are]

publicly practising the meanest and most disgraceful arts
of tricks of swindling."

William Findley of western Penn

sylvania was one of the most persuasive proponents of an
agrarian land act.

He summed up the Republican argument in

March of 1796:
Some members thought to obtain money was the
grand object . . . [I do] not. . . . Had
gentlemen considered what they were about?
Whether they were merchants only to get
money?
Surely not; they had men and the
happiness of men in their view. . . . The
comparison betwixt a merchant selling goods
and the government selling land would not
hold.
It is a sort of transaction which
should always be kept in the hands of government and not in those of speculators. . .
The Federalists completely rejected this view.

They b e 

lieved in Hamilton's system of using land revenues to fund
the federal government.

Moreover, many of the Federalists

were speculating heavily in western lands.

Congressman

William Cooper had amassed a fortune from his land investments
in up-state New York.

He maintained "the true cause of land

selling was the competition of moneyed men," and argued that
poor men would not buy land even if it was offered to them.
In opposing Republican efforts to reduce the size of minimum
purchases. Cooper remarked that Congress should not put itself
into the business of laying out "garden spots" for yeoman
13

Annals of Congress. 4th Congress, February-March 1796,
pp. 330, 404, 414; Treat, National Land System, pp. 82-83.
Findley and Gallatin emerged as spokesmen for the West during
the Whiskey Rebellion of the early 1790s.
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farmers!

Some of his colleagues were nearly as outspoken.

One Federalist did not believe ’’there were as many families
ready to go and settle upon these lands as has been assumed,”
and he opposed "removing the inhabitants of the Atlantic
states into these back settlements."

Federalist Congressman

Kittera spoke the sentiments of many anti-expansionists in
March of 1796:

"This kind of bounty as to encourage emigra

tion is not good policy.

There is still plenty of good land

in the east to be disposed of."^^
Southern and Western strength in the House resulted in
the passage of a fairly liberal land law, but a Senate c o m 
mittee composed of Federalists Ross, King, Marshall, and
Strong amended all of the liberal features out of the Land
Act of 1796.

The result was a bill even more unfavorable

to the West than the Ordinance of 1785.
acre minimum purchase at $2.00 per acre.

It required a 640Even the credit

provision, added as a feeble compromise, required a farmer
to produce $1,280.00 in cash during one year.

This bordered

on the absurd, yet it reflected the wishes of most Federal
ists .
Annals of Congress. 4th Congress, February-March,
pp. 344, 348, 352, 408, 416.
Congressman William Cooper
the father of novelist James Fenimore Cooper.
See Henry
Smith, Virgin Land. The American West as Symbol and Myth
York, 1950) , p. 67.

1796,
was
Nash
(New

^^Annals of Congress. 4th Congress, April, 1796, p. 6 8 ;
Cox, Robert Goodloe H a r p e r , p. 52; Treat, National Land Sys
tem . pp. 85, 92, 378.
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The election of John Adams as Washington's successor
meant a continuation of the Federalist western policies.
Although Adams came to represent what has been called the
"agrarian" element of his p a r t y , h e

nevertheless enter

tained many apprehensions concerning the trans-Appalachian
West, and believed "The country is explored and thinly
planted much too fast."

Federalists during the Adams admin

istration acted on several measures which reflected their
attitudes toward the frontier.

On January 25, 1799, the

House voted to exempt the Mississippi River from restric
tions on commercial intercourse.

Thirty-two of the thirty-

four congressmen who opposed this pro-western measure were
Federalists.

On April 24, 1800, a bill to grant Ohio terri

torial governor Arthur St. Clair the right to dissolve the
Ohio territorial legislature was defeated, 49 to 42.
of those who favored the motion were Federalists.

17

Forty
These

measures not only reflect Federalist animosity towards the
West, but also show a decline in the power of the Federal
party's constrictionist element.

Tennessee's admission in

1796 was an early indication of this development.

Another

important step was the Harrison Land Law of 1800, passed by
a coalition of Republicans and southern Federalists.

It

provided for a 320-acre minimum purchase at $2.00 per acre

^^See Dauer, The Adams Federalists, pp. 7, 18

17

I b i d . , Congressional v o t i n g appendix.
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with four years credit.

Although the Harrison act was not

as radical as Jefferson's Land Act of 1804

(160-acre minimum

at $1.64 per acre, but no credit), it was the most liberal
land law ever passed by Congress.

The conservatives still

had bargaining power in 1800, but it was on the decline.
After twenty years, the American yeoman was now able to
purchase good land in the West on credit from the federal
government.

Federalist efforts to slow westward migration

through a restrictive land policy had only worked temporarily.

18

They had postponed the inevitable for twenty

ye ars.
Payson Treat is correct in his observation that expan
sion from 1789-1800 occurred despite efforts of the federal
government.

The revenue-oriented programs of the Federal

party showed no consideration for the people of the transAppalachian frontier.

But settlers continued to migrate;

pioneers squatted on land they could not afford to buy, and
stole from the Indians the lands which were not for sale.
18

Smelser, The Democratic Republic, pp. 36, 134; Phil
brick, Rise of the W e s t , p. 295; Treat, National Land Sys
tem . pp. 101, 141.
Reviewing the four land ordinances dis
cussed in these essays one can see a definite evolution.
The Land Ordinance of 1785 provided for a 640-acre minimum
purchase at $l/acre and no credit.
The Land Act of 1796
also specified a 640-acre minimum purchase, but at $2/acre
and one year ciredit.
The Harrison Land Act of 18 00 provided
for a 320-acre minimum at $2/acre, but with four years credit
The 1804 law legislated for a 160-acre minimum purchase at
$1.64/acre (the price was higher if you wanted credit).
So
after twenty years purchasers.could buy land directly from
the government, saving the expense of dealing through land
speculators and investors.
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Federalist efforts to slow expansion through a liberal
Indian policy, slow admission of western states, and a r e 
strictive land policy proved ineffective.^^

Eventually,

the anachronistic nature of Federalist western policy b e 
came as apparent as the intent of the frontier settlers to
ignore that policy.

The unpopularity of Federalist western

policy was one of many factors that led to Jefferson's v i c 
tory over Adams in 1800.

But Thomas Jefferson's election

did not mean the Federalist anti-expansionists had sur
rendered;

it simply marked the beginning of the end.

The

phenomenal westward push during the "Great Migration" of
the 1800s greatly worried conservatives during Jefferson's
first administration.

The aborted Federalist attempts to

block admission of Ohio (1802) and the purchase of Louisiana
(1803) demonstrated that the Northeasterners were not willing
to change their views--even though their inflexibility meant
political oblivion.
Congress debated the Ohio statehood question during the
Spring of 1802.

By this time, the people of Ohio were

clamoring for statehood.

They had met the requirements of

the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and sent petitions to Con
gress asking for admission into the Union.

Federalist terri

torial governor Arthur St. Clair vigorously opposed this

^^Treat, National Land System, p. 377; White, The Federalists, p p . 366-386.
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statehood movement.

He and other Ohio Federalists believed

statehood would produce "nothing but misfortune."

The

Ohioans, according to St. Clair, were too poor and ignorant
"to employ their thoughts on abtruse questions of Government
and policy."

"Fixed political principles they have none,"

he declared.

"Their government would most probably be demo 

cratic in form and oligarchic in execution, and more trouble
some and more opposed to the measures of the United States
than even Kentucky."

St. Clair and his allies in Congress

used every political device available to prevent statehood,

20

but the Republican Congress voted to admit Ohio into the
Union in March of 1802.

Of the twenty-nine members of the

House who opposed admission, twenty-three were Federalists.
The six senators who opposed admitting Ohio into the Union
were all members of the Federal party.

21

The constrictionist Federalists waged their final great
20

In Congress, the Federalists produced petitions from
Ohioans who did not want statehood.
When this failed. Fed
eralists Griswold, Henderson, Goddard, and Bayard tried to
gerrymander the borders of the new state.
This would, accord
ing to St. Clair, divide the inhabitants "in such a manner as
to make the upper or Eastern division surely Federal, and form
a counterpoise . . . to those who are unfriendly to the G en
eral Government."
For Ohio statehood, see Horsman, Formative
Years. p. 89; Hockett, "Federalism and the West," pp. 123-24.
The debates over statehood for Ohio are in Annals of Congress.
7th Congress, March, 1802* pp. 296, 1104-5, 1120, 1123, 1161.
Prior to the Congressional vote. President Thomas Jefferson
dismissed St. Clair from the governorship of the territory.

21

Annals of Congress, 7th Congress, March 1802, p. 1161.
The six Federalist senators were Ogden, Foster, Howard, Morris,
Tracy, and Olcott.
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battle over the Louisiana Purchase.

Jefferson's proposed

purchase of the Louisiana territory from France was in every
sense an ideal issue for the Federalists, since it lay at
the very heart of the expansion question.

If the United

States purchased Louisiana, there could be no turning back;
the American republic would become an empire, and expansion
would play an increasingly important role in the American
experience.

Inevitably, the political party which had op

posed the West would suffer.

Fully realizing this, a small

band of Federalists in Congress prepared to fight the Pur
chase.

The Hartford Courant sounded the Federalist battle

cry:
Fifteen million dollars for bogs, mountains,
and Indians!
Fifteen million dollars for
uninhabited wasteland and refuge for crimi
nals!
And for what purposes? To enhance
the power of Virginia's politicians.
To
pour millions into the coffers of Napoleon
on the eve of war with E n g l a n d . 22
The constrictionist Federalists used several avenues of
attack.

Fisher Ames protested the expense of Louisiana and

deplored wasting the "many millions it costs."

Roger Griswold

doubted the validity of the French title to Louisiana, while
Senator Timothy Pickering warned of Spanish objections to the
purchase.

Most surprisingly, the Federalists employed a

'strict construction'

of the Constitution argument and termed

the Louisiana Purchase "unconstitutional."

23

But Federalist

22james Eugene Smith, One Hundred Years of Hartford's
Courant (New York, 1949), pi 82.
23Ames, Life and Works of Fisher Ames, pp. 323-24; King,
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arguments against the expense, constitutionality, and d i p 
lomatic consequences of purchasing Louisiana convinced no
one.

The House voted 90 to 25 in favor of the Louisiana

Purchase.

Nineteen of the twenty-five opponents belonged

to the Federal party.

In the Senate, the vote was 24 to 7,

with all seven nays coming from the Federalists.^^
Thus the United States admitted into its boundaries a
territory populated by what one conservative termed a
"Gallo-Hispano-Indian ominum gatherum of savages and adven
turers."

With finalization of the Purchase, Fisher Ames

wrote gloomily:
Now by adding an unmeasured world beyond that
river [the Mississippi] we rush like a comet
into infinite space.
In our wild career we
may jostle some other world out of its orbit,
but we shall, in every event, quench the
light of our o w n . 25
Such d o o m ’s day talk was no charade.

Most members of the

Federal party honestly believed that westward expansion would

Correspondence of Rufus K i n g . 1:360; Smelser, Democratic R e 
public . p. 98. The only Republican who had scruples over
the constitutionality of the purchase was Jefferson himself.
Thus both parties had performed a flip-flop as regards their
1790s view of the Constitution.
For Congressional debates
over Louisiana, see Annals of Congress. 8 th Congress, pp. 34,
44, 46, 73, 386, 432, 441, 445, 454, 472, 488.
^^Annals of Congress, 8 th Congress, October, 1783, p.
488; Smelser, Democratic Republic, p. 97.
Smelser notes
several prominent Federalists who did support the Louisiana
Purchase were Rufus King, John Adams, Alexander Hamilton,
and John Marshall.
^^Ames, Life and Works of Fisher Ames, 1:323-24.
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result in. disaster for the American people.

The Federalists

had many tangible economic and political reasons for their
constrictionist ideas, but at the heart of their view of the
West was their basic conservatism.

Linda Kerber has shown

that the constrictionist Federalists were suspicious and
wary on the unknown West.

They had no desire whatsoever to

venture into this "Land of Marvels."

Such preposterous n o 

tions could only be entertained by Jeffersonians and other
fools!26
The Federalists refused to embrace the West, and they
paid the political price.

After Kentucky and Tennessee

allied with the South to elect Jefferson in 1800, the Federal
party died a quick death.

Their strength steadily declined,

while the Republicans gained additional support in Kentucky,
Tennessee, and western Pennsylvania and up-state New York.
Admission of Ohio and the Louisiana Purchase promised to
further lighten New England's political power.

At the same

time, the Federalists suffered an intra-party sectional split.
According to Manning Dauer, the decline of Federalism was due
largely to the decline of the agrarian, and Southern elements
of the party.

These "Adams Federalists," or "Half-Federalists"

left the party after the Hamilton-Adams feud.

Thus the Hamil

ton Federalists changed their party from one with an Eastern
Linda J. Kerber, Federalists in Dissent: Imagery and
Ideology in Jeffersonian America (Ithaca, 1970).
Kerber
explores the Federalist psyche and makes some interesting
observations as to their conception of the West as a "Land
of Marvels."
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seaboard following to one with only a Northeastern seaboard
following.
licans.

The South and West turned solidly to the Repub

Some historians contend that the Federalists could

have successfully courted the western vote.

Robert Goodloe

Harper and other southern Federalists certainly did.

But

the arch-Federalists seemed bent on self-destruction.
withdrawal into New England insured it.

Their

27

The irony of the whole affair is that the Federalists'
political heirs, the Whigs and Republicans

(GOP) of the

1830-1860 period, came to be great political allies of the
West.

The hero of Tippecanoe and "Harry of the West"

were Whigs, not Jacksonian democrats.
pened during the intervening years.

28

Obviously, much h a p 
The Northeast was tem

pered by democracy while the industrial revolution shifted
that section's livelihood from commerce to manufacturing.
In the meantime the Old Northwest was settled by trans
planted Northeasterners.
27

These developments combined with

Smelser, Democratic Republic, p. 76; James M. Banner,
J r ., To the Hartford Convention; The Federalists and the
Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts. 1789-1815 (New
York, 1970), p. 113; Dauer, The Adams Federalists, pp. 7,
18. As Dauer notes, the "Half-Federalists" were hardly
frontiersmen.
They resided in the exporting agricultural
regions, not on self-sufficient homesteads.
Yet on many
western issues they sided with the W'esterners and Republi
cans.
A good biography of one of the Half-Federalists is
Cox, Robert Goodloe H a r pe r. Read the chapter entitled
"Robert Goodloe Harper and the West."
?8
William Henry Harrison of Ohio (Whig candidate for
president in 1840) and Henry Clay of Kentucky (Whig candi
date in 1832, 1836, and 1844).
And do not forget that trans
planted Kentuckian in Illinois who ran for president on the
Republican ticket in 1860.

295
completion of the Erie Canal

(1825) to create a new partner

ship between East and West, as the Westerners furnished raw
materials, foodstuffs, and a consumer market for Eastern
manufactures.

The old South-West alliance was superseded

by an East-West alliance that lasted through the Civil War
and much of the nineteenth century.

Industrial capitalism

thus forged a partnership between two sections the archFederalists thought to be inherently at odds with each
?Q
other.
But the Federalists of the 1790s and 1800s were no
prophets.

They feared and distrusted the West, and believed

westward expansion boded ill for the republic.

In Indian

policy, diplomacy, land legislation, and admission of new
states and territories they tried to discourage migration
to the trans-Appalachian West.

They tried, in vain, to

thwart the growth of a segment of the population whom they
considered to be a "wild, ungovernable race, little less
savage than their tawn neighbors.
course, disagreed.

Many Americans, of

A western legislator had earlier answered

similar charges in an emotional speech before the Confedera
tion Congress of 1783:
. . . with the utmost frankness, I admit
their personal appearance is not the most
fashionable and elegant kind; they are
^^Hockett, "Federalism and the West," pp. 134-35.
^^Quoted in Tatter, "Land Policy During the Confedera
tion," p. 182.
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not decorated in all the style, the gaiety,
and the taste of a dandy of the first
water.
Their means are too limited and
their discretion too great, I trust, for
the indulgence of such foppery and extravagence. , . . Sir, these are the very
constituents of whom the nation ought to
be proud.
They constitute the bone sinew
and strength of your government.31
Twenty years later, during the debate over Louisiana, a
young frontier Congressman named Andrew Jackson insisted "the
frontier people will listen to reason and respect the laws
of their country."

And in 1809, the pioneers of Shawneetown

(in southern Illinois) alluded to the misapprehensions about
Westerners shared by many Federalists in a letter to Matthew
Lyon:
We must beg leave to make mention with
diffidence lest a misconception be p r e 
possessed from misrepresentations, that
there are amongst our number both Moral
and Relidgeous as well as many enterpris
ing and industrious p e o p l e . 3 2
Despite these defenses, and after more than twenty
years of debate. Federalist attitudes towards the West r e 
mained virtually unchanged.

The party which had harnessed

the energy of the new republic was now unable to control it.
The conservatism which made the Federal party a sturdy base
on which to build a new culture, prevented it from changing
with that culture.
31

Although the West is only one window

Quoted in Karl F. Geiser, "New England and the Western
Reserve," Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley Historical
Association VI (1912-13):62.
32
Annals of Congress, 8 th Congress, September-October
1803, pi 455; Philbrick, Laws of the Illinois Territory,
XXV:cccxliv.
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through which one may view the growing obsolescence of the
Federalist party, it is one of the clearest.

The several

hundred thousand pioneers who had crossed the Appalachians
symbolized the energy and feeling that pulsed throughout
America in 1800.

Men and women who willingly risked their

lives in an untamed wilderness demonstrated the spirit of a
rising people.

Like the frontiersmen among them, Americans

in 1800 were searching for something indefinable, something
called national greatness.

They were in no mood to tolerate

a political party that frustrated their search.

In its

attitudes toward the West, as in so many other ways, the
Federal party had become an anachronism.
in the America of 1800--no place at all.

It had no place
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